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Abstract
This Article describes the relevant features of United Nationas Convention on the Law of the
Sea (”UNCLOS”), demonstrates how the Convention is ill-equipped to handle the complexity of
the South China Sea disputes, and explores the role of the private sector behind State actors in any
negotiated resolution of these disputes. This Article also surveys the development of these disputes
from the last decade to the present day, using as a case study the tension between China and Viet-
nam in the 1990s when UNCLOS went into force. Although the case study occurred in the past
decade, the pattern of behaviors observed may recur at any time, due to the Realpolitik dynamics
of the situation. Specifically, this Article argues that: (1) The South China Sea disputes will likely
be resolved, if at all, through ad hoc negotiation of bilateral or multilateral treaties influenced by
Realpolitik. In such a negotiation, as the proponent and/or implementer of “joint development”
among nations, the private sector will play a crucial role behind the frontal role of governmental
parties. The private sector could be caught between the competing nations, thereby forced to play
the role of an opportunist intermediary while managing political risks. (2) Meaningful treaty nego-
tiation requires equal bargaining powers among the negotiating nations–a utopian picture. Treaty
resolution will more likely tip toward the interest of the more militarily and economically powerful
State, to the detriment of weaker and smaller nations. The dominant State with the most sweeping
claim to the South China Sea is China. Propositions one and two above point to the following real-
ity: A major role in the structuring of a negotiated solution may belong to those companies receiv-
ing the support of China, i.e., those multinational enterprises that have the most incentive to please
China because of their substantial economic stake in China as a consumer or supplier market.
Accordingly, to counterbalance the military and economic dominance of China (and its alliance
of private companies behind the scene), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)
Member States should strategically join forces as one negotiating bloc. Such strategic alliance
must be predicated upon the successful building of consensus among the ASEAN claimants. If
successful, the multilateral treaty resolution of the South China Sea disputes may serve as an exam-
ple of, or a de facto predecessor for, the long-desired (yet so far unachievable) regional investment
and trade bloc for Asia. Ultimately, it is the powerful oil and gas multinationals–the implementers
of upstream technology in the wildcat chase for oil–that fashion and drive the determination of
sovereign boundaries, whether or not these economic entities sit at the negotiating table among
the Nation-States. As engineer, proponent, and implementer of joint development, these economic
enterprises help shape the resolution of the South China Sea disputes, and, hence, ultimately de-
termine the distribution of petroleum resources for the people of East and Southeast Asia. These
observations confirm the “monarch” and “monopoly” theories expounded in the Author’s previ-
ous writings: modern international petroleum transactions in the developing economies represent
the “confidential handshake” between governments–the modern monarchs–and the multinational
corporate rainmakers, to the exclusion of middle-class entrepreneurs and Third World inhabitants.
This Article hopefully will serve as another awakening bell.
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In 2005, the retail price of gasoline reached an unprece-
dented figure, calling into question alternative sources of energy
or new petroleum reservoirs in faraway places. One such place is
the beautiful, yet geologically complex South China Sea (the
"Sea").' The Sea has been a subject of intense territorial dis-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. The
author extends special thanks to her colleagues at the University of Denver Sturm Col-
lege of Law, especially Professors Rock Pring and Julie Nice, for their invaluable com-
ments on my work. The author also thanks her research assistants: Aaron Einhorn (for
the substantial research on the Pacific Rim, the United Nations ("U.N.") Convention on
the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), and Joint Development Authorities ("JDAs") needed
to build the argument below), Eleni Slaughter (for the selected corporate research that
went into this Article), and Anna Salas and Tonye Oki (for coordinating all research
and working diligently with footnote materials). The author's International Business
Transactions students-Karen May, Oluwaseyi Adeyemo, and Tonye Oki-added the
"international touch" to the research and cite-checking needed for this Article. Just as
this Article is rolling onto press, news sources have announced that the seemingly dor-
mant territorial dispute between Hanoi and Beijing over the Spratly Islands has come
alive (as the author has predicted), this time over the $2 billion gas project offshore
Vietnam led by British Petroleum in a consortium of international petroleum compa-
nies. Here, in this Article, the author suggests that the ASEAN nations (including Viet-
nam) ultimately join forces to reach power equilibrium against China in designing a
long-term, Realpolitik solution to territorial disputes in the region. See Andrew Symon,
China, Vietnam Spar Over Gas, ASIA TIMES, May 1, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
SoutheastAsia/IE01AeO1.html (last visited May 8, 2007)/.
1. The U.S. Department of Energy lists four potential petroleum reserves: the Cas-
pian Sea, the North Sea Region, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. As of 2003,
the estimates for the South China Sea, however, were relatively small compared to the
Persian Gulf (estimated 7 billion barrels of oil and 150.3 trillion cubit feet of gas for the
South China Sea, compared to 674 billion barrels of oil and 1,923 trillion cubic feet of
gas for the Persian Gulf). See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, South China
Sea Tables and Maps (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter South China Sea Tables and Maps],
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schinatab.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). As of
2001, production for the South China Sea was estimated at 2.2 million barrels of oil per
day, and 3.2 trillion cubic feet of gas per year, showing that the South China Sea has not
been fully exploited. See DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON & MARK J. VALENCIA, PACIFIC OCEAN
BOUNDARY PROBLEMS: STATUS AND SOLUTIONS 8 (1991); Chinese Bureaucrats Draw the Line
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putes among governments, and a challenging prospect for the
adventurous petroleum explorationist. Its geological complexity
can make exploration costs astronomical, and territorial disputes
can heighten political risks.
Stretching from the southern coast of China toward the
equator and joining together all countries of Southeast Asia with
its sapphire blue water, the South China Sea owes its interna-
tional name to its location-south of China. Yet, in Vietnam, it
is called "East Sea" (east of Vietnam, rather than "south of
China") .2 Other Southeast Asian countries call this Sea and the
various islands within it different names in their native lan-
guages. The variety of local names reflects the intense national
spirit attached to the area.
The South China Sea Territorial Disputes
After the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s, the Pacific
Rim was ready to re-emerge economically. But the tragedy of
September 11th and the two wars initiated by the United States
have steered international attention away from Asia-Pacific to
terrorism and the U.S. presence in the Middle East.' Before this
major switch of attention, in the 1980s and 1990s, territorial dis-
putes in the South China Sea bred intermittent military and po-
litical conflicts, occupying daily news broadcasts and routinely
featured in headlines of the regional media. Despite recent
peace-making progress, this Sea and its petroleum resources
continue to be the subject of overlapping territorial claims by
seven Asian governments: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines (the "South China Sea Dis-
putes" or the "Disputes").
in South China Sea, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, July 1995, at 16-17 (Chinese scientists have
estimated the area to contain about 105 billion barrels of oil, 25 billion cubic meters of
gas, and 300,000 tons of phosphorous).
2. This "East Sea" is distinguishable from the "East China Sea," which is the part of
the Pacific Ocean closer to Japan.
3. Asia plays a crucial role in the war against terrorism, with Afghanistan in the
heart of the international battle, and Islamic oil-producing Indonesia as the center of
the Muslim culture in Southeast Asia. See generally Matt Williams, Don't Neglect the Sprat-
lys, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 26, 2002. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN") Regional Forum's discussion of security for Asia Pacific stressed terrorism,
Kashmir, and Korea as areas of concern, naming Spratly Disputes only as token. Mr.
Williams concluded that "international attention has strayed from South China Sea"
disputes and advocated that the "South China Sea must be made a higher priority." See
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International petroleum companies and consortia have
long been exploring for petroleum resources in the area. In the
1990s, the opening up of Cambodia offshore extended frontier
exploration acreage all the way south to the Gulf of Thailand.
Many production projects have gone on unchallenged and unaf-
fected by the Disputes. For example, the Russians have ex-
tracted oil from the lucrative, yet structurally complicated White
Tiger field ("Bach Ho") off the coast of Vietnam.4 The Natuna
field in the southern part of the disputed area continues to be
part of the economic backbone of oil-producing Indonesia.5
Shell International has announced discoveries in the deep water
blocks off of the Palawan Island in the Philippines.6 Other ma-
jor discoveries have included British Petroleum's gas field in Vi-
etnam's Con Son Basin, estimated at approximately three trillion
cubic feet.7 Reportedly, UNOCAL has also discovered gas off
the coast of Vietnam and in land-locked Myanmar and Indone-
sia.8 The China National Offshore Oil Corporation and other
companies have also announced oil and gas discoveries in the
South China Sea.9
Increasing exploration activities, especially in deep-water ar-
eas, will refocus international attention on the South China Sea
4. See Sergei Blagov, Russians Tough it Out in Vietnam's Oilfield of Broken Dreams, AsIA
TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 3, 1999, http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/AL03AgO1.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2006).
5. See LOWELL FELD, INDONESIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF (Dep't of Energy, Energy
Info. Admin., 2004), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/indonesia.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2007); see also Wayne Arnold, High Oil Prices Challenge Indonesia's Economy, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 17, 2005, at 14.
6. See INTEC Engineering, Shell Malampaya Pipeline Project, http://www.
intecengineering.com/expertise/pipelines/resumes/02z-0046.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
7. See Press Release, British Petroleum, $1.3 Billion Nam Con Son Project Delivers
First Gas (Nov. 26, 2002), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&
contentd=2001403.
8. See Jeff Moore, UNOCAL's Stake in Southeast Asia, AsIA TIMES ONLINE, July 20,
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/southeast asia/GG20AeO3.html (last visited Nov.
10, 2006).
9. See Alan Boyd, South China Sea: It's Not All About Oil, AsIA TIMES ONLINE, Sept
06, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/E106Ad02.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2006); see also CNOOC Found New Oil in the South China Sea, AsIA TIMES ONLINE, June 03,
2004, www.atimes.com/atimes/china/FF03AdO.htmi (last visited Nov. 10, 2006); Husky
Says Makes Major Gas Find Off China, REUTERS, June 15, 2006, http://news.oneindia.in/
2006/06/15/husky-says-makes-major-gas-find-off-china-l150328032.htrnl (last visited
Nov. 10, 2006) (noting discovery of natural gas in South China Sea off Chinese coast
south of Hong Kong).
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Disputes, primarily because of the competing economic interests
at stake. In the past, whether nations stirred up the Disputes
(typically in a "chain reaction") often depended on the drilling
activities of the international petroleum companies doing busi-
ness in the region.10 The competing countries also asserted
their claims publicly to defend their sovereignty, at times refer-
encing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (the "Con-
vention" or "UNCLOS"). In fact, the political tension and press
coverage of the South China Disputes intensified in 1994, when
UNCLOS came into effect. But does UNCLOS apply, or does it
offer a legal solution for the Disputes?
Summary of Argument
This Article describes the relevant features of UNCLOS,
demonstrates how the Convention is ill-equipped to handle the
complexity of the South China Sea Disputes, and explores the
role of the private sector behind State actors in any negotiated
resolution of these Disputes. This Article also surveys the devel-
opment of these Disputes from the last decade to the present
day, using as a case study the tension between China and Viet-
nam in the 1990s when UNCLOS went into force. Although the
case study occurred in the past decade, the pattern of behaviors
observed may recur at any time, due to the Realpolitik dynamics
of the situation. Specifically, this Article argues that:
(1) The South China Sea Disputes will likely be resolved, if
at all, through ad hoc negotiation of bilateral or multilateral
treaties influenced by Realpolitik. In such a negotiation, as the
proponent and/or implementer of 'joint development" among
nations, the private sector will play a crucial role behind the
frontal role of governmental parties. The private sector could be
caught between the competing nations, thereby forced to play
the role of an opportunist intermediary while managing political
risks.
(2) Meaningful treaty negotiation requires equal bargaining
powers among the negotiating nations-a utopian picture.
Treaty resolution will more likely tip toward the interest of the
more militarily and economically powerful State, to the detri-
10. See, e.g., infra note 47 (discussing Vietnam's protest over Malaysia's grant of
explorations fights to BhP in an area that is contested by the two nations).
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ment of weaker and smaller nations. The dominant State with
the most sweeping claim to the South China Sea is China.
Propositions one and two above point to the following real-
ity: A major role in the structuring of a negotiated solution may
belong to those companies receiving the support of China, i.e.,
those multinational enterprises that have the most incentive to
please China because of their substantial economic stake in
China as a consumer or supplier market. Accordingly, to coun-
terbalance the military and economic dominance of China (and
its alliance of private companies behind the scene), the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") Member States
should strategically join forces as one negotiating bloc. Such
strategic alliance must be predicated upon the successful build-
ing of consensus among the ASEAN claimants. If successful, the
multilateral treaty resolution of the South China Sea Disputes
may serve as an example of, or a de facto predecessor for, the
long-desired (yet so far unachievable) regional investment and
trade bloc for Asia.
Ultimately, it is the powerful oil and gas multinationals-
the implementers of upstream technology in the wildcat chase
for oil-that fashion and drive the determination of sovereign
boundaries, whether or not these economic entities sit at the ne-
gotiating table among the Nation-States. As engineer, propo-
nent, and implementer of joint development, these economic
enterprises help shape the resolution of the South China Sea
Disputes, and, hence, ultimately determine the distribution of
petroleum resources for the people of East and Southeast Asia.
These observations confirm the "monarch" and "monopoly"
theories expounded in the Author's previous writings: Modern
international petroleum transactions in the developing econo-
mies represent the "confidential handshake" between govern-
ments-the modern monarchs-and the multinational corpo-
rate rainmakers, to the exclusion of middle-class entrepreneurs
and Third World inhabitants." This Article hopefully will serve
as another awakening bell.
11. See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs in the Search for Oil-Case One:
Unveiling and Re-examining the Patterns of "Third World" Economic Development in the Petro-
leum Sector, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1171 (2004); see also Wendy N. Duong, Partner-
ships with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources-Case Two: Dissecting an Indepen-
dent Power Project and Re-evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project Financing in the Inter-
national Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. hNT'L ECON. L. 69 (2005).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Area of Conflicts
Various conflicting territorial claims cover the entire South
China Sea.1 2 China's claims are the most extensive, running all
the way from the Chinese coasts to the coasts of Brunei, Malay-
sia, and Indonesia.',' Taiwan's claims are essentially co-extensive
with China's, because Taiwan has always maintained it is the le-
gitimate government of mainland China. The Disputes have un-
doubtedly contributed to political tension among these nations,
especially China and Vietnam.' 4 The competing sovereign
claims have centered around two main geographical points.1 5
12. See generally ROBERT CATLEY & MAKMUR KELIAT, SPRATLYS: THE DISPUTE IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA (1997) (describing historical development and research studies on
the South China Sea, including its strategic importance, and identifying five sensitive
areas of territorial conflicts).
13. The only island of any significance that falls outside Beijing's claims is Natuna,
occupied by Indonesia. Nonetheless, when China made sweeping claims to the South
China Sea, China reportedly drew territorial lines that encompassed certain parts of
Indonesia's Natuna gas field developed by Exxon, thereby agitating Indonesia. See
Manuela Saragosa, Beijing's South China Sea Ambitions Rattle Indonesia, FIN. TIMES, May
26, 1995 at 4.
Natuna's adjacent waters are claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia as
within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones. See GlobalSecurity.org, Territorial
Claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/war/spratly-claims.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
14. See Saragosa, supra note 13.
15. Southeast Asian scholars have focused on four principal territorial conflicts in
the South China Sea: 1) The Gulf of Thailand disputes, covering a zone of about 4,000
square nautical miles that is claimed by Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia; 2)
the Spratlys disputes, involving claims of seven competing governments; 3) the Gulf of
Tonkin disputes, involving claims by China and Vietnam; and 4) the Natuna disputes
involving claims by Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Sovereignty over the Natuna is-
lands themselves is not disputed; what is disputed is the area of the sea surrounding the
shelf delimitation line drawn from Natuna. See generally ALBERT CHANDLER & ELAINE
CHIEW, UNSETTLED MARITIME BOUNDARIES: THE GULF OF THAILAND AND SOUTH CHINA
SEA (Inst. for Int'l Research, Asia Pac. Oil and Gas Tax Issues 1993).
The Gulf of Thailand and The Gulf of Tonkin disputes have tentatively been re-
solved. See ERIK KREIL, SOUTH CHINA SEA REGION COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF (Dep't of
Energy, Energy Info. Admin., 2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2006). The Natuna disputes originate from the nations' claims to
the Spratlys. Id. at 1-2. Disputes over the Paracels and the Spratlys are still unresolved.
Id. at 3.
Other parts of the Pacific Ocean have also been disputed. SeeJi Guoxing, Maritime
Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas: Options for Equitable Settlement 8-14 (Inst. on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper No. 19, 1995), http://igcc.ucsd.edu/pdf/
policypapers/ppl9.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2007); see also Jonathan Charney, Central
East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 724 (describing or
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1. The Paracel Archipelago
The Paracel Archipelago is a group of approximately 120
small islands' 6 about 220 miles southeast of China's Hainan Is-
land."v Once claimed concurrently by Vietnam, Taiwan and
Beijing, the Paracels have been occupied by China since 1974,
when Chinese forces took over the islands from the U.S.-backed
South Vietnam. 8 The Disputes are fewer and less intense with
respect to the Paracels than with respect to the Spratlys (dis-
cussed below), primarily due to two factors. First, China has oc-
cupied the area for a long time (over Vietnam's continuous ob-
jections).1" Second, offshore exploration activities have been
less frequent near the Paracels. China's military takeover of the
Paracels in 1974 amply demonstrated its aggressive stand in the
Pacific vis-A-vis a passively observing Asia-Pacific community.
2. The Spratly Archipelago
The second point of conflict, and the more popular one, is
the Spratly Archipelago, named after a nineteenth century Brit-
ish whaling captain.20 This is a group of approximately 100 plus
islands, reefs, and shoals spread over approximately 7000 square
miles in the southern part of the South China Sea, a region of
"confused typography."2' The Spratlys were temporarily occu-
pied by Japan during the Second World War and were visited
referencing, inter alia, disputes in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of
Japan).
16. See Richard D. Fisher, Brewing Conflict in the South China Sea (Heritage Found.,
Asian Studies Backgrounder No. 17, 1984), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
AsiaandthePacific/upload/90517_l.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (asserting that the
Paracels contain 120 islands). Other secondary sources report that the Paracel group
consists of only twenty main islands and others are cays, reefs, and banks. See, e.g.,
Charney, supra note 15, at 732 n.50; Hungah Chiu & Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the
Paracel and Spratly Islands, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1 (1975).
17. (See Exhibit B appended to this Article).
18. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ("CIA"), THE WORLD FACT BOOK: THE
PARACEL ISLANDS, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pf.html (last
visited Nov. 11, 2006).
19. See South China Sea Tables and Maps, supra note 1. Despite China's continu-
ous occupation of the Paracels since 1974, to date, the Vietnamese Communist Party
has steadfastly asserted Vietnam's sovereignty over these islands, detailing historical evi-
dence dating back to the seventeenth century. See Vietnamese Communist Party, The
Islands and Seas of Vietnam (Bien Dao Viet Nam), http://www.cpv.org.vn/index-e.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2006); see also infra notes 206-207.
20. (See Exhibit C appended to this Article).
21. CHANDLER & CHIEW, supra note 16, at 21.
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occasionally by French and Chinese warships. During the post-
war period, however, many islands were unoccupied, except for
periodic visits by fishermen during the monsoon months of De-
cember and January.22
Specifically, the group is located between 4Q and 11L- , 30'
latitude and 1092, 30' and 117 °, 50' longitude along the wide
expanse of the South China Sea, spreading across the world's
busiest sea lanes.25 Part of the main group lies closest to the
Philippines, about 150 miles west of Palawan Island. According
to a Chinese source, the group spreads over 1,800 kilometers
from north to south, and over 900 kilometers from east to west.24
The group also contains numerous rocks that stand permanently
above sea level. 25 These rocks, on their own, may not be able to
sustain human habitation. Secondary sources and research pa-
pers often have reported conflicting figures as to the exact num-
ber of structures within the group. As described by commenta-
tors, "[t]here are so many Spratly islets, reefs, shoals, rocks, bays,
22. According to Prescott, Johnston, and Valencia, as of the past decade, the status
of occupation was as follows:
" China occupied four islands: Nan Xun Jiao (Gaven), Kennan, Yung Shu Jiao (Fiery
Cross), and Hua Yang Jiao.
" Indonesia principally claimed the waters surrounding and adjacent to Natuna.
" Malaysia occupied three islands: Terumbu Ubi, Terumbu Layang-Layang (Swallow
Reef), and Terumbu Ssemarang Barat Kecil (Louisa Reef). There are sources re-
porting that Malaysia actually occupied four islands.
" The Philippines occupied seven islands: Loaita (Kota), Thitu (Pagasa), Northeast
Cay (Parola), West York Island (Likas), Flat Island (Patag), Nanshan Island (Lawak),
and Lankiam Cay (Panata) on Loaita Bank.
" Vietnam occupied five islands: Spratly (Truong Sa), Southwest Cay (Song Tu Cay),
Sin Cowe (Sinh Ton), Namyit Island (Nam Yt), and Amboyna Cay (An Bang). The
Spratly Island (from which the group gets its collective name) lies the closest to
Vietnam.
See generally JOHNSTON & VALENCIA, supra note 1; PRESCOTr, infta note 25. As of October
2005, Professor Ji Guoxing provided a different tally: Vietnam allegedly has occupied
twenty-seven islands and reefs in the western and central parts of the archipelago; the
Philippines have occupied eight islands in the eastern part; Malaysia has occupied three
in the southern part; China has occupied seven; and Taiwan has occupied one in the
central part. See Guoxing, supra note 15, at 14-16.
23. See Christopher Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea:
Problems, Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation, 13 INr'LJ MAR. & COAST. L.
53, 56 (1998).
24. See U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm'n ("U.S.C.C."), The Worrisome Situa-
tion of the South China Sea-China Facing the Stepped-up Military Infiltration by the U.S.,
Japan, and India (USCC Research Paper) [hereinafter Worrisome Situation], http://www.
uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/southchinaseamilitary.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
25. See J.R.V. PRESCOTT, MARITIME JURISDICTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMMEN-
TARY AND A MAP 36 (1981).
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atolls, banks. Between and around them there is so much sea...
[that] . . . it is difficult to keep a sense of proportion, or to ban-
ish a sense of the absurd."26 Disputes over the Spratlys have
been so notorious that they tend to overshadow other disputes in
the South China Sea.
The competing nations 27 have made numerous claims to
the Spratly groups. China traces her claim to the Han Dynasty
(206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) and has continued to take over islands
and islets. In 1992, China occupied the eighth island in the
Spratlys group.28 In the words of a competing claimant, Chinese
expansionists view "the entire South China Sea as a Chinese
lake. ' 29 Taiwan "tags" her claims upon China's historical evi-
dence, contending that Taiwan alone represents the people of
China.
Vietnam claims she has acquired sovereignty over the is-
lands since ancient time, especially after she gained indepen-
dence from France-France integrated the Spratlys into French
Indochina in the 1920s." Vietnam is currently occupying the
Spratly Island, the largest island from which the Spradys group
obtains its collective name.
The Philippines's claim and Tomas Cloma's claim share the
same origin. Tomas Cloma, the owner of a Philippine fishing
vessel company and director of the Philippine Maritime Insti-
tute, explored the Spratlys with his brothers and their crews
sometime between 1947 and 1956 in their search for better fish-
ing grounds. Mr. Cloma claimed he had discovered and occu-
26. See id. at 30.
27. The competing nations are: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Bru-
nei, Taiwan and Indonesia. See Worrisome Situation, supra note 24.
28. See China 'Occupied Eighth Spratly Isle,' STRAITS TIMES, July 17, 1992.
29. See Eric Hyer, South China Sea Disputes: The Implications of China's Earlier Territo-
rial Settlements, 68 PAc. Aen. 34, 36 (Spring 1995); see also Statement of the Royal Sover-
eign Military & Hospitaller Order of St. John ofJerusalem (on file with author) (claim-
ing sovereignty over Spratlys as a result of Thomas Cloma's claims over the "Freedom-
land" in the Spratly group).
30. The Vietnam Courier published historical documents claiming sovereignty
over the Paracels and the Spratlys dating from French colonialism to 1983. See The
Paracel and Sprally Archipelago II, VIETNAM COURIER, 1985; see also Tong Luoc Tuyen Cao
14/2/1974 cua VNCH ve Hoang Sa [Summary of the Announcement Dated 14/2/1974
of the Republic of Vietnam Regarding the Paracels Islands], http://www.ykien.net/
tdbiengioi02.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006); Vuong HongAnh, Tong Luoc Tuyen Bo cua
Thu Tuong Tran Van Huu o Hoa Hoi 1951 [Summary of Announcement by [Vietnamese]
Prime Minister Tran Van Huu at the 1951 Peace Talk], http://www.ykien.net/tl_
biengioi0l.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
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pied fifty-three islands and reefs in the Spratlys and renamed
them the "Kalayaan" (Freedomland Island group) .31 In fact, he
declared a new sovereign nation called the "Free Territory of
Freedomland," under the theory of "discovery and occupa-
tion. '3 2 The Freedomland's Supreme Council later took asylum
in Manila and changed the name of the territory to "Kingdom of
Colonia." (Later, Cloma also added "St. John" to the name). Af-
ter 1974, the Supreme Council moved its exile government to
Lubuan, Sabah and has since continued to assert sovereignty
over the Spratlys in competition with the Philippines and other
countries.33
The Philippines, on the other hand, claims that Tomas
Cloma transferred sovereignty of the islands to the Philippines
in 1974 through a Deed of Accession and asserts sovereignty over
the Kalayaan group by virtue of Presidential Decree 1596. 34
Kalayaan was annexed into the Palawan province as a municipal-
ity in April, 1972.35 In 1978, Presidential Decree 1599 under-
scored the fact that Kalayaan is within the Philippines' Exclusive
Economic Zone.
Malaysia contends that approximately twelve structures
within the Spratly group are located on its Continental Shelf.3 7
This claim was first raised in 1979 based on the theories of "dis-
covery and occupation."3
Indonesia has not made a claim to any island within the
Spratly group. The majority of scholarly work on the Disputes
omits discussion of Indonesia. However, some sources contend
that part of the disputed Spratly waters extend into Indonesia's
"exploration agreement zone," established for international pe-
troleum exploration and exploitation, based on Indonesia's
31. See Guoxing, supra note 15, at 16; see also Marwyn S. Samuels, CONTEST FOR THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA 81-82 (1982).
32. For a brief discussion of various theories of customary international law sup-
porting sovereign claims, see Wendy Duong, The Long Saga of the Spratly Islands "Elon-
gated Sandbanks": Overview of the Territorial Disputes Among Vietnam, China, and Other
ASEAN Nations in the South China Sea, 6 TEx. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 47 (1997).
33. See Statement by the Royal Sovereign Military & Hospitaller Order of St. John
of Jerusalem (May 18, 1992) (on file with author).
34. See Joyner, supra note 23, at 62.
35. See Guoxing, supra note 15, at 16.
36. See id.
37. See Lian A. Mito, The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the
Spratly Islands, 13 AM. U. INr'L L. REv. 727, 744 (1998).
38. See id. at 743-44; see also Duong, supra note 32.
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ownership of Natuna.39
Brunei has claimed the Louisa Reef and the Rifleman Bank
as within its Continental Shelf,4 ° relying on a 1954 British decree
fixing Brunei's maritime boundaries.4 Brunei is the only coun-
try making a claim to part of the Spratly Islands without occupa-
tion of any islands.42 Brunei has also claimed a fisheries zone
touching upon the extreme southern sector of the disputed
area.
43
Periodically, the competing nations have engaged in mili-
tary outbursts and aggression to establish their presence on
these islands.44 Quite often the weaker nation took the defeat
and the stronger State got to "flex the muscles" establishing sov-
39. See Worrisome Situation, supra note 24; see also Saragosa supra note 13 (describ-
ing sovereign claims to Natuna Island).
40. See Mito, supra note 37, at 746. But seeJoyner, supra note 24, at 204 (asserting
that Brunei's only claim is to Louisa Reef); see also CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SPRATLY
ISLANDS, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pg.html#Geo (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2006) (asserting that Brunei has established a fishing zone that overlaps a
southern reef, but has not made any formal claim).
41. See Mito, supra note 37, at 746.
42. See Charles Liu, Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A Pragmatic Solution to
the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 Lov. L.A. INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 865, 873 (1996)
43. See South China Sea Tables and Maps, supra note 1.
44. Examples of Military Aggression in the 1980s: In 1983, Malaysia sent commandos
to occupy certain islands only about 40 miles away from Vietnamese fortifications. At
various times, Chinese ships allegedly harassed French exploration vessels, and the Chi-
nese naval squadron reportedly conducted exercises near Vietnam-held islands. Other
battles between Vietnam and China in the Spratlys occurred in 1988, whereupon the
Chinese navy reportedly sank Vietnamese ships and many lives were reportedly lost. In
the showdown, Vietnam lost two small warships and seventy men. See Vietnam Rejects
China's Survey for Oil Near Spratlys, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Sept. 5, 1998.
Examples of military aggression in the 1990s: In 1994, after Mobil Oil Corporation had
commenced exploration activities in the Blue Dragon block off the coast of Vietnam,
Chinese ships reportedly blocked a Vietnamese oil rig in the area of another conces-
sion, the Vanguard Bank, awarded by China to U.S.-based Crestone Corporation. See
infra, Part VII; see also Chinese Ships Block Viet Oil Rig in South China Sea, STRAITS TIMES,
July 19, 1994. Notwithstanding this military clash, the Vietnam Investment Review alleg-
edly reported a possible US$170 million loan from China to Vietnam to fund a steel
mill-an indication that relations between the two countries were normal in other as-
pects. See Vietnamese Leader Do Muoi Arrives in China, JAP. ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 26, 1995
(citing to VIETNAM INVESTMENT REPORT). Further details with respect to the Mobil Oil-
Crestone Corporation scenario are provided in Part VI below. See China Says Vietnam
Seized Spratly Reefs, Voices Strong Protest, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 8, 1998 (reporting
on China-Vietnam military clash over Spratlys in 1988, 1992, 1998; quoting military
strategists as predicting Spratlys to be one of the most dangerous potential flashpoints
in Southeast Asia); China Demands Vietnam Withdraw from Reefs in Spratlys, JANE'S INTELLI-
GENCE REv., Oct. 1, 1998 (reporting on military clashes between China, the Philippines,
and Vietnam); Intruding Chinese Trawlers Arrested, VIETNAM NEWS, July 6, 1994 (reporting
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ereignty by occupation.4" This was the ambiance of the 1970s,
1980s, and especially the 1990s, when UNCLOS went into force.
Specifically, the years of 1992 and 1993, which preceded UN-
CLOS' coming into effect in 1994, marked a period of increased
acts of aggression, political tension, and press coverage regard-
ing government-endorsed exploration activities, especially be-
tween China and Vietnam.4 6 For almost a decade, China and
Vietnam waged a war of words while their navies eyed each other
before a watchful regional community. 47
B. Signs of Progress and Recent Multilateral Agreements
A change in ambiance was noted after the Asian currency
crisis of the late 1990s and at the beginning of the new millen-
nium. In general, there has been a decline of military violence
committed by the competing nations. Military outbursts and ar-
rests of fishermen, although still occurring, 48 have been replaced
on Vietnam's arrest of Chinese intruders on Vietnam-controlled islands); Tensions
Mount Over Sovereign Claims on Spratlys Islands, STRAITS TIMES, July 23, 1992.
45. One such example is China's occupation of the Paracel Islands since 1974. See
Chietigh Bajpaee, The Price of Asian Conflict, ASIA TIMES, May 24, 2005, http://atimesOl.
atimes.com/atimes/Asian/Economy/GE24DkOI.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
46. See, e.g., Beijing: Spratlys Chinese Territoiy Since Ancient Times, STRAITS TIMES, July
10, 1992; China "Occupied Eighth Spratly Isle," supra note 28; Countries in Spratlys Row Have
Beefed up Troops: Hanoi, STRAITS TIMES, July 6, 1992; Dan Eaton, China and Southeast Asia
to Sign Spratlys Deal, REUTERS, Nov. 4, 2002 (reporting most recent progress on Spratlys
controversy and recognizing overt clashes between China and Vietnam in the 1990s);
Hanoi Expected to Seek ASEAN Support over Spratlys Issue, STRAITS TIMES, July 21, 1992;
Tensions Are Mounting in the Spratlys, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 21, 1992; BARRY WAIN,
China Puts the Squeeze on Vietnam, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1992.
47. See, e.g., Barry Wain, Beijing and Hanoi Play with Fire in S. China Sea, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., July 20, 1994, at 1. The notorious tension between China and Vietnam should
not overshadow similar conflicts among the ASEAN nations, although they might re-
ceive less press coverage. For example, in November 1991, Vietnam protested Malay-
sia's granting of exploration rights to BhP in an area of approximately 1000 square
kilometers contested by the two nations. See Greg Englefield, Conference Held on Island
and Maritime Disputes of South-East Asia, SEAPOL NEWSLETTER, Dec. 1993, at 2.
48. For example, throughout 2001 and 2002 there were many instances of Chinese
fishermen being arrested and detained (for up to six months in one instance) for illegal
fishing in Philippine waters. See Another 21 Chinese Fishermen Detained by Philippine Army,
Total Hits 118, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 9, 2002, http:/English.people.com.cn/200202/09/
eng2002020990229.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). In 2001, Vietnam reported that
200 fishermen and 17 fishing boats had been seized by "foreign boats" near the Spratly
Islands. See Boat Detentions Spark South China Sea Dispute, CNN ONLINE (July 21, 2001),
http: / /archives.cnn.com/ 2001/WORLD/ asiapcf/southeast/07/ 21 /vietnam.spratlys
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006). More common than military arrests, however, is a more
overt policy to use diplomacy. Taiwan, for example, discovered Chinese fishing vessels
in what it claimed to be its waters in 2005. Taiwan did not arrest the fishermen; rather,
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by more conscious diplomatic efforts.4 9 The continuing diplo-
matic approach has been evidenced by, and may be attributed
to, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South
China Sea signed by China and the ten ASEAN members in No-
vember 2002 (the "2002 Declaration" or "Declaration"). 50 The
Declaration expresses the signatories' good faith desire to secure
peace for the region, including peaceful resolution for their ter-
ritorial disputes. It can serve as a political foundation for possi-
ble sovereign collaboration in oil and gas exploration in the fu-
ture.
But it was not until March 2005 that, acting upon the Decla-
ration, the respective State-owned oil companies of Vietnam,
China, and the Philippines entered into a tripartite agreement
to gather datajointly in the search for oil and gas in the disputed
area (the "Tripartite Agreement"). Under this agreement, the
countries would jointly gather two and three-dimensional seis-
mic data on a 140,000-square kilometer sea area over a period of
three years.5 The 2002 Declaration and the Tripartite Agree-
ment can be viewed as a hopeful sign for the future end of the
South China Sea Disputes. Nonetheless, as explained below, an
astute observer must look closely underneath these agreements
for other signs of inequity to decipher if there is any true hope.
Until that hopeful day comes, in today's political and eco-
nomic climate, no islet or sand bar in the South China Sea, no
matter how small, is really immune from territorial claims. To
most petroleum companies active in the area, the Disputes are
the Taiwanese National Security Advisor elected to make a diplomatic gesture to inform
the world community of the territorial invasion. See Chiu Yu-Tzu, Chen Travels to the
Disputed Pratas Islands, TAwEI TIMES, July 29, 2005, http:/www.taipeitimes.com/News/
Taiwan/archives/2005/07/39/22003265485 (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
49. See Yu-Tzu, supra note 48.
50. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ("2002 Declara-
tion"), Nov. 4, 2002, ASEAN-P.R.C. [hereinafter 2002 Declaration], http://www.asean
sec.org/13163.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007); see also Eaton, supra note 46. The ten
ASEAN members are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, My-
anmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See ASEAN, Member Countries,
http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
51. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Oil Compa-
nies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam Signed Agreement on South China Sea
Cooperation, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.
htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). The Chinese Embassy's announcement discusses the
Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in
the South China Sea ("2005 Tripartite Agreement"). The precise area covered by the
joint study is not available for the public.
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but one more political risk hovering over their investment. The
problems these companies are experiencing often lie in the
highly competitive bidding for an exploration block and success-
ful partnership with governments. The extremely complex geo-
physical characteristics of the area result in exuberant explora-
tion and development costs, and account for the real obstacle in
the full exploitation of the South China Sea.
II. SCOPING THE ISSUES
The principal legal issues underlying the South China Sea
Disputes can be categorized into three main groups.
Group #1: Issues Involving Territorial Sovereignty
This group consists of two issues: (i) who owns the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagoes, and under what theor(ies) of custom-
ary international law? and (ii) what is the historical and scien-
tific evidence establishing the competing nations' ownership of
the islands, either by historical title or by effective occupation
and control? How reliable is the evidence? How can conflicting
evidence be weighed, by whom, and to what result?
To establish sovereignty over the islands, the States have re-
sorted to international treaties at the close of the colonial era, as
well as to customary international law, including the five modes
of territorial acquisition: occupation, prescription, conquest, ac-
cretion, and avulsion.52 Conquest as a mode of territorial acqui-
sition has been outlawed, but pre-World War II conquests were
used to establish national boundaries.5" Each country may be
52. See Duong, supra note 32 (discussing and summarizing theories of customary
international law that underlie the competing nations' respective claims of sover-
eignty); see also Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and
the Natural Resources?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS FROM THE EAST ASIAN PERSPEC-
TivE 486 (Choon-ho Park &Jae Kyu Park eds., 1987). See generally DANIEL DZUREK, THE
SPRATLY ISLAND DISPUTE: WHO'S ON FIRST? (1996) (summarizing national claims and
ranking their strength).
53. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been part
of customary international law or, occasionally, has been established via treaties. The
view of most international lawyers is that customs are not a form of tacit treaty law, but
an independent body of general rules of law applicable to all States, unless a State has
unambiguously and persistently registered its objection to such rules. See, e.g., MALCOLM
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 68-71 (5th ed. 2003). Once becoming general rules of inter-
national law, customary practices bind all States that have not opposed those practices,
whether or not the States themselves have participated in the formation of those cus-
toms. Id.; H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 13541
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claiming a different theory, or a combination thereof.
Because these theories require historical evidence, 54 coun-
tries have continued to release into the public domain facts and
proof establishing early habitation, historical title, or continuous
occupation in order to bolster their respective legal claims.55
The evidence presented by the competing State must eventually
be adjudicated in an international tribunal, requiring expert tes-
timony and credibility assessment. A prediction of outcome is
speculation at best.56 Accordingly, the Article will focus on the
next two groups of issues.
(1972). In territorial disputes, the notion that custom may be formed in the absence of
specific State opposition may lead to the following dangerous result: Although military
conquest has been outlawed, sovereignty over land can still be acquired by adverse pos-
session, if forced occupation remains unchallenged by the world community, nor ob-
jected to by the occupied State.
54. See, e.g., Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928) (concluding "[t]he Netherlands' title of sovereignty, acquired by continuous and
peaceful display of State authority during a long period of time going probably back
beyond the year 1700, therefore holds good").
55. See, e.g., Do Hao, Truong Sa Islands: New Archeological Findings, VIETNAM NEWS,
June 5, 1994 (discussing new evidence that, as far back as the fifteenth century,
Vietnamese fishermen or merchants were living on the Spratly Islands).
56. The International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") awarded the tiny Celebes Sea islands
of Ligitan and Sipadan to Malaysia in her territorial dispute with Indonesia. See Sover-
eignty Over Palau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.CJ. 625 (Dec.
17); see also Press Release No. 2002/39, I.CJ., Court Finds That Sovereignty Over the
Islands of Ligitan and Sipadan Belongs to Malaysia (Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Ligitan-
Sipadan], http://www.icj-cj.org/icjwww/idocket/iinma/iinmaframe.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2007). At least one commentator has viewed the decision as having negative
implications for all claimants in the Spradys Dispute. See Mark Valencia, The Spratlys
Island Dispute, FAR E. ECON. REv., Jan. 9, 2003. The decision disregarded theories such
as "discovery," "title by succession," "colonial treaty claims," or "historical claims" to the
two islands that undisputedly are not permanently inhabited. The ICJ held that neither
nation successfully established treaty-based title to the islands. Instead, the court took
into account specific evidence of continuous, effective occupation, administration or
control over a considerable period of time in the absence of protests from others (the
notion of "effectivities"), and awarded the islands to Malaysia. See id.; see also Ligitan-
Sipadan, supra. In the Spratlys Dispute, since the end of World War II, no country has
occupied or controlled the Spratlys without protests from others. Evidence of any occu-
pation prior to the twentieth century can be the subject of expert testimony and will
have to be evaluated by the ICJ. Further, unlike the Celebes Sea islands, an "either/or"
situation in a bilateral dispute, occupation of the Spratlys has been divided among the
nations and hence does not clearly lend itself to an "either/or" determination of owner-
ship. Most likely the ICJ would not award the entire Spratly group to any one single
claimant. But more importantly, in the Ligitan-Sipadan dispute, the two state claimants
consented to the jurisdiction of the World Court. In the Spratly Dispute, it is unlikely
that the smaller states can haul China into the ICJ forum in the absence of her consent.
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Group #2: Application of UNCLOS
The issues in this group concern: (i) does UNCLOS estab-
lish sovereign title to the islands, or does it answer questions of
sea-use rights and rights to the exploitation of natural re-
sources?; and (ii) how can overlapping Continental Shelves and
Exclusive Economic Zones ("EEZs" or "Zones") be resolved
under UNCLOS?; and (iii) what is the binding effect of UN-
CLOS upon non-consenting States, in light of the various reser-
vations or declarations made by States parties in the process of
ratification or accession?57
Group #3: Alternative Solutions
Assuming that the issue of legal ownership of the islands is
temporarily held in abeyance, will there be an alternative solu-
tion to ownership of petroleum resources in the disputed area,
and does UNCLOS provide support for such a solution? What is
the real-life working of such a solution?
57. See infra notes 121-151 and accompanying text. The Summary of Practice of
the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, contains the following defi-
nition of "Declaration":
Declarations, however they may be known (communications, interpretative
declarations, understandings, etc.), either made at the time of signature or at
the time of deposit of a binding instrument, are to be distinguished from res-
ervations in that they do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effects of
the treaty. The purpose of declarations is rather, in principle, to make more
explicit the meaning of a particular provision. However, declarations are
made in a political context-for example, to express satisfaction at the adop-
tion of the treaty, or to express regret that a provision has not been included
in the treaty and the hope that through an amendment it will be in the future,
or to express dismay that a provision has been included which the State con-
cerned finds offensive. While declarations are usually made at the time of the
deposit of the corresponding instrument or at the time of signature, they are
sometimes made in contemplation of the impending signature of the treaty,
after its adoption, and the text of such declarations is then frequently repro-
duced in the Final Act of the Conference that adopted the treaty.
Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties 63,
ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter U.N. Summary of Practice]. Chapter VIII of the
Summary incorporates verbatim the definition of "reservation" from Paragraph 1 (d) of
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which restates established
customary international treaty law on the matter. The Vienna Convention defines the
term "reservation" as follows: "Reservation" means a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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In addressing Groups #2 and #3 issues, this Article asserts
that: (i) under current geopolitical circumstances, law may not
matter in the distribution of petroleum resources; and (ii) in a
negotiated treaty solution, factors of Realpolitik will continue to
disserve the interest of the smaller and economically weaker na-
tions.
III. THE INEFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
("UNCLOS") IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES
A. Introduction to UNCLOS
1. History
Adopted and first made open for signature in 1982, UN-
CLOS was the result of the 1973 Third United Nations ("U.N.")
Conference on the Law of the Sea.5" UNCLOS's predecessor,
the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf (the "Ge-
neva Convention") 5 1 codified the rule of customary interna-
tional law that a coastal State has sovereignty rights over its Con-
tinental Shelf, and no other State may explore or exploit the
resources of such Continental Shelf without the express consent
of the coastal state.6" The Geneva Convention, however, did not
sufficiently define the outer limit of the Continental Shelf. Ef-
forts by the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea were
to cure this defect, resulting in the signing of UNCLOS.6" Not
58. See Guido Carducci, New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 420 (2002)
(noting that "the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea... resulted
in the adoption in 1982 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.")
59. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
60. The development of international maritime law and the obligations of the
coastal States can be traced in the following documents (predecessors of UNCLOS): (i)
Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea
Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28,
1945) [hereinafter 1945 Truman Proclamation]; (ii) Convention on the Continental
Shelf, supra note 59; (iii) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; (iv) Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; and (v) Convention on Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559
U.N.T.S. 285.
61. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also Carducci, supra note 58, at 420.
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only does UNCLOS define the outer limit of the Continental
Shelf, but it also establishes an EEZ, which co-exists with the
Shelf and entitles the coastal state to the exclusive exploitation
of natural resources within the Zone.
In 1990, the United States launched informal negotiations,
which culminated in its signing of a Supplemental Agreement
on July 28, 1994, purportedly changing UNCLOS's legal regime
governing the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction.62 By
this agreement, the United States and other developed countries
opposed UNCLOS's seabed mining regime as denying the devel-
oped nations a voice that equaled their economic interests.63
Nonetheless, because the Supplemental Agreement represents
the views of the industrialized nations,64 it renders a vital boost
to UNCLOS's legitimacy as an enduring symbol of the "new in-
ternational economic order" of the twentieth century.
In November, 1994, a year after the sixtieth nation had rati-
fied the Convention, UNCLOS met the requirement for going
into force, having obtained the sufficient ratification or acces-
sion instruments from States. 5 Almost two years later, on July
28, 1996, the Supplemental Agreement also entered into force.66
Notwithstanding the reluctance of the United States-alleg-
edly the world's leading maritime power with the longest coast-
lines and the largest EEZ-to date 149 States have ratified UN-
62. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature July
28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (entered into force July 28, 1996) [hereinafter Supplemental
Agreement]. The Supplemental Agreement and UNCLOS are to be interpreted and
applied as a single treaty, although in case of an inconsistency, the Agreement prevails.
See id. art. II.
63. SeeJason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical Analysis of
the Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Authority, 16 CoLo. J. IN-r'L
ENVrL. L. & POL'y 27, 32-33.
64. See, e.g., Gregory F. Maggio, Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications
under International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, 4
Bui'. ENVT'L. LJ. 161, 210 (noting that the "United States and other industrialized
countries refused to become Parties to the [original version of UNCLOS] unless these
provisions[,] [regarding deep sea-bed mineral resources,] were modified").
65. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea ("DOALOS"), United Na-
tions, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter UNCLOS Status], http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference-files/status
2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
66. See Marjorie Ann Browne, Congressional Research Service, The Law of the Sea
Convention and U.S. Policy 1, 2 (May 12, 2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/
NLE/CRSreports/Marine/mar-16.cfm.
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CLOS and 122 have ratified the Supplemental Agreement. 67 All
coastal state-claimants in the South China Sea Disputes, with the
exception of Taiwan, have ratified UNCLOS, 68 although Viet-
nam and China have each deposited declarations together with
their ratifying documents. 61 With respect to the Supplemental
Agreement, only China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines
have signed and ratified it; the two remaining claimants, Viet-
nam and Brunei, have not signed on to the Supplemental Agree-
ment.
7 °
2. Overview of UNCLOS's Legal Framework
Overall, the international community of legal scholars and
commentators recognizes UNCLOS as the contemporary author-
ity on international maritime law. But this means UNCLOS only
regulates sea-use rights among nations and provides a framework
for identifying maritime sovereignty over the sea. Within such
framework are methods for drawing a sovereign State's coastal
"baselines," from which the State can claim a Continental Shelf
and the newly introduced EEZ. Such a maritime framework
does not establish a State's territorial sovereignty over any island
in the South China Sea. Once ownership of an island is estab-
lished under traditional theories of international law, claims to
the Continental Shelf or EEZ can be drawn from the island
based on the maritime principles of UNCLOS. In other words,
only after sovereignty over land or an island has been established
can a State apply UNCLOS to resolve sea-use rights. Sovereignty
over an island in the South China Sea means extending the
State's territory and coastal baselines to that island. From that
island, the State can claim its rights to exploit natural resources
in the Continental Shelf/EEZ recognized by UNCLOS.
67. See DOALOS, United Nations, Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Acces-
sions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements (Dec. 28, 2006)
[hereinafter Ratifications List], http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chrono-
logical lists of ratifications.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007)
68. See id; see also Greg Englefield, Managing Boundaries in the South China Sea, 2
BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULL. 36 (July 1944).
69. See DOALOS, United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations
Made Upon Signature, Ratification, Accession or Succession or Anytime Thereafter
(Dec. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Declarations List], http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/conventiondeclarations.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
70. See DOALOS, United Nations, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 50, at 6, 8-10, 14
(Feb. 2003), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalospublicaions/LOSBulletins/bulletin
pdf/bulletinE50.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
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Ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, therefore, will
establish the competing nations' maritime sovereignty over the
sea surrounding the islands, where offshore petroleum explora-
tion may be conducted. Legal problems also occur where, in a
narrow area of semi-enclosed sea such as the South China Sea or
parts thereof, the claimed Continental Shelves and EEZs of sev-
eral States overlap. This is the gist of the South China Sea Dis-
putes.
The salient features, underlying policies, and binding effect
of UNCLOS are examined below.
B. Relevant Salient Features of UNCLOS
1. The Establishment of Maritime Boundaries and
Sea-Use Rights
UNCLOS establishes the following maritime boundaries:7"
Baseline
Maritime boundaries must be measured from a coastal
state's "baselines. '7 2 UNCLOS provides methods for drawing
the "baseline," depending on the marine characteristics of the
area. For example, depending on certain coastal characteristics,
a State may draw a "straight baseline"7" by nominating a number
of points along its coast and connecting them by straight lines."
Internal Waters
Article 8 of UNCLOS defines the internal waters of a coastal
state as the "waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
[T] erritorial [S] ea."
Territorial Sea
Article 2 of UNCLOS permits the "sovereignty of a coastal
State [to] extend . . . beyond its land territory and internal wa-
71. See also Exhibit A appended to this Article.
72. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 59, art. 6.
73. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 7.
74. See id. UNCLOS also provides that these baselines must be "shown on charts of
a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position," or alternatively, "a list of
geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted."
See id. art. 16. The coastal State must deposit a copy of such chart or list with the U.N.
Secretary General.
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ters and, in the case of archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters,
to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the [T]erritorial [S]ea."
Under Article 3, "[e]very State has the right to establish the
breadth of its [T]erritorial [S]ea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles [approximately 19 km],75 measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this Convention." The coastal
state has complete sovereignty over its Territorial Sea.
Contiguous Zone
UNCLOS establishes a zone "contiguous to a coastal state's
[T]erritorial [S]ea, which may not extend beyond 24 nautical
miles [approximately 38 km] from the baselines from which the
breadth of the [T]erritorial [S]ea is measured."7 6 The coastal
State may exercise the same control in the Contiguous Zone as
in its Territorial Sea. The Contiguous Zone is established prima-
rily for regulatory and police purposes.7 7 In other words, while
the coastal state may claim legal ownership over the Territorial
Sea the same way it can claim complete sovereign rights over
land, it can only claim regulatory and police power over the con-
tiguous zone as an exercise of its sovereign power.
Continental Shelf
Filling in the gap left by the Geneva Convention, Article 76
of UNCLOS recognizes a Continental Shelf which extends to
200 nautical miles (approximately 370 kilometers) from the
baselines of the Territorial Sea, or the areas that "extend beyond
[a coastal state's] [T] erritorial [S] ea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continen-
tal margin. ' 78 Where the "continental margin" extends beyond
75. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 3 (emphasis added).
The conversion of measurement units is as follows:
I Nautical mile = 1.15077945 miles
I mile = 1.6093444 kilometers
See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GENERAL TABLES OF UNITES OF MEASUREMENT
(2006), available at http://ts.nist.gov/weightsandmeasures/publications/appxc.cfm.
76. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 33 (emphasis added).
77. See id.
78. See 1945 Truman Declaration, supra note 60 (proclaiming that resources of the
subsoil and sea-bed of the Continental Shelf are within the jurisdiction of the United
States).
The Continental Margin is defined as that which "comprises the submerged pro-
longation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil
of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with it
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the 200 nautical mile limit, or in case of "submarine ridges," the
Continental Shelf may be extended up to 350 nautical miles (ap-
proximately 647 kilometers) from the baselines from which the
breadth of the Territorial Sea is measured.79 UNCLOS gives the
coastal State sovereign power over its Continental Shelf "for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources,"
such that "no one may undertake these activities without the ex-
press consent of the coastal [s]tate."8"' Such sovereign power
"doe [es] not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on
any express proclamation."'" In the South China Sea, the 200
nautical mile limit has become a source of conflicts, because in
the Sea, there are few spots where a coastal state's 200 nautical
mile limit can be applied without overlapping with those of
other coastal states.
Exclusive Economic Zone
UNLCOS also introduces the concept of the EEZ,"2 which
gives the coastal state the exclusive right to exploit natural re-
sources in the area. While the EEZ is considered a new notion
introduced primarily by the Latin American and African State
parties, arguably the EEZ also has its roots in existing customary
international law, which allows a coastal state to extend its terri-
tory into the sea as far as reasonable for national purposes.83
Because the EEZ also extends up to 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the Territorial Sea is measured, the
EEZ is co-extensive with the Continental Shelf. As a result, the
two areas are frequently interchangeable, although conceptually
they are different, primarily in two aspects. First, only the Conti-
nental Shelf may, in certain cases, extend beyond 200 nautical
oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof." UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 76(3). UNCLOS
also establishes the method by which the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of
the continental margin. See id. art. 76(4) (a).
79. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, arts. 76(5)-(6). UNCLOS also creates a Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to consider requests of coastal states that
seek to establish their Continental Shelves beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. See id. art.
76(8).
80. Id. arts. 77 (1), (2).
81. Id. art. 77(3).
82. See generally id. arts. 55-75.
83. See Louis Henkin, Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 56-57
(1974); see also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 77-78
(1985) (summarizing development of sovereign claims beyond the 200-nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zones).
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miles up to 350 nautical miles. Second, the EEZ is a more lim-
ited and specific concept than the Continental Shelf. In the
Continental Shelf, the coastal state enjoys inherent sovereignty
rights.8 4 In the EEZ, the coastal state must proclaim it and will
enjoy the exclusive rights to the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources.
The "Area"
UNCLOS also established principles governing the "Area,"
which includes the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. 5 This "Area" is considered the
"common heritage of mankind," 6 administered by various inter-
national bodies established under UNCLOS. 7 Since the "Area"
is collectively owned by the whole world community, theoreti-
cally, any petroleum discovery beyond national jurisdiction, to
the extent feasible under current technology, must be shared by
all States.
2. Archipelagic Baselines
UNCLOS provides guidance for the drawing of the base-
lines for "archipelagic states." 8 The breadth of the Territorial
84. See, e.g., 1945 Truman Declaration, supra note 60.
85. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 1(1).
86. Id. art. 136. UNCLOS does not define the "common heritage of mankind."
However, Article 137 of UNCLOS provides that:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, not shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sov-
ereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the [International Seabed] Authority shall act. These resources
are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however,
may only be alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority.
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance
with this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights
shall be recognized.
Id. art. 137
87. See id. arts. 133-91.
88. An archipelagic State may draw "straight archipelagic baselines joining the out-
ermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago, provided
that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio
of the area of the water to the area of land, including atolls, is between 1 to I and 9 to
1." Id. art. 47(1). The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
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Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, and the EEZ
shall be measured from such archipelagic baselines,89 but only if
the islands qualify as an "archipelagic State. ''9 °
It is uncertain whether the most disputed point of conflict,
the Spratly group, may qualify as an "archipelago," defined as a
"group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting wa-
ters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated
that such islands, waters and other natural features form an in-
trinsic geographical economic and political entity, or which has histori-
cally been regarded as such."'" Unless the competing sovereign
claims are solved under customary international law, the Spratlys
themselves may never have any political identity on their own.
Accordingly, UNCLOS rules for drawing "archipelagic base-
lines" will apply to the Spratlys only if: (i) the Spratlys qualify as
an "archipelagic State"-an archipelago in the geographical
sense may not automatically qualify as an "archipelagic State" or
an "archipelago" in the legal sense under UNCLOS unless the
"archipelago" is a political and economic entity; and (ii) the en-
tire Spratly group must be considered non-divisible for purposes
of claiming sovereignty. Various States currently occupy various
parts of the Spratlys, offering conflicting evidence and argu-
ments about historical title to the public domain. 2 A genuine
issue of law and fact exists whether the group can be divided
piecemeal as belonging to various nations, depending on the his-
torical evidence pointing to the earliest, undisputed, uninter-
rupted, and continuous occupation and control.
If "archipelagic baselines" cannot legally be drawn around
except that only up to three percent of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. Id.
art 47(2). The drawing of such baselines shall not depart appreciably from the general
configuration of the archipelago, and shall not cut off the Territorial Sea of another
State from the high seas or the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"). Id. arts 47(4)-(5).
The sovereignty asserted by the archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines (described as "archipelagic waters"), regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast. Id. art. 49. The archipelagic State must record the baselines
drawn on charts of a scale adequate for ascertaining their position (or alternatively, lists
of geographical coordinates), and must deposit such chart or list with the U.N. Id. arts.
47(8)-(9).
89. Id. art. 48.
90. Id. arts. 46-54.
91. Id. art. 46 (emphasis added).
92. See Chin Yoon Chin, Potential for Conflicts in the Spratly Islands 5 (Dec. 2003)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School); Joyner, supra note 23, at 195.
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the entire Sprady group, then baselines must be drawn around
the individual islands or islets, but only when such islands or is-
lets are political entities.
3. Exceptions to Maritime Boundaries
Having defined the above maritime boundaries, UNCLOS
provides a number of exceptions to these boundaries, summa-
rized below.
a. The "Delimitation" Exception
UNCLOS provides "delimitation" exceptions to overlapping
Territorial Seas, Continental Shelves and EEZ's between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts.
With respect to the Territorial Sea, Article 15 of UNCLOS
states:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to
each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agree-
ment between them to the contrary, to extend its
[T]erritorial [S]ea beyond the median line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the [T]erritorial [S]ea of each of
the two states is measured. The above provision does not ap-
ply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or
other special circumstances to delimit the [T] erritorial [S] eas
of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.9 3
Delimitation is part of international law because it has be-
come a widespread practice.9 4 Historically, the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") has rejected a straightforward or
93. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 15.
94. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.),
1969 I.CJ. 3, 4 (Feb. 20) (holding that delimitation is to be by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, taking in account all relevant circumstances such as configur-
ation of coast lines, desirability of maintaining unity of deposits, and reasonable degree
of proportionality between limits of coast line and area of Continental Shelf). See gener-
ally Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of
International Law, 64 AmJ. IN r'L L. 892 (1970) (discussing customary rules of law relat-
ing to delimitation). The "equidistance" or "median line" rule as a method of delimita-
tion was also set forth in UNCLOS's predecessor, the 1958 Geneva Convention. Under
the 1958 Geneva Convention, delimitation could be achieved via the drawing of a "me-
dian line" between the respective coasts, in the absence of an agreement or "special
circumstances" to the contrary. See Gillian Triggs, Joint Development Zones: A Way
Forward 2 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Convention on
the Continental Shelf, supra note 59, arts. 5(5), 6(3).
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mechanical equidistance drawing of delimitation, in favor of a
more fluid equitable solution.9" Accordingly, UNCLOS recog-
nizes that the "median line" delimitation can be fluid, based on
historic title or other "special circumstances." The Convention
is silent as to what may constitute "special circumstances."
With respect to the EEZ and the Continental Shelf, Articles
74 and 83 of UNCLOS state in similar language:
The delimitation of the [Continental Shelf/EEZ] between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agree-
ment on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve
an equitable solution. If no agreement can be reached within a
reasonable period of time, the states concerned shall resort to
the procedures provided for in Part XV [of UNCLOS] [settle-
ment of disputes] .6
Commentators have viewed Articles 74 and 83 as retarding
real-world efforts to resolve overlapping claims to the Continen-
tal Shelf/EEZ, by: (i) elevating "equitable solution" as the pre-
eminent objective, (ii) diminishing the importance of the more
concrete "equi-distant/special circumstances" rule,9 7 and (iii)
creating uncertainty through the introduction of the phrase "in-
ternational law." These added features inject more vagueness
and complication into the legal test. At least one commentator
has described the "equitable solution" formula of Articles 74 and
83 as a "moveable feast,"98 which compounds rather than clarify-
ing or simplifying the formula for delimitation,99 since one
95. See Triggs, supra note 94, at 3; see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969
I.CJ. at 4 (defining "equitable solution"); accord Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra
note 59, arts. 6(l)-(2); L.D.M. Nelson, The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime
Boundaries, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 837, 839-41 (1990). Past State practices show that, when
used to resolve territorial disputes, historically, the equidistance rule has been modified
frequently. Quite often, the common boundary intersecting point is a "negotiated
point" not settled by any mathematical formula. See OFF. OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS-TERRITORIAL SEA BOUNDARY: DENMARK-SWEDEN 3-5
(Ser. A, No. 26 July 16, 1970), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza
tion/61562.pdf.
96. UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 74(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Triggs, supra note 94, at 2-3.
98. See id. at 3; see also Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 59, arts. 5-6
(describing delimitation procedures under the U.N. Convention on the Continental
Shelf); Nelson, supra note 95, at 3941 (discussing equitable resolutions of maritime
issues).
99. UNCLOS establishes that the competing States must show the outer limits of
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country's equity can be another country's injustice. One thing
remains certain: With respect to the delimitation of overlapping
Continental Shelf/EEZ claims, UNCLOS mandates that States
negotiate an acceptable "equitable solution" via the signing of
treaties, and to utilize the dispute resolution procedures of UN-
CLOS in the event such treaty negotiation fails.1"'
b. The "Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas" Exception
A genuine factual and legal issue exists as to whether the
South China Sea, or parts of it, may qualify as an "enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea" under UNCLOS."' Article 122 of UNCLOS
states:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-en-
closed sea" means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or
more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a
narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the
[T]erritorial [S]eas and [E]xclusive [E]conomic [Z]ones of
two or more coastal [s]tates.
Where territorial claims are made to an "enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea," Article 123 of UNCLOS provides that the border-
ing States "should co-operate ... in the exercise of their rights
and in the performance of their duties under this Convention."
In describing the scope of the States' cooperation, Article
123 expressly refers to issues such as the exploitation of living
resources, marine protection, or research endeavors. Yet, the
Convention does not mention the exploitation of natural re-
sources (non-living resources such as hydrocarbons), which,
under UNCLOS, is the exclusive right of a State proclaiming its
EEZ. Although one may argue that to "cooperate" means to ab-
stain from unilateral action or development, a non-consenting
State may assert that Article 123's "cooperation" is not intended
to displace EEZjurisdiction and the associated rights and duties
accorded by UNCLOS. The argument draws a distinction be-
their EEZs and the lines of delimitation on charts of a scale adequate to ascertain their
position. See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 75(1).
100. Id. arts. 74, 83 ("the delimitation ... shall be effected by agreement").
101. For example, the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea, is a semi-
enclosed gulf embraced by the mainland of China and Vietnam, as well as China's Hai-
nan Island. As of the date of this Article, China and Vietnam have settled (at least part,
if not all of) their disputes as to the Gulf of Tonkin. See infra notes 228-234 and accom-
panying text.
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tween "living resources" and "natural resources" such that sover-
eign rights may be "delimited" as to the former, but not the
later. Under this argument, a coastal state proclaiming the EEZ
is under no good faith duty to "cooperate" with respect to the
sharing of the natural resources found in an "enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea." The argument potentially can undercut the over-
all peace-making spirit of UNCLOS by allowing coastal states to
declare overlapping exclusive EEZs without making a good faith
effort at "cooperation." In any event, the language of Article 123
is simply an encouragement ("should cooperate"), not a man-
date or imposition of an affirmative duty.
c. Exceptions Concerning the Regime of Islands
Part VIII of UNCLOS, which consists solely of Article 121
addressing "Regime of Islands," provides that "[r]ocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or [C]ontinental
[S]helf." Only islands, naturally formed areas of land sur-
rounded by waters and standing above high tide, may be used to
make claims to Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zones, EEZs, and
Continental Shelves.' 0 2 Thus, the sovereignty owning an "island"
may draw the 12 nautical mile Territorial Sea around it, but is
not entitled to claiming a 200 nautical mile Continental Shelf or
EEZ therefrom if the island cannot support human habitation or
economic life. 10
Commentators relying on various scientific sources have
pointed out that several subgroups within the Spralys may fall
under this category and thus cannot serve as the basis for any
102. UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 121. An island is "a naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide ... Rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive eco-
nomic zone or continental shelf." Id. art. 121 (3). At lease one scholar has opined that,
because the limitation accorded to "rocks" is listed as part of UNCLOS's "Regime of
Islands," UNCLOS drafters must have meant for the definition of an island to include
such "rocks." So, under this interpretation, an island which is a "rock that cannot sus-
tain human habitation or economic life of its own" will not have a Continental Shelf or
EEZ around it. Jonhathan 1. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93
AM.J. INr'L L. 863, 865-76 (1999); see also Charney, supra note 15, at 731 (raising inquir-
ies such as: What constitutes "rocks" under UNCLOS? As defined by earth sciences?
Does "economic life" mean complete self-sufficiency, referring to the past, present, or
future?).
103. See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 121; see also Charney, supra note 102, 863.
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Continental Shelf or EEZ claimed by any countries. 04 The data
regarding human habitation and economic life will eventually
have to be adjudicated in a forum of competent jurisdiction.
In summary, UNCLOS leaves many maritime jurisdiction is-
sues unresolved. It is necessary, therefore, to observe the poli-
cies underlying UNCLOS, as they may shed light upon how an
international adjudicatory tribunal may interpret the Conven-
tion.
C. Underlying Policies of UNCLOS
Purportedly to replace the 1958 Geneva Convention, which
was developed in the aftermath of the Second World War and at
the end of colonialism, UNCLOS articulates several polices de-
signed to achieve world peace.
1. Peace-Keeping Dispute Resolution Commitment
An important aspect of UNCLOS is its commitment to
peaceful resolution of sea-use right disputes, and to the use of
international tribunals in dispute resolution. Articles 279 and
280 of UNCLOS subject State parties to "peaceful means" of set-
tlement of disputes in accordance with the U.N. Charter or as
agreed to by the parties. Choices of procedure and forum in-
clude the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (estab-
lished under UNCLOS), the ICJ, or an ad hoc tribunal estab-
lished under Article 287.105 Any such tribunal is obligated to ap-
ply UNCLOS and other rules of international law.'0 6
UNCLOS also commits State parties to a duty to "refrain
from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the principles of international law embodied in
the [U.N. Charter]."1°7 At the same time, the Convention also
104. Many structures within the Asian side of the Pacific Ocean probably fit this
definition, and not just the Spratlys: China's Pratas Reef, Senkaku Island (disputed by
China and Japan), the Japanese Danjo Gunto, and the Ryukyu Islands. See, e.g., Char-
ney, supra note 15, at 731; Charney, supra note 102, at 863; Chin & Park, supra note 16;
Choon-ho Park, Book Note, 92 Am.J. INT'L L. 354 (1998) (reviewing MARKJ. VALENCIA,
JON M. VAN DvKE & NOEL A. LUDWIG, SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
(1997)).
105. UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 287.
106. Id. art. 293.
107. Id. art. 301.
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recognizes and reinforces sovereignty power, allowing States to
take actions that assert, symbolize and protect their sovereign
rights. For example, a coastal state can "arrest" vessels and crews
that violate its sovereign rights in the EEZ. °8 The balance be-
tween the assertion of sovereignty and the commitment to peace
must therefore be delicately drawn, and, to that end UNCLOS
offers no concrete guidance.
2. Application of "Equity" as a Vague and Slippery
Concept of Customary International Law
Also apparent in UNCLOS is the policy that sovereignty
conflicts should be resolved based on principles of equity, a gen-
eral notion of fairness that does not necessarily imply equality,
but should include "elementary considerations of humanity."
10 9
For example, Article 59 states:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or
jurisdiction to the coastal [s] tate or to other States within the
exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the
interests of the coastal [s] tate and any other State or States,
the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of
all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective im-
portance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the inter-
national community as a whole."11 o
In any event, the ICJ has applied this rule of equity in delim-
iting the Continental Shelves between adjoining States,11 recog-
nizing equity as a principle of interpretation rooted in customary
international law (distinguishable from the English common-law
separation between "law" and "equity" as systems of justice ad-
ministration)." 2 In boundary delimitation, the ICJ views equity
as incorporating "a reasonable degree of proportionality which a
delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to
bring about.""' It is interesting to note that the drafters of UN-
108. Id. art. 73.
109. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
110. UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 59 (emphasis added).
111. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
46-54 (Feb. 20).
112. See Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 70, at 76-78 (June 28); see also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (1964).
113. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 52; see also Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at
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CLOS Article 59 have chosen to use the aspirational word
"should" instead of the mandatory "shall." Accordingly, it is un-
certain how an adjudicatory forum may view its duty to apply
Article 59: Is the forum obligated to apply the "equity" test?
One could speculate that an adjudicatory tribunal may look
at UNCLOS as a post-colonialism convention, interpreting it in a
way that remedially favors the decolonized, developing States.
Such speculation does not change the obvious fact that the test
outlined in Article 59 offers no clear answer to the Disputes at
hand. Rather, "equity" may provide room for contested argu-
ments based on non-legal considerations, leaving the ultimate
determination in the hands of international jurists. The "equity"
concept offers no real comfort to the private investor getting
caught among the competing national interests. To the private
sector, a future resolution based on "equity" is simply a non-
quantifiable political risk. Not only does this inspirational "good
faith" spirit of UNCLOS typify remedial post-colonial conven-
tions, but it also evidences the imprecise nature of public inter-
national law. This vagueness encourages the private sector to re-
sort to self-help measures and formulate its own risk manage-
ment programs. Because notions of "equity" are so
unpredictable and imprecise, the private sector may be moti-
vated to form risk-reducing alliances with the government that
most favors the investor in order to protect its investment. In
fact, the investor will have every incentive to dissuade its govern-
ment partner from submitting the territorial dispute to an adju-
dicatory tribunal because the investor cannot rely on or predict
legal outcomes. If, because of such non-quantifiable political
risk, the private investor forgoes the Foreign Direct Investment
("FDI") project that can otherwise stimulate local economies ul-
timately the people who are impacted the most will be the inhab-
itants of the poorest countries in the region. Those poor coun-
tries may have the least leverage in any bilateral or multilateral
negotiation to resolve competing sovereignty claims. This is pre-
cisely the consequence that "equity" seeks to avoid.
Scholars who are pessimistic about the inspirational nature
of public international law will view law with little teeth and gui-
dance as worse than having no law at all. Where law is soft,
vague, and purely inspirational, lawlessness may follow. "Soft" or
"vague" law will encourage self-help, including the type of con-
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tractual alliances that fortify the ruling elites." 4
3. Policy Supporting Distribution of Resources in
Favor of Developing Countries
But UNCLOS is not always vague; nor does it always rely on
inspirational good faith compliance. Where national jurisdic-
tion is not an issue, UNCLOS firmly establishes rules that favor
the more disadvantaged nations. For example, Article 136 de-
fines the "Area" beyond national jurisdiction as the "common
heritage of mankind," favoring the landlocked States." 5 State
parties are prohibited from entering separate agreements in der-
ogation of these principles.1" 6 The Convention also grants
"land-locked States"' 17  and "geographically disadvantaged
States" ' the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the
exploitation and appropriation of "living resources" within an
EEZ, unless the economy of the coastal state "is overwhelmingly
dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of its
[EEZ].""19 As a result, the industrialized nations have criticized
UNCLOS as promoting the distribution of maritime resources in
favor of the developing countries, 20 the kind of favoritism suited
only for a post-colonialism Cold War era when socialism was still
reaffirming its influence in competition with free enterprise.
With the above policies clearly expressed in UNCLOS, there
is a scintilla of hope that an international adjudicatory tribunal
such as the ICJ may interpret the "equity" element of UNCLOS
to include a socialist distribution of natural resources in favor of
the developing countries. It follows, therefore, that in the South
China Disputes, notwithstanding the lack of clear guidance from
UNCLOS, the smaller and less powerful ASEAN nations may
114. In international relations, such lawlessness, when uncontested or unopposed
overtime, may very well become legitimized or accepted as a fait accompli. Perhaps in no
other situation can this disturbing aspect of our current international law regime be
demonstrated better than China's occupation of Tibet and the Paracels, in an era
where military conquest has clearly been outlawed on the book! See SHAw, supra note
53, at 422-24.
115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing UNCLOS's guidance
with respect to legal characteristics of "common heritage of mankind").
116. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 311(6).
117. Id. art. 69.
118. Id. art. 70.
119. Id. art. 71.
120. See supra notes 64 (discussing industrialized nations' view as expressed in the
1994 Supplemental Agreement to UNCLOS).
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have the incentive to ratify and rely on UNCLOS, in order to
benefit from both these "equitable" policies and the peace-mak-
ing mission of UNCLOS as safeguard against the military aggres-
sion by the more powerful China in the event of armed threats.
D. Binding Effect of UNCLOS-Is UNCLOS
Really the Law of the Sea?
If customary international law is the "law of the globe," does
UNCLOS constitute "the law of the sea"? In other words, the
following questions must be raised: (i) whether UNCLOS codi-
fies existing customary international law, and/or (ii) whether
UNCLOS principles have universally been observed by States
over time such that those principles are no longer contractual
obligations, but have evolved into customary legal practices bind-
ing upon the community of nations as a whole?
1. The Nature of Treaty Obligations and
U.N. Conventional Law
Treaties are formally sources of obligations, 12' but they may
not always be statements of law. Treaty obligations must be car-
ried out contractually, but the obligations themselves may or
may not constitute law. 1 2 2 Under these principles, strictly as an
international convention, UNCLOS is only binding upon State
parties, defined as "States which have consented to be bound by
this Convention and for which this Convention in force. 123
121. Professor Raustiala talks of two types of international agreements: contracts
and pledges. See generally Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99
Am. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005). Contracts create legally binding obligations, whereas
pledges create moral or political obligations. See id. at 586. Professor Christine Chinkin
has also argued that "the use of a treaty form does not of itself ensure a hard obliga-
tion." Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of SofiLaw: Development and Change in Interna-
tional Law, 38 IrNrr'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
122. See Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of Interna-
tional Law, in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 57, 157-64 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.,
2000). Professor Raustiala argues that there is no such thing as "soft law" with respect
to international agreements. The concept of "soft law" refers to the spectrum of legal-
ity-something between binding law and no law. The critique of "soft law," according
to Professor Raustiala, applies to two types of international agreements: (1) those that
are nominally nonbinding, such as "consensus documents" coming out of the 1990s'
U.N.-sponsored summits; and (2) those that are nominally binding but are of soft legal
quality because of deficiencies of the accord or in the enforcement framework. See
Raustiala, supra note 121, at 586-87.
123. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 1(2)(1).
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"State parties" include those States that have signed the Conven-
tion initially, whose national law requires no subsequent ratifica-
tion, 24 as well as States that are deemed as consenting to UN-
CLOS by way of depositing ratification/accession instruments.
In addition, because a ratifying State may deposit its ratifica-
tion instrument together with declarations, reservations or objec-
tions to limit the applicability of UNCLOS,125 the procedure it-
self may serve to undermine the argument that all of UNCLOS
principles are universally accepted. UNCLOS also allows a State
party to "denounce" the Convention by written notification ad-
dressed to the U.N. Secretary General. 126 The fact that a State
may show its reservation or may denounce UNCLOS may be
viewed as characteristic of purely contractual obligations. UN-
CLOS' express provisions addressing subsequent ratification, ac-
cession, confirmation, reservation, declaration, and denounce-
ment may bolster the Convention's contractual nature emphasiz-
ing consent.1 2' Accordingly, UNCLOS may be perceived as
falling short of general international law binding upon non-con-
senting States. Since a treaty is received as evidence of interna-
tional law only if non-party States adopt it in their own prac-
tices,' 2 ' the passage of time, and the neglect of States to join as
parties or to ratify the treaty may amount to a silent rejection of
the treaty. 129
However, Article 317 (addressing the process of "denounce-
ment") goes on to state: "The denunciation shall not in any way
affect the duty of any State Party to fulfill any obligation embod-
ied in this Convention to which it would be subject under inter-
national law independently of this Convention. '1"-0
This language points out that, notwithstanding the contrac-
124. Id. art. 1(2)(2).
125. Id. art. 298(1).
126. Id. art. 317. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of the
U.N.'s receipt of the denunciation notice. Id.
127. See Nuclear Test Cases (N.Z. v. Fra.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-73 (Dec. 20) ("It is
well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or
factual situations, may have the effect of legal obligations. When it is the intention of
the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms,
that intention confers on the declaration the character if a legal undertaking."); see also
U.N. Summary of Practice, supra note 57, § VIII.
128. See, e.g., R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Customs, 129 RECUEIL DES Couas 27, 64-67
(1970).
129. See id.
130. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 317.
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tual nature of conventional law, UNCLOS drafters intended for
it to encompass, or be consistent or coextensive with, principles
of customary international law reflected in the Convention. Al-
though customary international law is the "law of the globe," in
the contemporary world, the means of creating norms of inter-
national law is no longer solely custom, but also by way of a treaty
or convention. Multilateral international treaties can become a
direct means of changing, developing and creating new norms
of general international law. 131 Modern trends in international
law acknowledge that multilateral treaties can evidence jus cogens
binding on all States. 21 3  The principles articulated in a treaty
may be the codification of existing custom, or may pass into the
general corpus of customary international law after signing. Or,
a conventional rule may become customary international law if,
through the passage of time, the rule evolves into a settled prac-
tice, evidencing a common belief among all States that the prac-
tice has sufficiently become so widespread as to be rendered uni-
versally obligatory.1 33
Accordingly, in the South China Sea Disputes, a State party
relying on UNCLOS may argue that UNCLOS has "passed into
the general corpus of international law" by subsequent State
practices so as to render it binding even upon non-consenting
States. A non-consenting State may be one that has failed to rat-
ify UNCLOS or has ratified it with reservations. In any event, via
Article 317, UNCLOS expressly leaves general principles of in-
ternational law intact notwithstanding the Convention's specific
provisions injecting new concepts. Other provisions of the Con-
vention express the same or similar policy. For example, with
respect to the delimitation of the EEZ and the Continental
Shelf, Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS incorporate Article 38 of
the Statute of the ICJ, recognizing individual treaty obligations
as a source of international law.13 4
In summary, the binding effect of UNCLOS upon a non-
consenting party depends on whether UNCLOS only reflects the
131. See Grigory I. Tunkin, Coexistence and International Law, 95 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 21-23 (1958).
132. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 22
(4th ed., 1982) (noting treaties can be evidence of customary international law).
133. See id.
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
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view of consenting State parties, or whether the Convention, by
common consensus and practice, in considered the codification
or evidence of general international law. The general eagerness
of the archipelagic States to ratify or accede to the Convention,
together with the coming into force of the 1994 Supplemental
Agreement representing the view of the industrialized na-
tions, 1 35 indicates that certain principles of the Convention have
achieved the status of maritime custom, willingly recognized and
observed by States as their legal obligations.
On the other hand, a stumbling block preventing a number
of industrialized nations (including the United States) from rati-
fication has been the Convention's regime relating to the ex-
ploitation of natural resources beyond national jurisdiction, 13 6
and the distribution of living resources in EEZs in favor of land-
locked States. 3 v These features of UNCLOS may remain pure
contractual obligations and prevent all of UNCLOS from becom-
ing evidence of customary international law binding upon the
world community.
2. A Note on the Significance of the U.S. Position and
Its Reluctance to Ratify UNCLOS
Perhaps a note on the U.S. position will shed further insight
on the ultimate question of whether UNCLOS codifies, or has
evolved into, customary international law.
The United States played a prominent role in the negotiat-
ing sessions that culminated in the adoption of UNCLOS in
1982."38 Nonetheless, the United States recognized that Part XI
of UNCLOS-establishing an International Seabed Authority to
administer the mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction-did not further the U.S. interest.
Hence, it refused to sign UNCLOS in 1982.139 In 1983, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan instructed the Executive Branch to abide by
135. See supra notes 58-70, 121-151 and accompanying text (describing history of
UNCLOS and the 1994 Supplemental Agreement).
136. See Denton Hall & J.B. Blanche, The Spratly Islands Archipelago Influence on Re-
gional Stability in the South China Sea (June 1995).
137. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 69.
138. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Env't and Pub. Works, 108th Cong. 66 (2004) (statement of John T. Turner, Assistant
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all provisions of UNCLOS except for Part XI. 140 In 1990, the
United States spearheaded the negotiation of the Supplemental
Agreement, which opened for signature in 1994, purportedly
changing the implementing mechanism of Part XI in a way that
legally and adequately protects U.S. industry.141 In the same
year, on July 29, 1994, under the Clinton Administration, the
United States became a signatory to UNCLOS, after a decade of
expressed reservation that the Convention-prior to the adop-
tion of the Supplement Agreement-violated free enterprise
principals by mandating the subsidizing of mining costs in favor
of poorer nations. 142
To date, the United States, however, has not ratified either
UNCLOS or the Supplemental Agreement in order to incorpo-
rate the Convention into U.S. domestic law.' 43 This reluctance is
largely due to the congressional concerns that UNCLOS would
diminish the private sector's chance for profitability with respect
to deep seabed mining, and that the Supplemental Agreement
does not adequately restructure Part XI of UNCLOS to conform
completely to free market principles.144 Article 136 of UNCLOS
declares that the resources of the seabed belong to "the com-
140. See id.
141. According to Assistant Secretary of State John Turner, the Supplemental
Agreement does the following: (i) overhauls the decision-making procedures of Part
XI to accord the United States and others major economic interests and influence over
deep seabed mining decisions; (ii) guarantees the United States a seat on the decision-
making body; (iii) gives the United States right of consent over any amendment and
veto power in future decisions; (iv) restructures the deep seabed mining regime along
free market principles by scaling back the power of the decision-making body and link-
ing operation to actual development; (v) eliminates any obligation upon the United
States or other States to finance the deep seabed mining enterprise; (vi) eliminates all
requirements for mandatory technology transfer or production controls; and (vii)
grandfathers the seabed mine site claims by companies holding U.S. licenses based on
certain criteria. See id.
142. See supra notes 64-65; see also Ken Warn, U.S. Agrees to Sign Law of Sea Treaty,
FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1994, at 2. See generally supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text
(recounting history of U.S. position on UNCLOS over past decades).
143. See Ratifications List, supra note 67.
144. See Doug Bandow, Don't Resurrect the Law of the Sea Treaty, 59J. INT'L AFF. 25,
26 (2005); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Env't and Pub. Works, 108th Cong. 70 (2004) (statement ofJohn T. Turner, Assistant
Sec'y of State, Bureau of Oceans and Int'l, Envt'l & Scientific Affairs). Urging the U.S.
Congress to ratify UNCLOS, the Bush Administration maintains that challenges to UN-
CLOS are based on an incorrect interpretation of the Convention, defending the le-
gally binding nature of the changes to UNCLOS brought about by the 1994 Supple-
mental Agreement. Id.
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mon heritage of mankind."'4 5 This means that all nations, even
those that are land-locked, can share equally in natural resources
within the deep seabed.
More recently, actions have been stirred up on the steps of
Capitol Hill on this issue.146 The Bush Administration has un-
equivocally announced its support for the United States' ratifica-
tion of UNCLOS.14 7 According to the Administration, the Sup-
plemental Agreement guaranteed access by U.S. industry to
deep seabed minerals based on reasonable terms and condi-
tions.1 4 8 In February 2004, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee voted unanimously in favor of sending UNCLOS to the
full Senate for ratification."' Yet, the Senate has proposed a
number of important declarations setting out the United States'
reservations in case ratification is in order. These declarations
address areas such as dispute resolution and the United States'
interest in preserving its maritime regulation and national secur-
ity.'5 ° As of the date of this Article, these matters are still pend-
ing in Congress.
145. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 136.
146. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations).
147. See Bandow, supra note 144, at 27; Howard S. Schiffman, U.S. Membership in
UNCLOS: What Consequences for the Marine Environment?, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
477, 480 (2005); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Hearing: Before the
Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of John T. Turner,
Assistant Sec'y of State, Bureau of Oceans and Int'l, Envt'l & Scientific Affairs).
148. See Bandow, supra note 144, at 27-28.
149. See, e.g., Senator Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Leadership in the World and the Law
of the Sea, http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006); see also
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations) ("The Law of the Sea Convention has great potential to advance
U.S. interests related to navigation of the seas, the productive use of their resources,
and the protection of the marine environment."). See generally Marjorie Ann Browne,
Congressional Research Service, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States:
Developments Since October 2003 (June 3, 2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/37196.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Schiffman, supra note 147. Most notably, with respect to the dispute
settlement under Part XV of UNCLOS, the U.S. Senate has proposed a declaration that
designates a "special arbitral tribunal" for disputes related to fisheries, protection of the
marine environment, marine scientific research, navigation, and pollution from vessels
and from dumping. Other proposed declarations stress the right to establish condi-
tions for entry of foreign ships into U.S. waters, the right to regulate when species are
introduced into the marine environment, and the right to fix permissible catch limits of
living resources within its EEZ. Id. at 481.
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The United States' reluctance primarily centers around the
sufficiency of the Supplemental Agreement with respect to deep
seabed mining, together with the United States' overall concern
for its maritime regulation on account of national security inter-
ests. Other maritime sovereignty and sea-use right principles of
UNCLOS do not pose obstacles for future ratification of UN-
CLOS by the United States. The fact that the Bush Administra-
tion and various research groups strongly support ratification,
viewing UNCLOS as a "widely accepted and comprehensive law
of the sea," 151 should bolster the argument that UNCLOS' re-
gime with respect to national maritime jurisdiction evidences
customary international law.
E. Summary: The Bundle of Uncertainties Left by UNCLOS
From the discussion above, it is evident that UNCLOS leaves
open several uncertainties.
First, a distinction must be made between competing territo-
rial claims and competing Continental Shelf/EEZ claims. Conti-
nental Shelf/EEZ claims concern sea-use rights, whereas territo-
rial claims concern ownership of various islands at sea. UN-
CLOS does not displace theories such as historic titles or other
customary international legal principles upon which a State may
base its territorial claims of sovereignty over the islands. These
theories are still being raised, with new evidence gathered or
publicized by the competing States. Meanwhile, no nation has
initiated a legal proceeding before the ICJ, for fear the outcome
cannot be controlled. 5 2 Although the new millennium occa-
sioned a couple of joint governmental agreements promising a
conciliatory treaty approach to the Disputes, 5 3 overall the Dis-
putes have remained dormant. This status quo may change as
151. See supra notes 138-142; see also David Sandalow, Law of the Sea Convention:
Should the U.S. Join?, (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 137, 2004), http://www.
brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb137.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2007) (advocating
U.S. ratification).
152. In the 1990s, when exploration activities near the disputed waters heightened
political tensions, there was some speculation that Vietnam might be willing to prose-
cute a case before the ICJ with the help of a prestigious U.S. law firm. See Barry Wain,
Lawyers Say Vietnam Has a Strong Case, AsiAN WALL ST. J., July 20, 1994, at 5 (recounting
China-Vietnam conflict and referring to representation of Vietnam by Washington,
D.C.-based Covington & Burling).
153. See supra notes 51-52 (referencing 2002 Declaration and 2005 Tripartite
Agreement).
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soon as a government announces an important grant of explora-
tory rights, or an oil and gas operator announces a substantial
commercial discovery in or near the disputed waters.
Second, whoever owns the Spratlys, or parts thereof, would
ostensibly be entitled to the Continental Shelf/EEZ extruding
from the islands(s). Here, UNCLOS triggers more of a legal
scramble down the road. The Continental Shelf/EEZ claimed
around the Spratlys may inevitably overlap with those claimed by
other coastal states in the region. Assuming that the underlying
claims of sovereignty are resolved as to the Spratlys, the compet-
ing nations must next tackle the question of overlapping Conti-
nental Shelf/EEZ claims. UNCLOS mandates treaty negotiation
and allows for "delimitation" to be resolved by "equitable solu-
tions." In the case of a conflict where the Convention "does not
attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal state or to other
States within the [EEZ] .... [The Convention merely provides
that such] conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity
. ,, 5" Determination based on "equity" offers no dispositive or
predictable answer to the Disputes, as the weighing of equity
rests with international judges or arbitrators whose jurisdiction
may be conferred solely by the litigants' consent. 55 Resolutions
based on equity cannot be predicted with any degree of cer-
tainty, although equity should favor countries with lower gross
national product ("GNP") or per capita income, considering the
fact that the Convention was a post-colonialism product and
signed by a large number of developing countries.
Third, the 200-nautical mile Continental Shelf/EEZ limit set
out in UNCLOS cannot resolve China's claim, which extends
well beyond the 200-nautical mile limit from China's baseline.
This expansive claim, therefore, must be predicated on China's
154. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 59.
155. The ICJ only has jurisdiction by the consent of State-party litigants. See gener-
ally Statute of International Court of Justice, ch. II, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993; see also Eric A. Posner & Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Biased?, (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 234, 2004),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_226-50/234.eap.icj-bias.pdf (last
visited Jan. 29, 2007); Philip V. Tisne, The ICJ and Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect
of the Avena and Lagrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29. FORIDHAM INrr'L L.J. 865, 877-84
(2006) (discussing bases for jurisdiction in the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ")); ICJ, Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction, http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasic-basisjurisdiction.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006).
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extension of its coastal baselines to both the Paracels and the
Spratlys. If China's ownership of the islands is legally estab-
lished, then under UNCLOS, China's Continental Shelf/EEZ
would encompass most, if not all, of the South China Sea. To
support its claim to the Paracels and the Spratlys, China must
rely on territorial acquisition principles rooted in customary in-
ternational law and substantiate its claim with historical evi-
dence. Still, China may not want this evidence adjudicated
before the ICJ or an ad hoc tribunal, fearing that such tribunal
may apply "equity" in favor of a lesser developed nation, espe-
cially in light of China's over-expansive claim. China would pre-
fer ad hoc treaty solutions, whereupon it can form economic alli-
ances with petroleum contractors and exert influence and lever-
age in the negotiation.
Fourth, under UNCLOS, even if the Spratlys Disputes did
not exist, or even if they were resolved in favor of China, China
and other ASEAN countries may still dispute their overlapping
respective Continental Shelf/EEZ claims in an "enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea." Whether the South China Sea or part
thereof qualifies as a "semi-enclosed sea" under UNCLOS will
introduce another level of uncertainty. If the South China Sea,
or part thereof, qualifies as a "semi-enclosed or enclosed sea,"
then UNCLOS does not mandate treaty solution regarding com-
peting or overlapping Continental Shelf/EEZ claims over hydro-
carbons-Article 123 only encourages "cooperation" among the
competing States, and only with respect to "living resources," not
"natural resources."
Fifth, even if all sovereign claims are resolved, the archipe-
lagic baselines of the islands must be determined to enable the
drawing of the Continental Shelf/EEZ, based on UNCLOS.
Here, difficulties arise because under UNCLOS, different juris-
dictional rights attach to rocks and islands. Empirically, not
every structure within the island group is capable of supporting
economic life, and any island or islet that is not capable of
human habitation or independent economic life will not have a
Continental Shelf or EEZ around it. Many structures within the
Spratlys may fall into this category, yet the competing countries
have strained to install garrisons or prove human habitations in
order to bolster their sovereign claims. The fortified rocks in
the South China Sea can hardly sustain the garrisons on them
without constant supplies brought in from the continent. All
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factual issues regarding independent economic life on the occu-
pied islands must be determined based on scientific, historical,
and expert testimonial evidence. For unoccupied islands,
habitation and economic activities may have to be proven in the
hypothetical, since there may be no actual evidence of human
habitation. '56
Sixth, there exists the uncertainty of whether the Spratlys
group may be divisible for purposes of claiming sovereignty. A
related question is whether a Continental Shelf/EEZ can be
drawn from the baselines of the entire Spratly group, or only
around some structures but not others (that is, whether a claim-
ant may assert sovereignty over the entire archipelago or only
over certain parts or structures thereof). It may be disingenuous
to circle an archipelagic baseline around the entire Spratlys
group as a single political entity, or to delineate precisely what
the group should encompass, because over time new islets may
form while existing ones disappear. On the other hand, if a
country successfully establishes sovereignty over the entire Sprat-
lys group as a non-divisible entity, UNCLOS's guidelines gov-
erning archipelagic states may apply to the entire group as the
possession of one single country.
Accordingly, the determination of sea-use rights under UN-
CLOS must first hinge upon: (i) whether certain structures
within the islands are habitable or capable of economiclife on
their own; (ii) whether the inhabitability of some of the islands
within the Spratlys may affect the legal characteristics of the en-
tire group, such that no Continental Shelf or EEZ can be
claimed; (iii) whether a State's sovereignty, if established, should
extend to all islands of the Spratlys group (not just any specific
structures thereof), including future formations; and (iv) under
these circumstances, whether baselines can be drawn for the
Spratlys in accordance with UNCLOS's guidelines governing
"archipelagic states" whereas the group may not have any inde-
pendent political identify of its own.
Seventh, resolution of the above issues depends on extrinsic
156. At least one commentator has opined that "human habitation" under UN-
CLOS Article 121(3) does not require proof of permanent human residence or contin-
uous economic life capable of sustaining a human being throughout the years. Accord-
ing to this commentator, the legal definition of "rocks" need not conform to scientific
or dictionary definitions, just as the term "Continental Shelf" under UNCLOS does not
necessarily mirror scientific definitions. See Charney, supra note 102, at 867.
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scientific or historical evidence that must fit the various legal
tests. Further, UNCLOS's "equity" test may invoke cases and ar-
bitral decisions articulating and interpreting the "median line"
and "equi-distance" rules, as well as evidence supporting the
"special circumstances" exception. The marine characteristics of
the islands and the South China Sea should also be taken into
consideration. Gathering such data and fitting it into the vari-
ous legal tests as well as into a "basket" of "equity" considerations
would amount to the "crystal ball" task of predicting the ruling
of an international judge or arbitrator, who may not be bound
by the practice of common-law stare decisis.
Eighth, although UNCLOS does not resolve sovereignty con-
flicts, it does offer principles that are relevant to the outcome,
for example, the drawing of baselines from which a Continental
Shelf/EEZ can be claimed. 157 But perhaps the most helpful fea-
ture of UNCLOS is its establishment of dispute resolution proce-
dures-UNCLOS provides a rather concrete mechanism for the
competing nations to arbitrate their Disputes, or to select a fo-
rum such as the ICJ for final adjudication. For instance, where
UNCLOS mandates the delimitation of the Continental Shelf/
EEZ by agreement, the Convention also obligates State claimants
resort to the Convention's dispute resolution procedures, should
they fail to reach agreement. On the other hand, voluntary sub-
mission of the Disputes to a forum, such as the ICJ, remains
speculative and remote. Private investors may be anxious to re-
move the cloud created by the political risk, yet they cannot
bring a claim for declaratory action in the ICJ. 58 Further, an ICJ
action and judgment will take a long time, and dispute resolu-
tion procedures do not become viable options unless and until
the Disputes are ripe. Even though some elementary joint gov-
ernmental framework has been established as evidenced by the
2002 Declaration and the Tripartite Agreement,159 only a major
157. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 15 (prohibiting opposite or adjacent States
from extending their territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial seas of each of the two states is measured). Still, at least one legal expert has
pointed out that both China and Vietnam, who have ratified UNCLOS, have also
claimed baselines that conflict with UNCLOS principles. See SEAPOL NEWSLETrER,
supra note 47.
158. See supra note 155 (noting that the jurisdiction of the ICJ is based on the
consent of the States to which it is open).
159. See generally 2002 Declaration, supra note 50; see also Ministry of Foreign Af-
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commercial petroleum discovery will enflame the Disputes suffi-
ciently to bring all interested parties to a negotiating table.
Finally, all parties to the South China Sea Disputes have rati-
fied UNCLOS (with the exception of Taiwan), 6 ° and, hence,
UNCLOS is now binding on all those ratifying Asian govern-
ments. China and Vietnam, however, have ratified UNCLOS
with filed declarations. 6 ' To urge compliance by non-con-
senting States, a challenging State must establish that UNCLOS
represents general rules of international law. Does it? In any
event, the Convention stands as the modern statement of inter-
national maritime law, whether through contractual obligations
or as customary usage. Its underlying policies are important for
UNCLOS signatories because they are the inspiration of a global
rule of law: The new international economic order must be
based on equity and peace, and "flexing military muscle" will
never be endorsed by the community of nations in the resolu-
tion of economic rights.
In summary, the future for the South China Sea Disputes
remains uncertain despite recent progress. One may also ques-
tion whether these signs of progress-for example, the 2002
Declaration and the 2005 Tripartite Agreement discussed in this
Article' 62-are truly progress or merely an interim diplomatic or
political move, part of the agendas of the region's leaders. The
private sector's comfort zone often comes from the success of
fairs of the People's Republic of China, supra note 51. See generally infra notes 181-214
and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing the 2002 Declaration and the 2005
Tripartite Agreement in greater detail).
160. See Declarations List, supra note 69; see also UNCLOS Status, supra note 65.
Although Taiwan has not ratified UNCLOS, Taiwan has not publicly denounced the
Convention, either.
161. See Declarations List, supra note 69. China, in particular, has even enacted
legislation annexing the Spratlys to its territory. See Law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, art. 2, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf; see also Raif Emi-
ners, Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo 6 (S.
Rajaratnam Sch. for Int'l Studies Working Paper No. 87, 2005), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/
publications/WorkingPapers/WP87.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (discussing China's
belief in its right to use force to protect the Spratlys and their surrounding waters). See
generally infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text (discussing China's legislative ef-
forts to annex territory).
162. See generally 2002 Declaration, supra note 50; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China, supra note 51. See generally 181-214 and accompanying text
(discussing and analyzing the 2002 Declaration and the 2005 Tripartite Agreement in
greater details).
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the 'Joint Development Zone" ('jDZ") concept, which offers the
hope that sovereignty disputes will pragmatically be resolved via
economic negotiation. As illustrated below, UNCLOS amply
supports the JDZ concept, but provides no roadmap for the ar-
chitecture of the JDZ itself.
IV. JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE AND THE
ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A. JDZ as Part of International Economic Law
Territorial disputes are not unusual or unique to the South
China Sea, and the Spratlys disputes are not the only example in
the region. Other territorial disputes include the Senkubu
(China,Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea), Kuriles (U.S.S.R. and
Japan), Sipadan and Ligitan (Indonesia and Malaysia),6' and
"Pedra Branca" (Singapore and Malaysia).164
Many disputes remain dormant and unresolved, primarily
because there is no immediate economic incentive for countries
to pursue remedies. Others have been resolved via Joint Devel-
opment Agreements ('jDA"), creating JDZs in which the com-
peting countries hold shared interests. Examples include the Ja-
pan-South Korea Agreement of 1974 regarding the East China
Sea, the Indonesia-Australia "Timor Gap" Treaty on the Zone of
Cooperation of 1988, the Malaysia-Thailand Treaty on the Estab-
lishment of the Joint Authority (MTJA) of 1990, and the Treaty
between Malaysia and Vietnam with respect to the Malay Ba-
163. See Ligitan-Sipadan, supra note 56 (resolving this dispute).
164. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum of Under-
standing between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the Exploration
and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf Involving the
Two Countries, Malay.-Vietnam, June 5, 1992 [hereinafter Malaysia-Vietnam Memoran-
dum], reprinted in 3 INT'L MAR. BOUNDARIES 2341 (Jonathan I. Charney & Robert W.
Smith eds., 2002); Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indone-
sian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Indon.- Austl., Dec. 11, 1989, 29
I.L.M. 469 (1990); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Kingdom of Thailand
and Malaysia on the Establishment of the Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the
Resources of the Sea Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Coun-
tries in the Gulf of Thailand, Thail.-Malay., 1979, 1291 U.N.T.S. 250 [hereinafter Thai-
land-Malaysia Memorandum]; Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea
ConcerningJoint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent
to the Two Countries, Japan-S. Korea, Feb. 5, 1974, 1225 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter
Japan-South Korea Agreement]. See generally MARuJ. VALENCIA, SOUTH-EAST ASIAN SEAS:
OIL UNDER TROUBLED WATERS 107-129 (1985); Kym P. Livesley, The Timor Gap Treaty, 90
ENERG" L. 61 (1990).
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sin.' 65 Outside of Asia Pacific, there have been the successes of
the 1976 Agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway
regarding cross-boundary petroleum operations, 166 the Persian
Gulf Agreement of 1965 between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
67
the Agreement between Iceland and Norway,' 6' and more re-
cently the JDZ treaty between Nigeria and Sdo Tom6 e Princip6
of 2001.169
The JDZ concept has increasingly been recognized by the
international community as a peaceful and pragmatic alternative
to settle the economic and emotional battles of competing sover-
eign claims-"emotional" in the sense that territorial disputes al-
ways involve an intense display of nationalism and can lead to
uproar, not just among governments, but also in the popu-
lace.170 To the extent thatJDZs form norms of practice and can
shape future commercial conduct, they could become part of
international economic law.
Several approaches toJDZs have been tried, resulting gener-
165. See Malaysia-Vietnam Memorandum, supra note 164, at 2341; Thailand-Malay-
sia Memorandum, supra note 164; Japan-South Korea Agreement, supra note 164; see
also Livesly, supra note 164.
166. See Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland And the Government of the Kingdom of Norway,
Concerning Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-Operation, U.K-Nor., Apr. 4, 2005, available
at http://www.og.dti.gov.uk/upstream/infrastructure/nfa_2005.doc (setting out the
terms for cross-boundary cooperation between the United Kingdom and Norway with
regard to petroleum activities).
167. See Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, July 7, 1965, 4 I.L.M.
1134 (agreeing to partition the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).
168. See Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland andJan Mayen, Ice.-
Nor., Oct. 22, 1981, 2124 U.N.T.S. 262 (agreeing on the procedure for determining the
delimitation line on the continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen).
169. See Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Re-
public of Sdo Tom6 e Princip6 on the Joint Development of Petroleum and Other Re-
sources, in Respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, Nig.-Sdo
Tom6 e Princip6, Feb. 21, 2001 [hereinafter Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 Treaty], available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES
/STP-NGA2001.PDF (agreeing on the formation of a Joint Development Zone for the
exploration of petroleum deposits in waters claimed by the two countries); see also infra
notes 289-348 and accompanying text.
170. See Wei Cui, Multilateral Management as a Fair Solution to the Spratly Disputes, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 799 (2003) (encouraging development of a joint management
system based on fairness and equity for the development of the Spratlys); Liu, supra
note 42 (arguing that it is in the best interests of all States with claims to the Spratlys to
concede sovereignty over the archipelago to China in exchange for a system of joint
resource development of the area).
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ally in three types of JDAs. In the first type, exemplified by the
Japan-South Korea agreement,1 71 each country is entitled to ap-
point its licensee for a licensed area, and the licensees are re-
quired to reach a joint agreement. In the second type, such as
the Malaysia-Thailand and Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 treaties, 172 a supra-
national authority is created to grant licenses and determine
their terms. In the third type, more common in the Middle East,
one nation is given the exclusive and unilateral right to develop
the disputed area for the benefit of all countries. 73 At least one
commentator had advocated the practice of forming a joint au-
thority as the preferred model (the 'Joint Authority Model"), be-
cause such a model purportedly creates a neutral body that ad-
ministers the whole of the JDZ, based on an intergovernmental
agreement establishing the legal and administrative scheme for
the JDZ. 174 The issue then becomes whether the administering
body is indeed neutral. Part VIII of this Article analyzes the Ni-
geria-Sdo Tom6 treaty as an example of this approach.
B. Viability of JDZ as a Legal and Contractual Framework
The JDZ concept is in line with the spirit of UNCLOS as a
post-Second World War peace-making treaty. For example, Arti-
cle 59 of UNCLOS encourages States parties to resolve their
Continental Shelf conflicts by agreement, taking into account
not only their national interests but also those of the interna-
tional community. 75 Likewise, Articles 74 and 83 provide that
the delimitation of the Continental Shelf/EEZ shall be effected
171. SeeJapan-South Korea Agreement, supra note 164.
172. See Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 Treaty, supra note 169; see also Thailand- Malaysia Mem-
orandum, supra note 164. See generally infra notes 289-348 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing, inter alia, the Nigeria-Sdo Tome Treaty).
173. See, e.g., Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign
Rights Over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, Qatar-Abu Dhabi, Mar. 30, 1969,
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
TREATIES/QAT-ARE1969MB.PDF; see also Hazel Fox et. al., Joint Development of Offshore
Oil and Gas: A Model Agreement for States forJoint Development with Explanatory Commentary
55-56 (British Inst. Int'l and Comparative Law, 1989) (describing the structure of the
agreement between Qatar and Abu Dhabi).
174. See Ernst Willheim, Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals
for a Joint Development Zone in the 'Timor Gap,'29 NAT. REsoURCES J. 821, 832-42 (1989)
(proposing that ajoint authority be responsible for administering the whole of theJDZ
under the authority of both disputing nations, with neither conceding their claims to
the territory).
175. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 59.
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by agreement, and "the States concerned, in a spirit of under-
standing and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature."'176 Together, Ar-
ticles 59, 74, and 83 form the legal basis for JDZ negotiation
under UNCLOS.
Problems remain with the JDZ notion because the JDZ solu-
tion is not mandatory. For example, although UNCLOS obli-
gates the disputing parties to resolve the delimitation of the Con-
tinental Shelf/EEZ, the Convention only encourages a "provi-
sional arrangement," and, in the case of an enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea, the Convention does not mandate joint develop-
ment of natural resources. 177
Country leaders may still face vehement objection from
their constituents, who may view any concession of sovereignty
made in aJDZ as an insult to nationalism. AJDA means that one
nation agrees to share with others what it once claimed was its
territory-a compromise of what the nation otherwise believes to
be its good claim. Thus, JDZ negotiation may still break down
because of emotional nationalism, and hence may rupture into
open hostilities that might otherwise have remained dormant.
Negotiating the economic terms of a JDZ may go on endlessly,
while the nationalistic fervor may escalate. Further, a JDZ may
uproot existing contractual terms between a host government
and its petroleum contractor, making concession of economic
terms with additional parties even more difficult to achieve.
The JDZ option is also not easy to implement. Three layers
of challenges exist in JDZ implementation. First, divergent na-
tional interest must be balanced into a compromise. Second, if
the JDA is predicated upon UNCLOS Articles 59, 74, and 83,
those States who have ratified UNCLOS will then be bound by its
dispute resolution alternatives and procedures, should JDZ ne-
gotiation result in an impasse. Third, in the process of JDZ ne-
gotiation, new obstacles may arise-the negotiating parties must
determine percentages of profit, control mechanism for interest
holders, and a consensual legal and administrative system to ac-
commodate every participating country.
176. See id. arts. 74, 83.
177. See id. arts. 74, 83, 123.
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V. THE "SILENT PARTNERSHIP" THEORY-AN EXAMPLE OF
REALPOLITIK: THE CHINA-VIETNAM CONFLICT1 78
This part of the Article uses the tension between China and
Vietnam in the past decade as a case study of how Realpolitik
could prompt State actions as well as corporate actions, how
these Realpolitik factors manifested themselves in the State's com-
mercial relationships with the private sector, and how such rela-
tionships could taint the JDA/JDZ negotiation, turning the
treaty solution into a political product that undermines the "eq-
uity" goals of UNCLOS. The past decade was used as an exam-
ple because, during that period, UNCLOS went into force, and
controversial exploration activities took place in the area, caus-
ing intense conflicts between China and Vietnam (the main pro-
tagonists in the Disputes) and resulting in overt strategic maneu-
vers by both nations. The tension between China and Vietnam
in the 1990s can recur at any time, notwithstanding recent bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements demonstrating diplomatic im-
provement and commitment to regional peace.
The competing countries motivated by Realpolitik may ma-
nipulate the private investor caught in the sovereign conflict.
179
In such a scenario, as pointed out in the case study, four immi-
nent possibilities may result. First, the private investor is likely to
fashion self-help, such as forming a silent partnership with a sup-
porting government. Second, such "self-help" mechanisms can
fortify an elitist structure that disengages the ultimate goals of
negotiated treaty solutions: the attainment of a compromise
that represents all national interests aided by the procedural fair-
ness and the integrity of the negotiation process. Third, in work-
ing toward a treaty solution, a State may use law (such as UN-
CLOS) to bolster its political agenda and achieve political objec-
tives. Law, therefore, becomes part of Realpolitik, and is used as a
tool of manipulation rather than as guidance or imperatives for
political conduct.1 " Finally, it is ultimately the silent partner-
178. This part of the Article is based strictly on public information and news
reports.
179. See Mark J. Valencia, How Governments Lure Companies Into the Sea, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., July 5, 1994, at 10.
180. The use of law for tactical manipulation comports with the age-old critique
that international law is not "real law" due to a lack of an effective enforcement mecha-
nism-States obey it only when they wish or when it serves their interest because the
duties it imposes are enforced only by moral sanctions or fear of provoking general
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ship between the most powerful State and the most able industry
player that controls the outcome of sovereign disputes over natu-
ral resources. The distribution of natural resources, therefore,
continues to be the domain of the powerful.
Quite often, a government's Realpolitik motive is rarely ar-
ticulated to the public. Commentators can only speculate by ex-
amining governmental actions as indicia of any such hidden
agenda. Many such agendas will even be deliberately shielded
from the public due to national security, public relations incen-
tives, and/or political concerns. Further, the national interests
may be at odds with the personal motivation of individual coun-
try leaders, who may or may not always have the best interest of
the nation at heart, depending on the political regime and the
actors in question. Accordingly, efforts to bolster the countries'
respective claims in a territorial dispute may have their roots not
only in macroeconomic considerations but also in the personal
political motives and careers of the ruling elites. This reality will
make it extremely difficult for any legal scholar to evaluate or
predict the possible outcome of any legal battles connected to
territorial disputes. (Indeed, such an effort will amount to a
pure academic exercise, which may infuse more public tension
into an arena also entangled with heated nationalism and fierce
economic competition.)
Accordingly, in these highly political matters, legal ques-
tions should be mapped vis-a-vis factors of Realpolitik, and the
legal scholar should be prepared to take on the role of a political
commentator. The result should be a hybrid, innovative form of
legal scholarship that combines real life reporting with legal
analysis. In other words, although law remains a relevant and
important matter for staging government action, the savvy ob-
server should ask: Ultimately, what good does law do?
hostility. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 142 (1954)
(noting that the law of nations "is not law properly so called"); see also Valencia, supra
note 179 (discussing legality of treaty schemes and its interplay with traditional thinking
regarding "soft" international law).
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VI. THE CASE STUDY INVOLVING. CHINA AND
VIETNAM IN THE SEARCH FOR OIL
A. Nation-States'Efforts to Use Law and Commerce to
Bolster Claims of Territorial Sovereignty
1. China's Law of 1992
On February 15, 1992, two years before UNCLOS came into
force, China enacted its Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Law ("Law of 1992" or "Law"). The Law declares Taiwan, the
Spratlys, the Paracels, and Diaoyu Tai islands (controlled by Ja-
pan) as part of China's "territorial land," and reaffirms China's
right to use military force to protect these islands. In fact, one
regional newspaper noted that under this Law, "there can be vir-
tually no offshore oil drilling in the East or South China Sea
without China's permission."" 1 The Law does not include any
coordinates or other indicator of boundaries for these islands. It
adopts UNCLOS's concepts of Internal Waters and the 12-nauti-
cal mile1 2 Territorial Sea limit, selects the straight line method
of drawing baselines, and reserves China's right to announce
such baselines in the future.18 3
2. The "Vanguard Bank" Test Case and the
Crestone Concession
But China did not stop there. In May 1992, only a few
months after the enactment of the Law, China awarded an oil
exploration deal covering some 30,000 square kilometers (ap-
proximately 9,700 square miles) to Crestone Energy Corporation
("Crestone"), a U.S. independent oil company based in Denver,
Colorado, on an area called Bai Tu Chinh Reef in Vietnamese,
and Wan An Bei in Chinese."8 4 This area is also known interna-
tionally as the "Vanguard Bank" ("Wai'an Tan" in Chinese)."8 5
181. Harvey Stockwin, China's Alarming Ripple Effect, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
8, 1992, at 9.
182. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 3.
183. See Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992,
art. 2, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF
FILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf; see also Stockwin, supra note 181; Spratlys Spat Unfolds Na-
ivety, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 18, 1995, at 4 (analyzing effect of China's Law of 1992).
184. (See Exhibit D appended to this Article).
185. See Obscure U.S. Oilman Bets His Firm on the China Card, WALL ST. J. ASIA, July
20, 1992, at 5; see also Scene Set for Clashes Over Rival Sea Claims, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
April 21, 1994, at 10 (recounting China's grant of exploration license to Crestone Cor-
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The Vanguard Bank allegedly was located approximately
174 miles (280 kilometers) to the southeast side of the
Vietnamese mainland, and approximately 621 miles (1000 kilo-
meters) from the nearest part of China, the Hainan Island.'86
The Vanguard Bank has long been claimed by Vietnam as within
its EEZ and Continental Shelf. At the time of China's award to
Crestone, Vietnam had scientific platforms on the Vanguard
Bank, but no military personnel. 187 It was reported that at its
most western point, the Crestone Concession is about 100 miles
(161 kilometers) from the Vietnamese coast, and is only about
47 miles (75 kilometers) east of Vietnam's producing oilfield,
which is in partnership with Australia and Japan, the Dai Hung
(Big Bear) project.188 Holding the contractual license granted
by China, Crestone took the position that the Vanguard Bank
belongs to China, but also publicly urged the peaceful solution
of negotiating joint development.189
China's move regarding the Vanguard Bank demonstrated
its expansionist policy, chilling petroleum companies already op-
erating in Hanoi, 9 ' and testing Vietnam's reaction. Then, fac-
ing the prospect that the United States would soon end the trade
embargo against Vietnam, China deliberately awarded the li-
cense to a small U.S. independent oil company trying to expand
internationally, the type of corporate entity that would likely
yield to China's agenda.
Other ASEAN countries hoped for U.S. assistance to
counter China's expansionism. 91 However, the United States
poration); Press Release, Crestone Corporation, Shanghai Presentation (Dec. 2003)
[hereinafter Crestone Press Release] (on file with author); Guoxing, supra note 15, at
14.
186. SeeVIETNAM OIL & GAS REPORT, June 1994, at 9, (on file with author); see also
Guoxing, supra note 15, at 14.
187. See Hanoi Defends Claims to Area Covered by Beijing Oil Deal, STRAITS TIMES, June
28, 1992; Vietnam Urges China to Scrap Spratly Oil Venture, STRAITS TIMES, June 23, 1992.
188. See SEAPOL NEWSLETTER, supra note 47 at 2; see also Valencia, supra note 179.
189. See Crestone Press Release, supra note 185 (on file with author).
190. See China's Spratlys Deal Has Oil Firms in Hanoi Worried, STRAITS TIMES, June 27,
1992.
191. See U.S. Ready to Talk on Spratlys, SUNDAY HER. SUN (Australia), July 26, 1992;
U.S. Urged to Back Talks on Disputed Spratlys, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992; U.S. Obliged to
Defend Manila if Spratlys Attacked, STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992; Don't Enforce Claim to
Spratlys, U.S. Warns China-Washington Not Backing Any of the Claimants, SUNDAY TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1992; Spratlys Could be Next Trouble Spot, Says U.S. Commander, STRAITS TIMES, Oct.
31, 1992.
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maintained neutrality, adhering to its official stance of non-in-
volvement, taking the position that the U.S.-Philippine defense
treaty of 1951 did not obligate the United States to be involved
in military action resulting from the Spratly Disputes. 192 None-
theless, to protect its commercial and strategic interest in the
Pacific Rim, the United States announced its "serious concern
[regarding] any... restriction on maritime activity in the South
China Sea that was not consistent with international law," and
expressed its unwillingness to tolerate any interference with ship-
ping in the region."t 3
3. Vietnam's "Blue Dragon" Move
In response to China's action, Vietnam steadfastly de-
nounced the action of Crestone, declaring that, "Crestone no
longer has any standing or rating in Hanoi" and should get a
"return ticket to Denver."'9 4  The official newspaper of the
Vietnamese Defense Ministry called the Crestone Concession a
clear "violation of the Continental Shelf of Vietnam and of inter-
national maritime law."
1 9 5
At the time of the Crestone award, Vietnam was facing a
myriad of challenges. The country had just completed about
eight years of experimental market economy combined with a
single-party Marxist political regime (a combination that Viet-
nam copied from China).1" 6 The U.S. trade embargo was still in
place, leaving the foreign investment scene in Vietnam to be oc-
cupied by Taiwan, Japan, France, Australia, and others. Eco-
nomic progress was slow due to inexperience, corruption (a
192. See End of the Sentry, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26, 1992. The United States and
oil-producing Indonesia were regarded as possible neutral brokers of the Disputes. See
Indonesia and US. Looked Upon to Ease Tension in Spratlys, 9 OIL & GAs NEws 26, July 13-
19, 1992. But see Saragosa, supra note 13.
193. See Ian James Storey, Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines, and the South
China Sea Dispute, 21 CONTEMP. SE. AsIA 9 n.65 (1999).
194. See, e.g., ViETNAM OIL & GAS R.EPORT, July 1995, at 11 (on file with author).
195. Scene Set for Clashes Over Rival Sea Claims, supra note 185; see VIETNAm OIL &
GAs REPORT, June 1994 (on file with author) (reporting on protesting statements from
Vietnamese Defense Ministry); see also Vietnam Rejects China's Survey for Oil Near Spratlys,
supra note 44 (reporting that Vietnam continued to object to Crestone deal six years
after Crestone award) (on file with author).
196. See generally Wendy Duong, Gender Equality and Women's Issues in Vietnam: The
Vietnamese Woman-Warrior and Poet, 10 PAC. RiM L. & POL'YJ. 191 (2001) (presenting
an overview of Vietnam's post-war development in order to identify and analyze gender
issues in contemporary Vietnamese society).
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problem that Vietnam also shared with China), lack of a mean-
ingful rule-of-law system especially in commercial matters, an
ideologically divisive nation run by an inert bureaucracy, and a
society whose standards of living were at least fifty years behind
the free world. 19 7 National debts owed to the former Soviet bloc
had to be paid after twenty years of die-hard commitment of all
national resources to the "American War." Among the prospect
of wealth was the granting of aggressive petroleum exploration
licenses along the country's 2500-kilometer coastline.
It took Vietnam's two years following the Crestone license
before the country could mastermind an alliance of offshore oil
and gas interests that appeared to counter-balance the threat of
the China-Crestone alliance. In April 1994, as soon as the U.S.
trade embargo was lifted, Vietnam closed its first petroleum deal
with a U.S. company, Mobil Corporation. The industry credited
Mobil with discovering the White Tiger oilfield in the South
China Sea, but it had to exit the country at the end of the Viet-
nam War, leaving White Tiger for the Soviet Union to develop.
In the same month as the Clinton Administration's lifting of
the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam, on April 19, 1994, the
Vietnamese government signed the "Blue Dragon" contract
awarding to a Mobil-led consortium an exploration block close
to the Spratlys archipelago and directly adjoining the Vanguard
Bank. 9 ' Blue Dragon was estimated to have recoverable
reserves of at least between 500 million and one billion bar-
rels,199 and gas in the range of 5 tcf. 20 0 Blue Dragon repre-
sented the joint interests of Japan, the United States, Russia, and
Vietnam. 20 1 China immediately objected to Vietnam's action
197. See id. at 216-19.
198. See R. THOMA COLLINS JR., BLUE DRAGON: RECKONING IN THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA (2002) (journalistic account of Mobil's relationship with Vietnam in Blue Dragon,
told by Mobil's former government relations executive). See generally Exhibit D ap-
pended to this Article.
199. See Crestone Press Release, supra note 185.
200. See id.
201. See VIETNAM OIL & GAS REPORT, June 1994, at 8 (on file with author). Viet-
nam officially released the identity of the Blue Dragon players. The consortium con-
sisted of Mobil, JAPEX and Nissho Iwai of Japan, Indonesia Petroleum Ltd. (INPEX),
PetroVietnam, and Zarubezhneft of Russia. Id. Vietnam announced the consortium to
the public even before the United States lifted its trade embargo against Vietnam. Mo-
bil, Japan Firms Set up Vietnam Oil Exploration Firm, VIETNAM NEWS, Feb. 2, 1994. Blue
Dragon represented the first exploitation interest held by a U.S. company in Vietnam.
See COLLINS, supra note 198, at 137. Japan held other exploitation interests in the
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and claimed rights over Blue Dragon, predicated upon China's
claim to the Spratlys. 2° 2 Once Blue Dragon had been "spud-
ded, '20 3 Vietnam began to move an oil rig into the Vanguard
Bank, perhaps to test China's reaction. Beijing immediately dis-
played its hostility with two Chinese warships, preventing Viet-
nam from re-supplying the rig.20 4
B. Linkage to the Ratification of UNLCOS
International scholars should expect the signing of treaties
to evidence the signatories' international commitment, and not
just a political move toward expansionism. Yet, in the case of
China and Vietnam, each country's ratification of UNCLOS in
the 1990s appeared to be tied to the nation's political agenda
with respect to the Spradys group. In filing their ratification in-
strument with the United Nations, both countries also filed "dec-
larations" to preserve their respective positions. 20 5
1. Vietnam's ratification of UNCLOS
A couple of months after the signing of the Blue Dragon
contract, the Vietnamese National Assembly passed a Resolution
South China Sea other than Blue Dragon. See Petro Vietnam website, http://www.
petrovietnam.com.vn (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (describing foreign oil and gas compa-
nies' activities offshore Vietnam). Russia held production interest in the White Tiger
field beginning in the 1970s. See Blagov, supra note 4.
202. Oilfield is Ours, Says China, STRAITS TIMES, May 11, 1994; Vietnam Oil Deal Fuels
Spratlys Row, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 9, 1994.
203. "Spudding" is a colloquial industry term to refer to the first boring of a hole
in the drilling of an oil well. See HoWARD R. WILAMS & CHARLESJ. MEYERS, OIL & GAS
LAW: MANUAL OF TERMS 1182 (12th ed. 1991).
204. See UNCLOS, supra note 61; see also U.N. Summary of Practice, supra note 57,
at 217-20.
205. The term "declaration" is used for various international instruments. The
term is often deliberately chosen to indicate that the parties merely want to declare
certain aspirations, but do not necessarily create binding obligations. See U.N., UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION: TREATY REFERENCE GUIDE (1999), http://untreaty.un.
org/English/guide.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2007). On the other hand, independent of
U.N. instruments, the ICJ has stated that a State can make "declarations" by way of
unilateral acts concerning legal or factual situations, and those unilateral acts may have
the effect of creating legal obligations based on the principle of "good faith." In the
language of the World Court, "declarations" of this kind may be and often are very
specific, and the intention of the State confers upon the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ 253, 267 (Dec. 20)
("An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding").
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on June 3, 1994, ratifying UNCLOS ("Resolution") .206 The Reso-
lution reasserts Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels and
Spratlys, and commits Vietnam to "peaceful resolution" by "co-
operating with the international community" and "in conformity
with UNCLOS." 20 7 Vietnam also distinguishes the Spratlys Dis-
putes from China's violation of the Vietnamese Continental
Shelf via China's grant of the Crestone Concession in the Van-
guard Bank.20 ' The Resolution clarifies that Vietnam's ratifica-
tion of UNCLOS does not constitute a retreat from its sovereign
claims over the islands or the defense of its Continental Shelf.
Vietnam's ratification of UNCLOS could be seen as its post-
Blue Dragon effort to solicit international support and to deter
China's aggression. It was Vietnam's official answer to China's
Law of 1992, but only after Vietnam had positioned itself with an
alliance of international interests in Blue Dragon to commemo-
rate the United States' return to Vietnam. The timing of Viet-
nam's ratification of UNCLOS, therefore, appeared to be strate-
gically planned.
2. China's ratification of UNCLOS
China signed the Convention in 1982,209 but did not ratify it
until June 7, 1996 (although it first announced its intent to ratify
UNCLOS in 1994, when its dispute with Vietnam over Blue
Dragon was most intense). 211 Compared to Vietnam's, China's
ratification of UNCLOS contains a more aggressive and more
specific declaration.
First, China reaffirms its sovereignty over the Paracels and
the Spratlys as pronounced in its national law (evidencing
206. Resolution Regarding Ratification of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea Issued by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (trans.)
[hereinafter Resolution], printed in NHAN DAN [THE PEOPLE'S NEWSPAPER], Official Com-
muniqu6 of the Vietnamese Communist Party, No. 14289 (June 1994) (on file with
author).
207. Id. at 3-4; see Nguyen Van Truong, Vietnam and the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, VIETNAM NEWS, July 3, 1994.
208. The Resolution specifically emphasized that "a clear distinction should be
made between the settlement of the territorial sovereignty dispute over the [Paracels]
and [Spratlys] archipelagoes on one hand, and, on the other hand, the defense of the
continental shelf that is fully under Vietnam's sovereign .. .jurisdiction in conformity
with [UNCLOS]." Resolution, supra note 206, 3-4.
209. See Declarations List, supra note 69.
210. See id.; see also HeJun, China Set to Join UN Convention on the Sea, CHINA DAILY,
Sept. 9, 1994. Accord UNCLOS Status, supra note 65.
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China's objection to any interpretation of UNCLOS that may un-
dercut China's sovereignty claims to the two island groups).
Second, China claims a Continental Shelf and EEZ of 200
nautical miles form its baselines drawn under the "straight base-
line" method. At least one commentator has pointed out that
China's straight baselines drawn along part of its coasts and sur-
rounding the Paracels can be construed as being at odds with
UNCLOS, which requires baselines to be drawn at "low water
marks"-UNCLOS only allows a straight baseline drawing when
the coastline meets certain geographical characteristics. 21
1 If
this view is correct, then China ratified UNCLOS only to violate
it!
However, China refrains from drawing straight baselines
around the two points of contested territories: the Japanese-con-
trolled "Senkakus" (Diaoyudao), and the Spratlys.2 12 Perhaps as
a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China is
conscious of, and wants to illustrate some degree of loyalty to
U.N. instruments.
Finally, China also reaffirms its right to require foreign na-
val vessels passing through its Territorial Sea to obtain China's
prior permission in accordance with the Law of 1992.213 This
seems to contradict UNCLOS' rule allowing vessels' innocent
passage through the Territorial Sea of a coastal state.2 1 4 In fact,
in its declaration, China specifically states that UNCLOS' inno-
cent passage provisions shall not prejudice China's right to grant
or deny prior permission for those innocent vessels to traverse
through its Territorial Sea.21 5
Despite the difference in form, certain parts of China's and
Vietnam's declaration are in essence the same. Both countries
want to assure that their ratification of UNCLOS will not waive
their substantive sovereign claims to the islands or the defense of
their Continental Shelves. One reality remains certain-the
211. The method of "straight baselines" joining appropriate points may be em-
ployed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
"in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe
of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. . . ." UNCLOS, supra note 61, art.
7(1); see Barry Wain, China Snubs the Law of the Sea, AsLAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1996.
212. See "Aain, supra note 211.
213. See Stockwin, supra note 181.
214. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 17.
215. See supra notes 209-210.
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countries' actions, including their turning to UNCLOS, coin-
cided with the "spudding" and prospect, if any, of commercial
discoveries in The Vanguard Band and Blue Dragon!
C. Prospect of Joint Development or Litigation before the
International Court of Justice
1. The Chinese Position
All throughout the commotion of the early 1990s, China ex-
hibited conflicting signals. She stated publicly that sovereignty
claims could only be resolved through joint development negoti-
ations, implying that international adjudication (permitted
under UNCLOS) would not be China's preferred solution to ad-
dress its claim of sovereignty.216 China specifically indicated that
she would be willing to explore a 'joint development" arrange-
ment with Vietnam, as well as other ASEAN countries.21 7
It is understandable why China would want to reject the ICJ
as the forum for resolution of the Disputes-her over-expansive
claim might appear prima facie unreasonable in light of the "eq-
uitable" spirit of a post-colonialism convention like UNCLOS,
and hence may not stand up before the ICJ. At the same time,
China still hinted at military actions and continued to take over
isles and islets.2 18 One could speculate that strategically, China
216. See Michael Richardson, In Spratlys Crisis, China Offers Joint Development-
Again, INT'L HERALD TIB., July 22, 1992; see also China is Open to Spratly Talks, INT'L
HERALD TRmB., July 21, 1992; Reginald Chua & Mary Kwang, China "Willing to Shelve"
Spratly Dispute, STRAITS TIMES, July 21, 1992.
217. See China Offers Hanoi a Deal on Spratlys, PLArr's OILGRAM NEWS, Sept. 7, 1994;
Malaysia to Study Chinese Offer to Develop Spratlys, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 26, 1992; see also
Don't Turn Spratlys into Global Row, Beijing Tells Manila, STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992;
Spratly Jurisdictional Dispute Garners Attention, 10 PETROCONSULTANTS' INT'L OIL LETTER,
Aug. 1, 1994.
218. See, e.g., China "Occupied Eighth Spratly Isle, "supra note 28; see also China Tests its
Rivals'Resolve in the Spratlys, supra note 44 (reporting on China's exercise of naval ships
in disputed area); Chinese Bureaucrats Draw the Line in South China Sea Chinese Bureaucrats
Draw the Line in South China Sea, supra note 1, at 16 (commenting that "Chinese state-
ments and foreign policy indicate [its determination] to project its naval power into the
South China Sea to solidify its claims to the Spratlys."); accord Stockwin, supra note 181.
With respect to China's intermittent takeovers of islets, the international community as
a whole may be less likely to react negatively to any such military occupation because
sovereignty has long been disputed and the ultimate outcome so certain. For example,
the international community remained complacent when, in the 1970s, China took
over the Paracels. At that time, the world's attention was on the end of the Vietnam
War-the United States' ultimate failure in Southeast Asia. China's military occupation
of some remote island group in the Pacific simply did not receive notoriety and was
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staged the most aggressive stand to bully neighboring Asian
States into concessions, from which it could eventually back
down into a show of international friendship and conciliation in
line with the spirit of UNCLOS. This melt-down attitude would
pave the way for advantageous joint development negotiation,
and would also help China look good before a peace-loving in-
ternational community.
2. The Vietnamese Position
In the early 1990s, outraged by the Crestone Concession,
Vietnam flatly refused any bilateral negotiations with China,219
although it indicated its willingness to participate in multilateral
negotiations (confirming Vietnam's desire for an ASEAN alli-
ance to counterbalance against China's military and economic
muscles).22° Vietnam's retaining of a prominent Washington
D.C. law firm, Covington & Burling, in the 1990s to assess the
Vietnamese legal position 22 indicated that Vietnam might be
amenable to bringing a claim before the ICJ, should there be a
commercial discovery in the Vanguard Bank or Blue Dragon.
222
In fact, in such a case, Vietnam might have no choice but to
initiate ICJ legal recourse. Bilateral negotiation would not bene-
fit Vietnam, which did not hold much political, economic, or
military leverage vis-a-vis China. The Covington & Burling brief
favoring the Vietnamese position was released to the Asian Wall
Street Journal,223 indicating Vietnam's intent to rally for interna-
tional support.
Unfortunately, after a period of unsuccessful and expensive
drilling, Mobil Corporation abandoned exploration, leaving
overshadowed by the traumatic fall of Saigon. China has occupied the Paracels for
thirty years, and activists have not criticized China for her taking of the Paracels the
same way they have condemned her occupation of Tibet.
219. See, e.g., Wain, supra note 46 ("Vietnamese analysts believe China is deliber-
ately exerting pressure on Vietnam as part of a wider goal to fill the post-Cold War
power vacuum in Southeast Asia"); see also Hanoi Defends Claims to Area Covered by Beijing
Oil Deal, supra note 187.
220. See, e.g., Hanoi Expected to Seek ASEAN Support Over Spratlys Issue, supra note 46.
221. See, Wain, supra note 152, at 5.
222. The mandate given to the law firm was to assess how the ICJ would settle
boundary disputes between Vietnam and China with respect to the Vanguard Bank. See
VIETNAM OIL AND GAS REPORT, July 1995, at 7 (on file with author).
223. Barry Wain, Vietnam Fires New Weapon in Oil Dispute: The Law, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., June 17, 1995; see also Wain, supra note 152.
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Blue Dragon a "dry hole. '224 Mobil's exploration division even-
tually left Vietnam. 225 Since then, Vietnam has had several off-
shore exploration blocks scheduled for seismic testing, drilling,
or production. 26 Petroleum activities have continued off its
coasts although its strongest U.S. corporate ally, Mobil Corpora-
tion, has left the scene. British Petroleum remains a substantial
stakeholder in the area with its gas discovery and offshore pipe-
line in the Con Son Basin.227
224. "Dry Hole" is the colloquial expression used by industry to describe unsuc-
cessful drilling. See Collins, supra note 198, at 7.
225. Within less than a couple of years after Mobil's departure from Vietnam, on
December 1, 1998, Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation signed an agreement to
merge. As of November 30, 1999, Exxon changed its name to Exxon-Mobil Corpora-
tion, and the new consolidated entity was created. See Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Re-
port (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 1999). For the few years immediately following the merger,
the newly consolidated entity, Exxon-Mobil, known today as the largest international
petroleum company in the world, did not return to Vietnam for further exploration
activities. See id.; see also Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Dec. 31,
2000); see also PetroVietnam, http://www.petrovietnam.com.vn (last visited Mar. 18,
2006) (describing activities of foreign oil companies doing business in Vietnam). In
contrast, Exxon-Mobil's heightened commercial presence in China, especially between
2000 and 2002, was evidenced by numerous corporate press releases announcing Ex-
xon-Mobil joint ventures with Chinese partners in petroleum, petrochemical, and gas
pipeline projects. See Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil and Sinopec Sign
Framework Agreement to Strengthen Strategic Alliance on China (Oct. 2002) (on file
with author); Press Release, Exxon-Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil Chemical in China (2001)
(on file with author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil and CLP Named
by Petrochemical for the China West-to-East Gas Pipeline Project (June 2001) (on file
with author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., Coal, Minerals & Power (2000) (on file
with author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil Chemical and Shanghai
Petrochemical Start UP Hydrocarbon Resins Plant in China (Apr. 2000) (on file with
author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., Exxon Mobil Corporation and China Petro-
leum and Chemical Corporation Expand Strategic Alliance (Sept. 2000) (on file with
author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., ExxonMobil Corporation Invests in China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation Initial Public Offering (Oct. 2000) (on file with
author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp., P.C. Tan to Head ExxonMobil's Ventures in
Mainland China (Mar. 2001) (on file with author); Press Release, Exxon Mobil Corp.,
Vision and Courage on China (2000) (on file with author). As of fiscal year ending
December 31, 1998, Exxon Corporation also disclosed majority-owned power plants in
China (prior to the Mobil-Exxon merger). See Exxon Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) (Dec. 31, 1998).
More, recently, Exxon-Mobil has decided to pursue some exploration interests off-
shore Vietnam, selectively.
226. See PetroVietnam, http://www.petrovietnam.com.vn (last visited Mar. 18,
2006).
227. See British Petroleum, Development Projects, http://ww.bp.com/generic
article.do?categoryld=3050027&contentId=3050054 (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also,
generally Sheddenuhde, BP Nam Con Son: Vietnam, Vung Tau, http://www.shed-
denuhde.com/BPVietnamVungTau (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (detailing and describ-
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3. Recent Development
The ups and downs in the two countries' diplomatic rela-
tions took a sharp turn to the detriment of Vietnam when, in
1999 and 2000, the two countries signed bilateral agreements to
resolve their border disputes (but not on the Spratlys) .228 The
unprecedented 1999 agreement resulted in the redrawing of
their land boundaries. 229 This re-delineation of land borders al-
lowed China to take over certain areas along the China-Vietnam
borders, thereby shrinking the territory of Vietnam. 23 0 Although
modest, the loss of Vietnamese territory outraged several
Vietnamese dissidents as well as the exile community in the
United States.23'
A year later, China and Vietnam also executed two other
agreements resolving their disputes with respect to the Tonkin
ing BP's activities in Vietnam via BPVietnam, a foreign-invested company operating in
Vietnam).
228. Wei Cui, supra note 170, at 809 (mentioning Vietnam-China land border
agreement and Tonkin Gulf agreements); see also China-Vietnam Agreement, N.Y TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2000, at 12 (briefly describing Tonkin Gulf agreements and land border agree-
ment).
229. See Vietnam Publishes China Border Agreement Without Fanfare, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 16, 2001; see also Vietnam Agreement, supra note 228, at 12; Resolution
36/2000/QH1O by the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ratifying the
Land Border Redrawing Agreement between Vietnam And China (June 9, 2000), pub-
lished in NHAN DAN [THE PEOPLE'S NEWSPAPER]. Nhan Dan is the official communiqu6
of the Vietnamese Communist Party.
The exile community alleged that the Resolution and the Agreement were pub-
lished on the online version of Nhan Dan on August 29, 2002, three years after the
agreement was signed on December 30, 1999, in order to test the reaction of the exile
community. See http://www.DanChu.net (on file with author) (opining that Vietnam's
release of the land border redrawing agreement to the exile community is merely a tool
for the Vietnamese government to explore the reaction of Vietnamese dissidents
abroad).
230. The first recession of Vietnamese territory along the China-Vietnam border
occurred during the period of 1886-1895, as a result of negotiation between France and
China. See Tu Mai, Mot So Su Lieu Quan Toi Bien Gioi Viet Hoa [A Few Historical Data
Relating to the Sino-Vietnamese Border], http://www.ykien.net/dtmsulieu.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2007).
231. See, e.g., Tran Dai Sy, Lanh Dao Nha Nuoc Cat Doi Lanh Tho, Lanh Hai cho Trung
Quoc [ Vietnamese Leadership Gave Away National (Land and Sea) Territory to China], http://
www.ykien.net/daisiOl.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Tu Mai, supra note 230; Bui
Tin, Xung Quanh Cac Hiep Dinh Viet Trung [Surrounding China-Vietnam Agreements], http:/
/ykien.net/mykbdv24.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Vien Nghien Cuu Chinh Sach
Quoc Gia [Vietnam Policy Research Institute], Tai Lieu Nghien Cuu Hiep Uoc Bien Gioi
tren Dat Lien giua CHXHCN Viet Nam va CHND Trung Hoa [Research Data on The Land
Border Redrawing Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and The People's Republic
of China], http://www.DanChu.net (on file with author).
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Gulf ("Beibu Bay" in Chinese, and "Bac Bo" in Vietnamese)-the
sea area between the northern coast of Vietnam and China's
Hainan Island. One agreement addressed the demarcation of
the Territorial Seas and the EEZs of the two countries; the other
agreement resolved their dispute with respect to fishing in the
Tonkin Gulf. There is no obvious explanation for the recession
of Vietnamese territorial sovereignty, although Vietnam main-
tained that "the Tonkin Gulf agreements completely resolved
the Tonkin Gulf disputes, constituting a positive contribution to-
ward regional peace and stabilization."232 Again, dissidents and
the Vietnamese exile community expressed their outrage, alleg-
ing that the new Tonkin Gulf agreements, as shown on maps,
yielded to China a substantial part of Vietnamese Territorial Sea
and fishing zone, and that, taken together, the land border
drawing agreement and the Tonkin Gulf agreements represent a
secret pact between Hanoi and Beijing to compromise
Vietnamese sovereignty. 233 Curiously, within a couple of years
after these bilateral agreements between China and Vietnam,
ASEAN and China entered into the 2002 Declaration, viewed as
the parties' "goodwill" commitment for regional peace.234
D. Successful JDZ for the South China Sea Disputes as Predecessor of
an All-Continent Asian-Pacific Investment and Trade Bloc
Intermittently, throughout the 1990s, the role of ASEAN as
a sponsor or facilitator of peace talks and negotiated treaty solu-
232. See Statement of Le Cong Phung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hiep Dinh Phan
Dinh Bac Bo va Hiep Dinh Hop Tac Nghe Ca Giua Viet Nam-Trung Quoc trong Vinh
Bac Bo [The Tonkin Gulf Demarcation Agreement and the Agreement Regarding Fish-
ing Cooperation between Vietnam and China in the Gulf of Tonkin], http://www.cpv.
org.vn/tccs/022001/6_lecongphung.htm (on file with author) (last visited Mar. 2007).
233. For maps published by the exile community showing comparison of territory
before and after demarcation agreement, see http:///www.ykien.net/bnbandovbb.
html (on file with author). See also Tran Dai Sy, Lanh Dao Nha Nuoc Cat Doi Lanh Tho
Lanh Hai cho Trung Quoc [ Vietnamese Leadership Gave Away National (Land and Sea) Terri-
tory to China], http://www.ykien.net/daisiO.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Tu Mai,
supra note 230; Bui Tin, Xung Quanh Cac Hiep Dinh Viet Trung [Surrounding China-Viet-
nam Agreements], http://ykien.net/mykbdv24.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Vien
Nghien Cuu Chinh Sach Quoc Gia [Vietnam Policy Research Institute], supra note 231
(opining that Vietnam's release of the land redrawing agreement in the Vietnamese
language to the exile community is merely a tool for the government to explore the
reaction of Vietnamese dissidents abroad).
234. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (introducing 2002 Declaration
between China and ASEAN as recent sign of progress); see also infra 260-272 and accom-
panying text (analyzing 2002 Declaration in great detail).
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dons was discussed. 235 ASEAN involvement in multilateral solu-
tions presented a hopeful prospect for regional stabilization as
the 1990s became the decade for Southeast Asia to face "island
impasse" and China's expansionism.236
Isolated efforts and progress were made among the claim-
ants throughout the 1990s and continuing on to the new millen-
nium. For example, in the middle of open hostility, occasionally
press reports also recounted China's and Vietnam's expressed
willingness to improve their diplomatic relations and to conduct
talks. 237 Within months after the "spudding" of Blue Dragon, it
was reported that Vietnamese and Chinese officials were explor-
ing dialogues on joint exploration, at the close of an ASEAN
meeting.238 Other ASEAN countries also reportedly discussed
regional cooperation on joint research exploration and develop-
ment,239 and China showed signs of cooperation. 240
235. See Reginald Chua, ASEAN Likely to Call for Restraint Over Spratlys, STRAIGHT
TIMES,July 20, 1992, at 15; Reginald Chua, ASEAN Poised for Bigger Role With the Passing of
an Era, STRAIGHT TIMES,July 17, 1992, at 15; Reginald Chua & Mary Kwang, Settle Spratlys
Dispute Amicably: ASEAN Ministers, Tensions Mount Over Sovereign Claims on Spratlys Is-
lands, supra note 44, at 1; Reginald Chua, Spratlys Declaration "Gives ASEAN New Role in
Dispute," STRAITS TIMES, July 31, 1992; Hanoi Expected to Seek ASEAN Support over Spratlys
Issue, supra note 46; Paul Jacob, Reps From 10 Nations Meet for Talks on Territorial Claims in
South China Sea, STRAIGHT TIMES, June 29, 1992, at 11; Raphael Pura, ASEAN Proposes
Guidelines for South China Sea, ASIAN WALL ST.J., July 23, 1992; Cameron Stewart, Spratlys
Issue Must Be Solved-Ramos, AUSTRALIAN,July 22, 1992, at 6 (reporting on ASEAN state-
ments).
236. See, e.g., Harvey Stockwin, Spratlys Spat Unfolds Naivety, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 18,
1995; Harvey Stockwin, Will China Be a Super Power?, JAKARTA PosT, Aug. 7, 1996 (analyz-
ing ASEAN-China relations in the 1990s, attributing "China Threat" to China's expan-
sionist politics).
237. See, e.g., China Offers Hanoi a Deal on Spratlys, PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS, Sept. 7,
2004, at 3; John Rogers, PetroVietnam to Consider Joint Spratleys Oil Search, REUTERS NEWS,
Aug. 24, 1994; Vietnam Sends Peace Delegation to China Amid Island Spat, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Sept. 14, 1998 (reporting on Vietnam's peace talk delegation sent to Beijing
in the middle of Spratlys squabble).
238. See, e.g., China Is Open to Spratly Talks-Foreign Minister Plays Down Island Dis-
pute, INT'L HERALD TRIu.,July 21, 2002; China, Vietnam Agree to Speed Up Talks on Disputes,
STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992; In Spratlys Crisis, China Offers Joint Development-Again, INr'L
HERALD TRIB., July 22, 1992; Vietnam, China will Settle Claims Peacefully, STRAITS TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1992; Hanoi Again Calls for Formal Talks on Spratly Island, STRAITS TIMES, July 24,
1992; Spratly Jurisdictional Dispute Garners Attention, PETROCONSULTANTS INT'L OIL LET-
TER, Aug. 1, 1994.
239. See supra notes 237-238; see also Manila to Propose International Talks on Spratly
Islands, STRAIT TIMES, July 15, 1992; Talks Lessen Potential for War Over Spratlys-Scientists
Agree on Research in South China Sea, STRAITS TIMES, June 3, 1993; Taipei Team for Spratlys
to Help Draw Up Policy, STRAITS TIMES, May 28, 1993.
240. See Beijing and Manila Agree to Jointly Develop Spratlys, STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 27,
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In summary, the ambiance of the 1990s was filled with con-
flicting signals. With the "peace-making" nature of UNCLOS in
the background, part of the military and the diplomatic activities
exhibited by Asian governments in the 1990s could be viewed as
strategically necessary to set the stage for treaty negotiation in
support of joint development. Perhaps the efforts bore fruit be-
cause the 2002 Declaration was signed. But, as explored later in
this Article, the 2002 Declaration only evidences a preliminary
step-a "nominally binding" good faith sovereign commitment
to peace,2 '" considered by its signatories as a sign of "security
cooperation" and not economic cooperation. 2 42
Consequently, it will take a substantial petroleum discovery
to trigger any real negotiation for sharing economic interests.
When such time arrives, if the goal of the ASEAN nations is to
counter-balance the military and economic dominance of China,
the ASEAN claimants would need to join forces as one negotiat-
ing bloc. While the goals of the ASEAN membership, individu-
ally and collectively, may be flexible and have changed over
time, 243 a JDZ alliance among the ASEAN claimants is the only
way to balance the inequity of power in the region with respect
to the possible sharing of petroleum resources.
A formalized investment and/or trade bloc for the entire
continent of Asia has been discussed and desired for a long time,
yet obstacles have not been overcome, due partly to the political
1993; China "Sincere in Wanting to Settle Spratlys Dispute, "STRuATS TiMES, July 27, 1992; KL
Will Settle Disputes Over 3 Isles Through Talks, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992; Malaysia to
Study Chinese Offer to Develop Spratlys, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992; Manila to Propose
International Talks on Spratlys Islands, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 15, 1992; Reps From 10 Na-
tions Meet for Talks on Territorial Claims in South China Sea, STRAITS TIMES, June 19, 1992.
241. See Raustiala, supra note 121 (certain international agreements by their very
nature have little binding effect. Examples given were the "consensus" U.N. instru-
ments that typified the 1990s).
242. SeeJoint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity, ASEAN-P.R.C., Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.aseansec.
org/15266.htm [hereinafter 2003 Joint Declaration].
243. ASEAN was initially formed to counter the effect and expansion of commu-
nism in Southeast Asia. As the Cold War came to an end, ASEAN has since evolved into
a different economic and political body, including serving as Southeast Asia's de facto
trade bloc. See generally ASEAN, Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); see also ASEAN Leaders Will
Next Week Discuss Establishing Powerful East Asia Free Trade Area withJapan, South Korea, and
China, ECON. NEWS, Nov. 24, 2004.
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dynamics and cultural diversity of Asia.244 So far, ASEAN has
successfully created a free trade area among its members, the
ASEAN Free Trade Area, as well as among its members and the
three giants: Japan, China, and South Korea-ASEAN Plus
Three ("APT").245 Recently, there has been talk among Asia-Pa-
cific leaders toward the establishment of a new expanded re-
gional grouping, including India, Australia, and New Zealand,
potentially a "balance-off' against China.2" 6 Those efforts, how-
ever, are limited to trade matters, rather than the more sensitive
244. See Richard Stubbs, ASEAN Plus Three [the APT]-Emerging East Asian Regional-
ism, 442 ASIAN SURVEY, XLII, No. 3, May/June 2002 (discussing competing voices of
regionalism within Asia and recent stagnation of two major regional groupings: ASEAN
and APEC); see also Harold Ditcher, Legal Implications of An Asia-Pacific Economic Group-
ing, 16 U.PA.J. INT'L L. 99, 142 (Spring, 1995) ("A related problem for the countries of
Asia-Pacific region is the weakness of the national courts in their respective domestic
contexts."); Thomas Fischer, A Commentary on Regional Institutions in the Pacific Rim: Do
APEC and ASEAN Still Matter?, 13 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 337 (2003) (commenting on
Asia's lack of comprehensive trade policy analogous to NAFTA or EU); Jeffrey A.
Kaplan, ASEAN's Rubicon: A Dispute Settlement Mechanism for AFTA, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L. J. 147 (1996) (discussing tardiness in legal infrastructure for ASEAN in its effort to
hammer out the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)); Yoshi Kodama, Development of Inter-
State Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region: Considerations for Regional Trade Compacts, 2
NAFTA: L & Bus. REV. AM. 70 (1996) (reporting on progress of regional arrangements
in Asia Pacific Region); accord Byung-Woon Lyou, Building the Northeast Asian Commu-
nity, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257 (2004) (discussing need for Northeast Asian
economic organization, thereby confirming Asian fragmentation of regional economic
interests); Jack Garvey, AFA After NAFTA: Regional Trade Blocs and the Propagation of
Environmental and Labor Standards, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 245, 246 (1997) ("[T]he
three major potential players - the United States, China andJapan - have relations to
the other Pacific Basin States that generate a variety of tensions working against a lead-
ership role, whether due to past imperialism, current economic competition, or ideo-
logical and cultural differences.").
245. See, e.g., Ali Alatas, "ASEAN Plus Three" Equals Peace Plus Prosperity (Jan. 5,
2001) (unpublished paper delivered at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies' 2001
Regional Outlook Forum), http://www.iseas.edu.sg/trends221.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2007); JEFFREY ROBERSTON, DEPARTMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, ASEAN PLUS
THREE: TOWARDS THE WORLD'S LARGEST FREE TRADE AGREEMENT? (Nov. 12, 2002),
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/RN/2002-03/03RN19.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2007); see also Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Dec. 12,
2005, available at http://www.aseansec.org/18036.htm; ASEAN Leaders Will Next Week
Discuss Establishing Powerful East Asia Free Trade Area with Japan, South Korea, and China,
ECONOMY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2004. See generally supra note 243 and accompanying text.
246. See Edward Cody, Asian Leaders Establish New Group, THE WASH. PosT, Dec. 15,
2005; see also Joint Declaration of the Leaders at the ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand
Commemorative Summit, and Chairman's Statement of the ASEAN-Australia and New
Zealand Commemorative Summit, Nov. 30, 2004, available at http://www.aseansec.org/
16748.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006); Won-Mog Choi, Regional Economic Integration in
East Asia: Prospect and Jurisprudence, 6J. INT'L EGON. L. 49 (2003) (reporting and com-
menting on prospect of free trade talks between ASEAN and East Asia countries). Coin-
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247issue of foreign investment or petroleum resources.
The joining of ASEAN nations on one side of the JDZ nego-
tiating table against China must be predicated upon the success-
ful building of consensus among the ASEAN claimants-a pro-
cess that would first require lengthy, painstaking, and individual
bilateral negotiation between any two ASEAN claimants before
the whole group can be united economically. The prospect may
be difficult and protracted, but not impossible. There have been
successful bilateral commitments resolving territorial disputes in
the region. For example, J.R.V. Prescott, a leading expert on
maritime boundaries, reported that as of the 1980s, there were
already fourteen international agreements defining twenty-three
boundary segments in Southeast Asia.248 Since then, JDZs have
been established between Thailand and Malaysia, and between
Malaysia and Vietnam (governing development in the Malay Ba-
sin in the southern part of the Gulf of Thailand).249
A JDZ ASEAN alliance is not too far-fetched, because the
2002 Declaration already signals the alliance of ASEAN as one
signature bloc against China in order to secure a good-faith com-
mitment to peace. ASEAN has also joined forces vis-A-vis China
in establishing a cooperative framework for future bilateral rela-
tions, including a joint declaration on Strategic Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity.25 ° Thus, China has already reached out to
pare East Asia Trade Bloc to Emerge Within 20 Years, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 1, 2002, with East
Asia Trade Bloc Would Balance NAFTA and EU, AsIA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2004.
247. See, e.g., ASEAN, Trade, http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2007); see also George 0. White, From Snowplows to Siopao-Trying to Compete in a Global
Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 TULSAJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 177 (2000).
248. See Chandler & Chiew, supra note 15.
249. See id.; see also Statement of Randall C. Thompson, President of Crestone En-
ergy Corporation (on file with author) (The Malaysia-VietnamJDZ was allegedly ajoint
development on block PM-3 awarded to IPL, Hamilton Oil, and BHP); Talisman En-
ergy, PM-3 Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA), http://www.offshore-technology.
com/projects/pm3 (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); 3 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES,
supra note 164; Memorandum of Understanding Between the Kingdom of Thailand
and Malaysia on the Establishment of the Resources of the Sea-Bed in a Defined Area of
the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand (Feb. 21, 1979) (on
file with author). For other successful JDZ's, see discussion in Part VI, supra. (on file
with author)
250. See 2003 Joint Declaration, supra note 242. Other similar achievements and
dialogues between China and ASEAN, as well as China's gesture of cooperation in-
clude: the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of
the Member Countries of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China
of 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum ("ARF"), the
Asia Cooperative Dialogue ("ACD"), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"),
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ASEAN after staging war games in the 1990s. Surely ASEAN
countries must have realized the power of unity-as Benjamin
Franklin has stated: "We must all hang together, or assuredly we
shall all hang separately."25 Further, since China is also disput-
ing other parts of the Pacific Ocean vis-;I-vis Japan, North Korea,
and South Korea,252 the alliance of ASEAN into one negotiating
bloc will present ASEAN as a force of unity and will strengthen
the membership's bargaining power and leverage-China will
stand alone against other constituents of the region.
The joining of the ASEAN claimants in a JDZ solution will
also present other positive possibilities. If a unified ASEAN ne-
gotiating bloc can be created vis-A-vis China for joint petroleum
development in the South China Sea, any such successful negoti-
ation can signify a tremendous step in consensus building. The
success itself may even be viewed as an embryonic predecessor of
a unified legal community and economic bloc for Asia Pacific (as
the counterpart to NAFTA or the EU). In fact, the concept is
much farther reaching than NAFTA or the EU, because unlike
these trade blocs, joint petroleum development would constitute
an "investment bloc" whereupon natural resources will be
shared. Regional organizations have been established for the
management of living resources, one example of which is the
Fisheries Task Force of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Com-
mittee ("PECC") linking Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and
Pacific Latin America.253 Yet, natural resource distribution
across borders has always invoked more tension, obstacles, and
debates. Thus, the successful JDZ grouping of the ASEAN claim-
ants vis-A-vis China can establish a precedent that exceeds the
the Asia-Europe Meeting ("SEM"), the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation
("FEELAC"), the October 8, 2006 Instrument of Access by China to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-Existence at the Great Hall of the People of Beijing, China, and other
regional and trans-regional mechanisms. See id.
251. SeeJOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Christopher Morley & Louella D.
Everett eds., 1 th ed. 1941). For another example demonstrating the joining forces of
ASEAN, see Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, available
at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm.
252. Shanghai's expert Ji Guoxing listed three separate disputes in the "China
Seas," representing China's claims to (1) the Yellow Sea; (2) the East China Sea, encom-
passing Japan-occupied Senkaku Islands; and (3) the South China Sea, encompassing
claims made against the ASEAN Member-States. See Guoxing, supra note 15.
253. See Pacific Economic Corporation Council, The Coordinating Group, http://
www.pecc.org/coordinating-group.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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present scope of the only formal (and the most developed) trade
block in existence today, the EU. However, three characteristics
distinguish the EU model as a regional trade bloc from an ad
hoc China-ASEAN joint petroleum development treaty solution
for the South China Sea Disputes.
First, since the South China JDZ treaty solution does not
involve or address the economic interests of the landlocked
States, the JDZ model cannot be compared to the EU model,
whose membership consists of countries regardless of coastal
characteristics.
Second, aJDZ treaty solution addresses the sharing of natu-
ral resources resulting from FDI. The EU model does not reach
FDI. In FDI matters, sovereignty distinction in the EU remains
intact notwithstanding a super-layer of regional legal positivism.
Third, in the JDZ treaty solution, the private sector can be-
come the driving force shaping sovereign negotiation and a par-
ticipant in the structuring of the JDZ itself. In contrast, the EU
law-making model represents the voice of collective sovereignty
and not the private sector. The impact of the private sector is so
pivotal in the JDZ solution because of the following reality:
Whether the geopolitical factors are ripe for a JDZ solution
largely depends on the action of the private sector, even if the
legal disputes are among sovereignties. This is so because in the
developing Asia, it is often the capital and technology of the pri-
vate sector that account for a petroleum discovery in the area of
conflict. International petroleum exploration has always been a
hit-or-miss business made feasible via expensive state-of-the-art
upstream technology applied in a complex environment of de-
pleted natural resources. In such an environment, quite often,
the private investor acts either as the sole technology/capital
provider or transferor, or as joint venture partner of govern-
ments. The private sector's role is presented in further detail
below.
E. The Difficult, Unique, and Indispensable Role of the Private Sector
In the absence of an existing joint development treaty, in
order to conduct exploration, typically the private sector will
have to ally with at least one government in the region in order
to get a license to drill. In an ambiance of territorial conflicts,
the investor will pick and choose the government with which to
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do business, probably over the objections of others. That means
the execution of a petroleum contract between the investor and
the licensing government, while other competing governments
may challenge the contract in the press or via diplomatic chan-
nels.
For example, as seen in the China-Vietnam tension of the
1990s, Crestone Corporation knocked on China's doors, and
Mobile Corporation knocked on Vietnam's doors. Undoubt-
edly, both companies faced objections and pressure from the
two host countries, each having the incentive to force its private
contractor into advocating for the host country's legal and politi-
cal positions before a watchful industry and international com-
munity.25 4 Thus, the following scenario would entirely be possi-
ble.
The private investor could face "manipulation" and retalia-
tion by the competing States. For example, Vietnam publicly
barred Crestone from competing for business in Vietnam.2 5 As
a small independent company, Crestone easily chose to ally with
China, the larger nation that was willing to support Crestone.
On the other hand, a multinational like Mobile might have a
much more complex decision to make.
Behind the scene, Mobil could easily be pressured by both
countries to make a choice-whether to publicly support Viet-
nam or China. The choice would depend on how the corpora-
tion weighed the relationship between Mobile and Vietnam in
the upstream segment of the business via its exploration invest-
ment offshore Vietnam in Blue Dragon against Mobil's eco-
nomic interest and footholds in continental China, including in-
vestment in the downstream segment (which could mean a con-
sumer market of billions of people), as well as Mobil's potential
future interests in China. The choice would amount to an eco-
nomic balancing act: Which segment of the business occupied a
larger market share or generated more profit for the corpora-
tion? Which county held a better prospect as a supplier or con-
sumer market for the corporation at that time? It would entirely
be possible that within the corporate structure, the upstream di-
vision and the downstream division would take contradictory ac-
tions and come into conflict, each division wanting to maintain
254. See Valencia, supra note 179.
255. See supra notes 196-197.
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its own market share and the support of the host government
essential to such market share. The career of the executive in
charge of each division could also be affected.
While Vietnam might pressure Mobil to take a public stand
on the Spratly Disputes and to support the assertion of Viet-
nam's sovereign power over Blue Dragon, China might also
choose to manipulate Mobil in other ways. It was entirely possi-
ble that Chinese officials could contact the downstream affiliate
of Mobil in China, pressuring the affiliate and threatening a re-
duction of government support for Mobil's downstream pres-
ence in the mainland, unless Mobil backed away from its support
of Vietnam in the upstream segment. Or, China might pressure
Mobil into persuading Vietnam to accede to China's joint devel-
opment model in the South China Sea-as Vietnam's upstream
technological and joint venture partner, Mobil would be in a
strategically unique position to put such pressure upon Vietnam.
All such manipulation would entirely be within view, whether or
not these manipulative tactics were announced to, reported in,
or detected by the press.
Placed between a rock and hard place, and possibly made
subject to manipulation (as demonstrated above), the private in-
vestor must thus navigate itself out of the competing sovereign
interests while maintaining its economic footholds in each coun-
try to achieve corporate profit goals. As a small independent
producer, Crestone could afford to forego business opportuni-
ties in Vietnam in favor of the bigger piece of the pie-the sup-
port of China. Unlike Crestone, Mobil, as a multinational with
larger portfolio of international assets and multiple profit cen-
ters, might not be so ready to sacrifice its presence in either
country.
It follows, therefore, that it would take a sizable commercial
discovery close enough to the disputed waters for a multina-
tional like Mobil to make a definitive choice that can stir govern-
ment economic retaliation. In other words, the heat and pres-
sure to propose and implement an inter-governmentalJDZ (with
a possible realignment of interests behind the scene) will not
begin until a sizable commercial discovery becomes imminent.
Yet, this is the kind of heat and pressure that would be welcomed
by any private investor, compared to the alternative scenario: a
"dry hole" or being chased out of the host country. In fact, the
JDZ provides the right avenue for the private investor to take
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control of the situation while guarding its profit goals. The com-
mercial discovery and prospects of JDZ implementation would
quickly turn the situation around and place the private investor
in the position of the manipulator, as compared to the previous
position-that of the manipulated. This is possible because in a
JDZ environment, it is the international petroleum company-
the investor-that is responsible for the commercial discovery,
the technology, the actual performance of petroleum activities,
as well as all pertinent technical or propriety data. The private
investor holds the key to the reservoir of future energy re-
sources, and can occupy the driver's seat. It can be the gate-
keeper as well as a mover-shaker for the successful structuring
and implementation of a JDZ. Its role and opportunity as the
real-life mastermind of JDZ is evident.
Specifically, the petroleum contractor and/or operator may
choose to act, or be asked by the dominant State to act, as a
silent or behind-the-scene partner in the JDA/JDZ negotiation
and implementation. In the coalition of interests, if a powerful
government joins forces with a powerful private interest, they
can form an alliance that will undoubtedly control the negotia-
tion table, leaving the lesser able players vulnerable to pressure,
exploitation, and oppression. JDA/JDZ negotiation is in essence
a negotiation of economic rights, in which the private interests
are stacked against the national interests of competing govern-
ments toward a compromise. The scenario thus accords the pri-
vate investor the type of pivotal role that can be played to rein-
force the existing economic relationships between the private in-
vestor and the dominant State. Smaller States that realize the
real-life partnerships between the private sector and the domi-
nant State may be inclined to forego their legally strong sover-
eign claims in favor of JDA/JDZs as a practical solution, all be-
cause of Realpolitik. The smaller States may end up accepting a
smaller stake in the JDZ, thereby bearing the same fate as minor-
ity shareholders in a U.S.-based closely held corporation. Yet,
unlike the corporate minority shareholders, the small State in a
JDA/JDZ negotiation does not have the protection of common
law legal doctrines designed to watch out for the minority inter-
ests against the majority's oppressive tactics. 2 5 6
256. There is U.S. caselaw that provides protection for minority shareholders
under theories such as the "oppression" doctrine, the "equal access" doctrine, or the
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More dangerously, lopsided JDA/JDZ resulting from less-
than arms-length negotiation can contribute to the formation of
international economic law. The British Institute for Interna-
tional and Comparative Law ("BIICL") has drafted a model JDA
with commentaries on key issues.25 7 Favoring the important role
of the petroleum contractor in a JDZ, the BIICL's model JDA
contains provisions addressing rights of contractors and protect-
ing them against cancellation of existing production-sharing or
development contracts. 258 The dominant feature of the model is
the favoring of production of resources, thereby promoting and
securing the economic interest and technical expertise of the
private sector. 259 Although each JDA is different and may not
have binding effect beyond the specific circumstances it pur-
ports to solve, together successful JDAs may form norms of prac-
tice. Over time they gain popularity, and future JDZs may be
fashioned based on, or with reference to, such norms. In that
regard, if regularly consulted or followed, JDA/JDZ may estab-
lish a body of precedents, constituting lex contractus and lex mer-
catoria in modern international economic law-the type of
normatives that govern international commercial conduct.
In principle, a JDZ could be structured to achieve propor-
tionality and equal protection to all national interests at stake.
For example, in aJDZ model that requires the establishment of a
'Joint Authority" to enter into development contracts with the
private sector, such Joint Authority may be made up of an equal
number of members from each participating country. In reality,
the petroleum contractor who signs the development contract
with the Joint Authority will control data and technology, and
will drive the negotiation and implementation toward the goal of
common law preemptive right" doctrine. See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460 (5th Cir.
2000) (applying "oppression doctrine" to protect passive shareholders against oppres-
sion by dominant controlling shareholder in closely held corporations); Byelick v.
Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D.Va. 1999) (formulating common law preemptive
right in closely held corporations and imposing upon majority shareholders fiduciary
duties owed to minority shareholders in corporate issuance of stock); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (addressing corporate
redemption of shareholders' stock and common-law equal access rule to protect minor-
ity shareholders in closely held corporations).
257. See BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LAW ("BIICL"), JOINT
DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS: A MODEL AGREEMENT FOR STATES FOR JOINT
DEVELOPMENT WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTARY (1989); see also supra note 229.
258. See BICCL, supra note 257, at 5.
259. See id.
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preserving its existing economic interests in the region. The
member country in which the private investor holds the largest
aggregate commercial stake will have the investor's support.
This dominant State may end up receiving the upper hand and
more negotiation leverage in the fashioning of contractual provi-
sions, as well as in the day-to-day implementation of those con-
tractual provisions. This can happen when one side of the nego-
tiation-the private investor-is in fact the silent partner of a
particular government that serves on the Joint Authority. The
neutrality of the Joint Authority and equal representation of the
national interests will, therefore, be displaced.
One may argue that the smaller States-most likely the mi-
nority interests holders-should exercise their rights as constitu-
ents of the Joint Authority and refrain from awarding petroleum
contracts to multinationals that already have or are eyeing sub-
stantial existing commercial interests in the more dominant
State. In other words, it is the responsibility of the smaller States
to avoid the "silent partnership" that may disserve them. While
this argument may make sense in theory, it ignores today's real-
ity. Recent mergers in the petroleum industry and the popular-
ity of risk- and technology-sharing petroleum consortia have re-
sulted in the concentration of capital and technology in just a
handful of petroleum entities. The smaller State may not have
much of a selection from which to choose a disinterested opera-
tor for the JDZ.
VII. THE PATTERN OF INEQUITY IN RECENTLY SIGNED
JDA 'S AND OTHER DISATISFACTORY ASPECTS OF
TREATY SOLUTIONS
This Part provides an overview of recently signed treaties or
JDAs that corroborate the concerns expressed above. These re-
cent treaty solutions offer evidence that (i) inherent inequity
may exist in the JDA/JDZ negotiation process due to Realpolitik
(a treaty commitment to resolve territorial disputes viaJDA/JDZ
solutions may just be part of such Realpolitik); and (ii) such an
inherently inequitable framework does not accord protection for
the smaller or lesser developed nations, notwithstanding the fact
that equity is the principle underlying UNCLOS as the modern
leading authority on maritime jurisdiction, sea-use rights, and
EEZs.
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Four recent multilateral treaties and one commercial agree-
ment are examined below for this type of evidence.
A. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, Executed By and Between China and ASEAN
As its name illustrates, the 2002 Declaration, signed by the
ASEAN Member States and the People's Republic of China,260 is
merely a declaration of good faith.26'
The 2002 Declaration is paved with politically correct words
and concepts. It recognizes "the need to promote a peaceful,
friendly, and harmonious environment in the South China Sea
between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, sta-
bility, economic growth, and prosperity in the region. '26 2 It
seeks to achieve these goals through "peaceful resolution of ter-
ritorial and jurisdictional disputes, self restraint, confidence-
building measures, and cooperative activities. 26 3  The parties
may "pursue consultations," and "stand ready" to continue ef-
forts aimed at "promoting good neighborliness and trans-
parency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and coop-
eration, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes. '"264
Specific commitments include the following. First, the par-
ties "undertake" to settle jurisdictional and territorial disputes
peacefully, without use or threat of force, and to "refrain from
... inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals,
cays, and other features." 26"  This commitment will hopefully
prevent military occupation of uninhibited islands and hence
preserve the ecology there. Additionally, the parties may volun-
260. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
261. The term declaration is used for various international instruments. Declara-
tions are not always legally binding. The term is often chosen to indicate that the par-
ties do not intend to create binding obligations but merely want to declare certain
aspirations. Declarations can, however, also be treaties in the generic sense, intended
to be binding at international law. It is, therefore, necessary to establish in each individ-
ual case whether the parties intended to create binding obligations. Ascertaining the
intention of the parties can often be a difficult task. Some instruments entitled "decla-
rations" were not originally intended to have binding force, although their provisions
may have reflected customary international law or may have gained binding character
as customary law at a later stage. On the other hand, depending on intent, a declara-
tion can be a treaty in the proper sense. See supra note 205.
262. See 2002 Declaration, supra note 50, pmbl.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 7.
265. Id. § 5.
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tarily exchange relevant information, hold discussions between
their military and defense officials, "ensur[e] just and humane
treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in dis-
tress," '2 6 6 and voluntarily notify other parties "of any impending
joint/combined military exercise." '267 This commitment will
hopefully deter any arrests or violence committed upon inno-
cent fishermen making a living in the disputed area. Pending a
comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the par-
ties may also engage in cooperative activities such as marine envi-
ronmental protection and scientific research, and search-and-
rescue operations. This commitment will hopefully deter envi-
ronmental damage and further joint scientific research. Finally,
the parties reaffirm the importance of adopting a code of con-
duct on the South China Sea, but no such code of conduct has
actually been issued, other than the general features stated
above.
It is important to note that although these expressions of
commitment may appear quite specific, they do not use legally
binding language.268 The 2002 Declaration states that parties
"undertake" to achieve peace, but does not state that the parties
shall take any such action. In many instances, the Declaration
uses the "permissive" form, "may," short of a legal mandate. Al-
though the Declaration suggests that consultation among the
States should be pursued, it does not require such consultation.
While the Declaration vocalizes the need for deeper cooperation
266. Id. § 5(b).
267. Id. § 5(c).
268. Researchers have concluded that the Declaration is only aspirational, and not
legally binding. See, e.g., Chin Yoon Chin, Potential for Conflicts in the Spratly Islands
(Dec. 2003) (unpublished M.A. thesis on file with author). Historically, a commitment
to peace by China as an aspirational means to resolve territorial conflicts has not pro-
duced effective real-life result. See Alan Boyd, South China Sea: Pact Won't Calm Waters,
ASIA TIMES, Jul. 2, 2003. For example, China and India signed onto the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence of 1954, committing both countries to peace with respect to
China's control of Tibet. Later, these "Five Principles" were written into the preface to
the Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on
Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India, Apr. 29, 1954,
http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china4.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
Notwithstanding these Five Principles, the two nations engaged in the Sino-Indian War
of 1962, with unresolved questions left open, ultimately leading to the Agreement be-
tween the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settle-
ment of the India-China Boundary Question, Apr. 11, 2005, http://www.ipcs.org/
guiding-principles.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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among ASEAN and China, it does not compel such cooperation.
This type of aspirational language may fall short of an intent
needed for the Declaration to have the binding effect of a
treaty. 269 In other words, if China refuses to exercise these op-
tions, citing national interest reasons, the ASEAN States may not
be able to hold China to a specific international obligation, or
subject her to an enforcement scheme before a monitoring
body. ASEAN, however, can certainly condemn China as a bad
faith actor in the pool of public opinion. The 2002 Declaration,
therefore, has the "soft" impact as our current system of aspira-
tional customary international law, at best.2
70
More importantly, the Declaration does not address joint
petroleum development. It simply reaffirms the parties' commit-
ment to international law and "their respect for ... freedom of
navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea."271
Nothing in the Declaration discusses rights to natural resources
or resolution of conflicting sea-use rights. One can easily con-
clude that the Declaration deliberately did not mention petro-
leum rights, as any such effort could immediately result in im-
passe. The Declaration, therefore, merely evidences the parties'
undertaking to avoid military aggression. It does not address the
underlying territorial disputes that may drive military conflagra-
tions. Just like UNCLOS, the Declaration is a peace-making ef-
fort. Its broad reference to international law does not render
specific nor fill the gap of uncertainty left by UNCLOS.
In summary, although the 2002 Declaration does unite
ASEAN against China and hence can be viewed an important
step towards a "peaceful, friendly, and harmonious environment
in the South China Sea ' 2 7 2 in contrast to the turmoil and up-
heavals of the 1990s, most likely the Declaration will not be suffi-
cient to ensure such stability because of the lack of specificity or
an enforcement or monitoring mechanism that can assure State
parties' accountability. As an expression of best efforts and a
statement of good intention to ease tension, perhaps the Decla-
ration provides ASEAN with peace of mind because it can now
rely on the good faith of China expressed in a politically correct
269. See 2002 Declaration, supra note 50.
270. Raustiala, supra note 121, at 581 (categorizing international agreements into
legally binding "contracts" versus morally and politically binding "pledges").
271. See 2002 Declaration, supra note 50.
272. See id. pmbl.
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international agreement-the Declaration tells ASEAN that
China understands the need for a long-term solution, the goal of
peace, and perhaps the important role of ASEAN as a potential
negotiating bloc. If the Declaration is a "grand salute," it must
be fortified and further demonstrated by smaller, yet concrete
gestures, particularly in relationship to natural resources devel-
opment. Future measures are yet to be seen. As such, the Decla-
ration cannot yet serve as the predecessor that may precipitate
the future formation of an investment and trade bloc for South-
east Asia. Further efforts by ASEAN will be necessary.
B. Latest Joint Agreement in Southeast Asia: 2005 Tripartite
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the
Agreement Area in the South China Sea By and Between the
State Oil Companies of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines
None of the three governments published the verbatim text
of the Tripartite Agreement for public perusal, 973 perhaps due
partly to the often confidential nature of seismic studies or geo-
logical surveys in petroleum exploration projects. Or, perhaps
this obvious lack of transparency speaks a silent message to the
world about the inter-government workings and power balance
(or lack thereof) among these Asian States, especially on petro-
leum resources, which can easily be defended by these govern-
ments as state secrets involving national and economic security.
Accordingly, minimal information is available about the Tri-
partite Agreement other than press reports and carefully worded
rhetorical diplomatic and policy statements made by the respec-
tive governments on their official websites. 274 These sparse and
273. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, supra
note 51.
274. For example, all throughout the making of the Tripartite Agreement, China's
Foreign Minister held regular press conferences to announce China's commitment of
resolving disputes through negotiations without waiving any territorial claims. His state-
ments were often collaborated by the Ministry of Commerce. See Ministry of Commerce
of the People's Republic of China, China, Vietnam Agree on Joint Exploration in South
China Sea (Jul. 20, 2005), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/
asiareport/200507/20050700181583.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). On the Viet-
namese side, much less information was available, except for the same "positive rheto-
ric" expressed by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister in response to reporters'
questions-a commitment to peace and stability without any waiver of Vietnam's sover-
eignty claims. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Tripartite Agreement forJoint
Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea: Answer to
Correspondent by Mr. Le Dzung, the Spokesman of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign
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carefully constructed governmental statements, together with
public discussions by outside observers and news sources, shed
some limited insight into, and corroborate the following salient
features of this Tripartite Agreement.
1. The Admittedly Commercial Nature of the
Tripartite Agreement
The Agreement calls for a joint three-year seismic study in
the South China Sea.275  The survey, which subsumes about
143,000 square kilometers, will take place in three stages. 276 Ac-
Affairs (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt-baochi/pbnfn/ns05031416
4241 (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Following Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong's
official visit to China in the summer of 2005, the two countries issued ajoint statement
addressing, inter alia, the Tripartite Agreement. The joint statement repeated the re-
dundant rhetoric-that the two governments "highly value[d]" the Tripartite Agree-
ment because it fostered greater stability in the region. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Vietnam, Vietnam and China Issue Joint Statement (Jul. 21, 2005), http://www.mofa.
gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns050726144049 (last visited Jan. 31,
2007). Independently, the Philippines echoed the same rhetoric sentiment, although
its leaders made stronger statements, praising the signatories at the recent ASEAN-Ja-
pan summit. See President Gloria Arroyo, Statement of the President at the ASEAN-
Japan Summit (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.ops.gov.ph/speeches2005/speech-2005
decl3c.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). The Philippine authority also took pride in the
Tripartite Agreement as historic and "model-setting." See Ignacio R. Bunye, Statement
of Secretary Ignacio R. Bunye: Re Signing of the PNOC-EC, CNOOC and PE-
TROVIETNAM Tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (Mar. 14, 2005), http://
www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives2005/marl4.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (calling the
Agreement a "model-setting approach on South China Sea issue"); see also Republic of
the Philippines, China, Vietnam, RP Ink Historic Joint Oil Seismic Research Accord in
South China Sea (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.gov.ph/news/?i=7285 (last visited Jan.
31, 2007) (reporting on Philippine President Gloria Arroyo's statement describing the
Agreement as "historic" and "a breakthrough in implementing (the 2002 Declara-
tion]"). The Philippines also emphasized specifically that the Agreement would set a
cooperative trend not only for governments, but also "for future multi-lateral agree-
ment among the different oil companies of the different countries in the region." Re-
public of the Philippines, supra.
275. Seismic Replaces Gunboats, INT'L GAS REP., Mar. 24, 2004, at 23.
276. See Seismic Research Deal Worth $10M up for Bidding, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jul.
27, 2005, at 5; see also Philippines, China, Vietnam to Explore S. China Sea Areas, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 2005. The exact area covered by the seismic study cannot exactly
be pinpointed without the actual text of the Tripartite Agreement and map exhibits, if
any, although description given by the press suggests that the study is conducted in the
area of the Spratly Archipelago. According to press reports, however, the seismic study
is supposed to be done in "[the] South China Sea and covers a 142,886 square kilome-
ters of agreed upon areas and will run for three years." Philippines, China, Vietnam to
Explore S. China Sea Areas, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 2005. According to one
Philippino press report, "[t]he agreement with China and Vietnam calls for a joint oil
exploration venture in the disputed Spratly Island, an oil rich island south of Palawan."
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quisition of geo-scientific seismic data was set to begin in late
2005, followed by the processing and interpretation of the gath-
ered data.2 7 7 China National Offshore Oil Corp., Vietnam Oil
and Gas Co., and Philippine National Oil Co. undertake the
work at an estimated cost of US$10-$20 million 271 to ascertain
the potential oil and gas reserves in the surveyed area.279
Hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough for stability in the re-gion, the Tripartite Agreement nonetheless has been viewed
by the respective governments as merely a joint commercial ef-
fort, and not a political document that would alter in any way the
countries' respective territorial claims to the South China Sea.
For example, the Philippines' Energy Secretary, Vincent Perez,
noted publicly that "we have not touched on any of the political
issues, the territorial claims, sovereignty issues. This is a purely
commercial transaction, supported by the respective govern-
ments .... ,,281 The Agreement itself expressly holds that it "will
not undermine the basic positions held by [the respective gov-
ernments], and predicates its existence upon the spirit of peace,
stability, cooperation, and development in accordance with [UN-
CLOS] and [the 2002 Declaration]. ' 282
2. A Note of Concern
This type of rudimentary 'joint study" agreement is com-
mon among private petroleum co-producers as a strategic alli-
ance for the purpose of sharing costs and data. The fact that
private co-producers have been substituted by State-owned pro-
Alena Mae S. Flores, PNOC DOE WOO China Oil, MANILA STANDARD, Sept. 8, 2005 (em-
phasis added).
277. See Seismic Research Deal Worth $10M up forBidding, supra note 276, at 5; see also
Flores, supra note 276 (joint project "will gather geoscientific data to assess the petro-
leum resource potential of an agreed area in the South China Sea covering 142,886
square kilometers").
278. See Seismic Research Deal Worth $1OM up for Bidding, supra note 276, at 5.
279. See Ma Theresa Torres & Niel Villegas Mugas, RP, China, Vietnam to Explore
Spratlys, MANILA TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005.
280. For example, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman, LiuJianchao, reported in
a press conference on Mar. 15, 2005, that the Agreement "will make historic contribu-
tion to the peace, stability and development in the South China Sea." Press Confer-
ence, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1 87617.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
281. See Philippine President Luds Spratly Agreement with China, Vietnam, AsIA AnmcA
INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Mar. 15, 2005.
282. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China, supra note
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ducers does not necessarily render the Tripartite Agreement a
JDA in the classic sense of the term. After all, the Tripartite
Agreement is not executed by the respective States, but only by
their commercial arms. At best, it may qualify as a joint state-
ment of intent among the respective governments to research
fully the petroleum potential of the hotly disputed South China
Sea.
Nonetheless, the Tripartite Agreement does take on sym-
bolic significance because it is the first sign of State cooperation
shown under the 2002 Declaration, in which ASEAN joined to
secure China's good faith commitment to peace. While limited
in scope (a small step toward a larger goal, yet to be achieved),
the Tripartite Agreement evidences the region's push towards
stability, whereupon China has agreed with two members of
ASEAN for a shared seismic database.
But a different type of question must be asked, especially if
this is the type of standard 'joint study," cost and data-sharing
confidential agreement often found in the private sector in
preparation for joint exploration down the road. Although all
three governments appeared enthusiastic about the Tripartite
Agreement, realistically why did two poorer and smaller ASEAN
nations, which are geographically much closer to the Spratlys
than China, feel motivated to share costs and data with a giant
country that had claimed the entire sea as its "neighborhood
pond"? It should be noted further that this type of cooperation
is exhibited in an era where: (i) China has openly advanced ex-
pansionism, 8 ' (ii) Vietnam has yielded and made explicit terri-
torial recessions with respect to its northern border and the Gulf
of Tonkin, 214 and (iii) both Vietnam and the Philippines have
been suffering from political and social turmoil within their own
territory. For example, the Philippines (or on a larger scale,
Southeast Asia) has always suffered from internal political unrest
and increasing extremist terrorist activities within its own bor-
ders. 28 5 While actively seeking WTO membership, 286 Vietnam
283. See, e.g., infra note 385 and accompanying text (describing China's failed at-
tempt to take over UNOCAL and her successful acquisition of assets in oil-producing
Kazakhstan).
284. See, supra notes 230-235 and accompanying text (discussing the China-Viet-
nam Tonkin Gulf Agreements and land border redrawing agreement).
285. See, e.g., Steven Rogers, Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (2004) (dis-
cussing how ethnic unrest and political instability have plagued the Philippines since its
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faced claims of oppression from various impoverished, dissident
ethnic and religious groups, backed by international human
rights non-governmental organizations ("NGO") and interna-
tional criticism of the government's control over the popula-
tion's freedom of speech. 2 7
The disturbing question is whether the larger goal of re-
gional peace and stability practically amounts to subtle pressure
for the smaller States to make contractual concession and recog-
nize the might of the more powerful State. Is this not the same
statement as: "Dear neighbor, I accede to your military and eco-
nomic power by signing a peace treaty with you whereupon I will
share the costs of your entering and peeping into the fruit trees
of my back yard? 288
independence in 1946 and noting that Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group, has recently made
the Philippines its home); see also Rommel C. Banlaoi, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast
Asia: the Abu Sayyaf Threat, 4 NAVAL WAR C. REv. 58, 63-80 (2005); Bernadette S. Sto.
Domingo, Bush Urges Philippines to Step up Efforts Versus Terror Groups, Bus. WORLD, Jul.
13, 2005; Bernadette S. Sto. Domingo, U.S. Issues New Travel Warning, Cites Crime Situa-
tion, Terror Threats, Bus. WORLD, Jul. 28, 2005; Heda Bayron, Philippine Military Cap-
tures Indonesian Terrorist Suspect (Voice of America radio broadcast Mar. 23, 2005)
(transcript on file with author); U.S. Ranks the Philippines as Terrorist Lair In S.E. Asia,
Sept. 19, 2005, http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/19/content_3515192.
htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
286. See World Trade Organization ("WTO"), Members and Observers, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007),
Vietnam made headway in fulfilling WTO requirements toward full membership. See
WTO, Bilaterals Done, Multilateral Nearly, Viet Nam's Membership Now In Sight, Jul. 19, 2006,
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsO6..e/accvietnam 19julyO6_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2007) (announcing the status of Vietnam's membership negotiations,
which indicates that full membership is imminent). As of the date of this publication,
Vietnam has been admitted to the WTO.
287. See, e.g., Ron Chepesiuk, Blocking the Net: Corporations Help Government Shut
Down the Information Superhighway, VERMONT GuARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2001, http://www.thsv.
org/news-details.aspx?newsID=783 (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Montagnard Founda-
tion, Secret Trials: Vietnam Sentences More Christian Montagnards to Prison (Nov. 1,
2001), http://www.active.org.au/sydney/webcast/front.php3?articleid=1168 (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2007); see also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Conditions in Vietnam:
July 23, 2002 Testimony of Nguyen Vu Binh, Dec. 29, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/
english/docs/2003/12/29/viema6887.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007); REPORTERS WITH-
OUT BORDERS, VIETNAM-2004 ANNUAL REPORT, Mar. 5, 2004, http://www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id aricle=10227&Valider=OK. But see Press Release, Amnesty Interna-
tional, Vietnam: Freedom for Elderly Prisoners of Conscience, Jan. 31, 2005, http://
news.amnesty.org/index/ENGASA410032005 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
288. See Amitav Acharya, Seeking Security in the Dragon's Shadow: China and Southeast
Asia in the Emerging Asian Order 5-6 (Inst. of Def. & Strategic Studies, Working Paper No.
44, 2003), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP44.PDF (last visited
Feb. 6, 2007) (noting that China refused to accede to Vietnam's demand to have the
2002 Declaration apply to the Paracel Islands, claimed by Vietnam although occupied
FOLLOWING THE PATH OF OIL
Further, the Tripartite Agreement can evidence a deliberate
sidestep from the central legal issues. Just as the 2002 Declara-
tion fails to compel cooperation and sidesteps the competing oil
claims, the Tripartite Agreement outlines a narrow scope of co-
operation for what the countries call a commercial project.
Within the framework of the Tripartite Agreement itself, pre-
sumably, the parties must have reached agreement on a number
of critical issues such as choice of law, confidential undertakings,
the proportionment and assignment of costs, and the delinea-
tion of tasks. Yet, none of these details is revealed to the public.
Further, are there expert contractors performing the Seismic
Study using state-of-the-art technology? If yes, who are they?
Given China's power, the lack of transparency on these terms
can be worrisome. China, with her might, can easily use the
Agreement to subsidize the cost of data gathering and research,
while potentially having full access to the data gathered, at all
times preserving the option to "muscle" Vietnam and the Philip-
pines into a less than equitable position during subsequent joint
development negotiation.
Finally, the other competing sovereignties-Taiwan, Malay-
sia, Brunei, and to a limited extent Indonesia-are not parties to
the Tripartite Agreement. Can the Tripartite Agreement be
seen as an effort at "slicing up" the unity of ASEAN and other
claimants down the road? Viewed this way, the Agreement can
by China, and that this refusal, among other factors, diminishes the 2002 Declaration's
significance as a confirmation of China's willingness to address competing claims on a
multilateral basis). To the internet community of dissident Vietnamese, this type of
.recession" agreement is just another signal that the government of Vietnam has sold
out its sovereignty to China. See supra notes 230-235 (outrage expressed by Vietnamese
in exile opposing the China-Vietnam land border redrawing agreement and Tonkin
Gulf Agreements).
As a matter of human interest, the author notes here the specific case of Nguyen
the Toan, an exiled Vietnamese lawyer who used to practice in the now defunct Repub-
lic of Vietnam. A political immigrant and currently the owner of a restaurant in north-
ern Virginia, where dissident Vietnamese in exile often congregate, Mr. Toan drafted a
document entitled "Indictment" condemning the Vietnamese Communist Party for sell-
ing Vietnamese territory to the Chinese Communist Party. He distributed his "Indict-
ment" to the patrons of his restaurant as a gesture showing his American freedom of
speech, with the intent of one day filing this "Indictment" in the name of the Statehood
of Vietnam before the ICJ to seek a declaratory judgment rendering the recession of
Vietnamese territory invalid. The author received a copy of the "Indictment" during a
visit to his restaurant this year. See Nguyen the Toan, Indictment of the Vietnamese
Communist Party for Its Criminal Act of Ceding the Nation's Territory to China (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author).
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ultimately deepen divisions and discord. The real impact of the
Tripartite Agreement, or what is truly behind it, remains specula-
tive and opaque.
C. JDA Between Nigeria and Sdo Tom4 e Principe-The Joint
Authority Model and the Issue of Equal Bargaining
Power Between the Signatory States
On February 21, 2001, the Federal Republic of Nigeria ("Ni-
geria") and the Democratic Republic of Sdo Tom6 e Principe
("Si.o Tom6") signed a bilateral treaty creating aJDZ (the "Nige-
ria-Sio Tom6 Treaty" or "Treaty").289 This Treaty was ratified by
the respective governments in February 2002. The JDZ sub-
sumes contested waters in the Atlantic Ocean south of Nigeria
and north of Sio Tom. 29 ° Sixty percent of revenue generated
from the JDZ goes to Nigeria and forty percent to Sdo Tome. 291
Sdo Tom6, the smaller State, is the minority interest holder. The
Treaty creates (i) an Authority who acts on behalf of the two
nations and enters into petroleum contracts with the private sec-
292tor, and (ii) a Joint Ministerial Council ("Council") that over-
sees the Authority's actions.293
At first sight, it must be noted that the pairing of Nigeria
and Sdo Tom6 in this bilateral Treaty represents the same kind
of disparity in power, size, and economic wealth as exists in the
case of Vietnam and China. Analyzing the nature of the joint
development relationship between Nigeria and Sdo Tome re-
quires an understanding of each country. Sdo Tom6, the second
smallest country in Africa, achieved independence from Portu-
gal in 1975. Since 1991, the country has boasted a multiparty
democracy, withstanding unsuccessful military coups in 1995
and 2003.294 Its elections were reportedly fair and peaceful in
general, although political instability, weak institutional struc-
tures, and corruption have damaged and retarded Sdo Tome's
289. See Nigeria-Sdo Tome Treaty, supra note 169.
290. See id. art. 2
291. See id. art. 3.1.
292. See id. art. 9.
293. See id. arts. 6, 8.
294. See Gerhard Seibert, Sdo TomW e Principi: The Difficult Transition from Aid-depen-
dent Cocoa Producer to Petrol State 1 (Afr. Studies Ass'n of Austl. & Pac. Annual Confer-
ence, Nov. 26-28, 2004), http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/global/afsaap/conferences/
2004proceedings/seibert.PDF (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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political process.295 With an estimated gross domestic product
("GDP") of US$214 million 296 and an external debt (as of 2003)
of US$282.5 million, its largely agricultural economy is not par-
ticularly strong.29 7 The combination of a weak economy and
high external debt likely prompted Sdo Tom6 to seek wealth
through oil revenues, as many of its neighbors have done. In
1998, the country worked with the Environmental Remediation
Holding Corporation ("ERHC"), a Nigerian-owned company
that has received substantial awards in bidding rounds, to estab-
lish an EEZ that extends 200 miles from its land.298 Sdo Tom6
has lodged its claimed EEZ with the U.N.299 Over the course of
three years, Sdo Tome was able to reach agreements with Equa-
torial Guinea and Gabon on the boundaries of their maritime
borders based on the principle of equidistance. Unable to con-
clude a similar delimitation agreement, Nigeria and Sdo Tome
decided to create aJDZ. °° A comparison of maps shows that the
JDZ subsumes a considerable part of Sio Tome's EEZ, and ap-
pears significantly closer to Sdo Tome's territory. °1 Thus, it is
possible even for a layperson to observe the possibility that Sdo
Tome may have compromised its EEZ claim in order to secure
the JDZ with Nigeria. Furthermore, as a newcomer to the oil
industry (Sao Tome has never produced oil),3°2 Sdo Tome may
not be familiar with the oil industry and may accept the JDZ in
exchange for guidance and expertise from oil-producing Nige-
ria.
In comparison, Nigeria is a much more powerful and glob-
ally significant country, nearly twice the size of California and
295. See id.
296. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SAo TOMt AND PRINCIP9, https://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tp.htm(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
297. See id.
298. See Seibert, supra note 294, at 3-4.
299. See Law 1/98 on Delimitation of the Territorial Sea and the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone art. 1 (Sao Tom6 & Princip6), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/STP.htm.
300. See Seibert, supra note 294, at 8.
301. SeeJoiNT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GUIDE TO THE 2004JDZ LICENSING ROUND
21 (2004), http://www.nigeriasaotomejda.com/PDFs/DZ%20Brochure.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2006); see also DOALOS, United Nations, Sao Tomle and Princip6 Official
Maritime Claims, http://www.un.org/Depts/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF
FILES/MAPS/STP MZN17_1998b&w.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Petroleum Geo-
Services ("PGS"), Nigeria-Sao Tom( and Principe Joint Development Zone MC3D,
http://www.pgs.com/upload/29685/data.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
302. See Seibert, supra note 294, at 1.
2007] 1181
1182 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1098
boasting a GDP of $125.7 billion.3"' Approximately twenty per-
cent of its GDP comes from oil revenues, although eighty per-
cent of these revenues flow to only one percent of the popula-
tion. 04 Historically, its government and military have been ac-
tively involved in promoting and protecting the country's oil
industry and related infrastructures. Accusations of corruption
and cronyism have circulated concerning the government and
its oil dealings for many years. Oil has dominated the Nigerian
economy for decades, but poverty has worsened.3 °5 Corruption
and inefficiency among government officials, oil company staff,
and local contractors are regarded as the chief cause of this pov-
erty and slow development, despite the country's wealth of oil. 3 6
This Treaty represents the Joint Authority Model, which
purportedly secures the equal participation of the negotiating
States. However, the lack of transparency and specificity renders
it inefficient as a model for the securing of equal bargaining
powers between the two governments and the people they alleg-
edly represent.
1. The Council
Article 6.2 of the Treaty states that: "[T]he Council shall
comprise not less than two nor more than four Ministers or per-
sons of equivalent rank appointed by the respective Heads of
State of each State Party."30 7 This provision does not necessarily
secure an equal number of Ministers from each signatory State,
although there are Treaty safeguards to make sure that repre-
sentatives of both signatory States participate in decision-mak-
ing. For example, "[t]he quorum for a valid meeting of the
Council shall be at least half the members, including at least one
appointed by each of the States Parties," and "[a]ll decisions of
303. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK NIGERIA, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publica
tions/factbook/print/ni.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
304. See ELIAS JOHNSON, NIGERIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF 6 (Dep't of Energy, En-
ergy Info. Admin., 2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2007).
305. See Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in
Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L COM. REG. 121, 127-
28 (2004). More recently, petroleum activities in the volatile Niger Delta have report-
edly been interrupted due to political unrest. See Joe Bavier, Niger Delta Oil Companies
Shut Some Facilities, Withdraw Workers, VOA NEWS, Sept. 23, 2005.
306. See Duruigbo, supra note 305, at 139.
307. See Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 Treaty, supra note 169, art. 6.2.
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the Council shall be adopted by consensus. '30 ' Furthermore,
"no decision of the Council shall be valid unless it is recorded in
writing and signed by at least one member from each State
Party. '30 9 Council meetings require the presence of at least one
minister from each State, and decisions require adoption by con-
sensus and signature by at least one minister from each State.
The Council has ultimate power over joint development. It
is charged with approving development contracts proposed by
the Authority, to be entered into with private contractors.
Under specific circumstances, the Treaty allows the Council to
provide direct input into the management of the Authority, and
not just acting as an overseeing body. For example, the Council
may assign Executive Directors to head departments of the Au-
thority in positions such as Secretary and Head Secretariat.
2. The Authority
Accountable to the Council, 310 the Authority can acquire
and dispose of property, manage activities relating to the explo-
ration and exploitation of the resources, and oversee and con-
trol the activities of the contractors.3"' The Authority's decisions
requires consensus, although "[w]here consensus cannot be
reached, the matter shall be referred to the Council. ' 312 Gov-
erned by a Board of Directors ("Board"),3 13 the Authority has
legal personality and can act on behalf of the States.' 14 The
Board consists of four Executive Directors.315 Two are ap-
pointed by the Head of State of Nigeria and two are appointed
by the Head of State of Sdo Tome. 316 To constitute a meeting of
the Board, at least one appointee from each State must be pre-
sent. 1 7 Thus, at least on the surface, the structure allows equal
participation by the States in management and decision-making.
Executive Directors normally hold office for six years, renewable
308. Id. arts. 7.1, 7.4.
309. Id. art. 7.6.
310. See id. art. 8.2(f).
311. See id. art. 9.6.
312. Id. art. 10.5.
313. See id. art. 10.1.
314. See id. art. 9.2.
315. See id. art. 10.1.
316. See id.
317. See id. art. 10.4.
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once "or until a replacement is appointed."318 These directors
then appoint other personnel, subject to the Council's ap-
proval. 1' To be valid, Board decisions must be recorded in writ-
ing and signed by at least one Executive Director from each
party.32
0
The Authority is seated in Abuja, Nigeria, with a subsidiary
office in Sio Tom6. 32' The management structure of the Au-
thority and its decision-making process is perhaps more bal-
anced than that of the Council. After all, under the Treaty, two
representatives from each State comprise the Board.3 2
3. Balancing of Power Between the Two Signatory States,
Transparency, and Corruption
Public information as of the date of this Article indicates
that the Council may now consist of twelve members 323 who are
foreign affairs and energy ministers from Nigeria and So
Tom6.3 24 Nonetheless, no public information can be found to
determine whether the composition of the Council allows for
equal numbers of Nigerian and So Tom6 ministers. Nor is pub-
lic information available as to whether safeguards are built into
the appointment process to avoid nepotism or conflicts of inter-
est, or on the balance of power among the ministers (for exam-
ple, whether Nigeria as the majority interest holder enjoys a
greater say either de jure or de facto). The unavailability of this
type of information hinders transparency in a part of the world
notorious for corruption-Nigeria, in particular, has frequently
been cited by Transparency International as one of the most cor-
318. Id. art. 10.1.
319. See id. arts. 10.2, 10.8.
320. See id. art. 10.7.
321. See id. art. 9.4.
322. As of the date of this Article, the two Nigerian representatives to the Board
are H.A. Tukur, Executive Director of Finance and Administration, and S.U. Obiorah,
an engineer who is Executive Director of Monitoring and Inspections. See Press Release,
Nig.-Sdo Tom6 & PrincipeJoint Dev. Auth., Two New Executive Directors Appointed to
the JDA Board (Oct. 29, 2004), http://www.nigeriasaotomejda.com/PDFs/New%20
Directors.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). Sdo Tom6's representatives are Carlos Gomes,
an engineer who is Chairman of the Board of the Council and Executive Director of
Commercial Investments, and Dr. Jorge Do Santos, Executive Director of Non-Hydro-
carbon Resources. See id.
323. See Oil Block Award Runs into Rough Weather, LIQUID AnuCA, May 24, 2005.
324. John C.K. Daly, UPI Energy Watch, WASH. TiMEs, May 23, 2004, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/up-breaking/20040426-033305-2012r.htm.
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rupt regimes in the world.3 2 5 Recent reports allege that Sdo
Tom6's President, Fradrique de Menezes, denounced the Au-
thority's contract recommendations in the 2004 licensing round.
Sio Tom6's President claimed that indigenous Nigerian firms
with connections to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo were
awarded significant interests in the blocks.32 6
The Treaty gives considerable power to Nigeria and Sdo
Tom6's Heads of State to appoint whomever they want to the
Authority's Board of Directors and to its overseeing body, the
Council. Given the region's history of development problems
and corruption, it seems likely that the Treaty scheme indulges
the Heads of State to appoint friends, family, or industry leaders,
and to award contracts to companies who have been loyal to
each respective government. For example, Article 15 of the
Treaty states that, "[u] nless otherwise expressly approved by the
Council, no Executive Director, officer, or other staff member of
the Authority may have any.., financial interest in development
activities in the Zone."3 27 However, this conflict of interest safe-
guard does not apply to the appointment of the ministers serv-
ing on the Council. Further, the provision also allows the Coun-
cil to make exceptions to the financial interests safeguards,
thereby nullifying the protection, at the discretion of the Coun-
cil.
4. Compromise of Sovereignty and the Vulnerability of the
Smaller, Lesser-Developed State-The Dilemma of
the Minority Interest Holder
Given the disparity in size, economic wealth, and political
power between the two States, it is no surprise that Sao Tom6
and Nigeria have established aJDZ that subsumes large portions
of Sdo Tom6's claimed EEZ. While Sdo Tome managed to enter
325. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2006, 298-302 (2006),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download-gcr#download.
Transparency International ("TI") cites Nigeria as the sixth most corrupt country of the
159 surveyed in TI's corruption perceptions report, a composite index that utilizes
surveys of business people and country analysts. Nigeria is therefore perceived as being
more corrupt than even countries which have recently been plagued by civil war such as
Somalia, Sudan, and Iraq.
326. See Mike Oduniyi, Protests Stall Award of Oil Blocks inJDZ, THIS DAY (Nigeria),
May 24, 2005; see also Oil Block Award Runs into Rough Weather, LIQUID AFRICA, May 24,
2005.
327. See Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 Treaty, supra note 169, art. 15.1.
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agreements concerning its EEZ with Equatorial Guinea and Ga-
bon, these two States are more commensurate to Sdo Tom6's
economy. Presumably, Sdo TomCs did not carry that same stat-
ure vis-,A-vis Nigeria. Rather than engaging in a protracted, costly
set of negotiations, it was predictable that Sdo Tom6 chose to
reach an accord in order to begin reaping oil revenues. Sio
Tom6 might have asserted a valid legal claim when delimiting its
EEZ, but relinquished this claim when confronted with Nigerian
demands for a piece of the pie-a demand backed by a larger
economy, larger military, and ultimately more bargaining power.
It is unclear whether the 60-40 split reflects the strength of Sio
Tom6's legal claim.
Finally, the unequal 60-40 split that might appear to be an
unwise, counterproductive arrangement between Sdo Tom6 and
Nigeria can also signal the specter of corruption within Sdo
Tom6,3 2 8 corroborated by news reports regarding irregular busi-
ness dealings between Sdo Tom6 and the oil industry. 29 An as-
tute observer cannot help but raise the question: apart from the
lack of bargaining power, is it possible that Sdo Tome agreed to
a 60-40 split in the JDZ because its leaders were concerned with
filling their own pockets, and a quick agreement with Nigeria
would likely further this goal? The lack of transparency in the
developing world's confidential negotiations necessitates the in-
quiry and makes room for speculation.
5. Selection of Private Investors and Operatorship
Under the auspices of the Treaty, the Authority held two
licensing rounds to award upstream petroleum contracts. The
first licensing round lasted six months (April-October 2003),
328. See Siebert, supra note 294, at 20.
329. For discussion of Sdo Tomb's long chronicle of questionable, seemingly cor-
rupt relationships with the oil industry, see generally id. at 12-13. For more recent
reports alleging corruption during the 2004 licensing round (the second licensing
round) and illegal payments by the EHRC to the Sio Tom6 government, see Sdo Tom to
Make Public Reaction to Oil Probe, VANGUARD (Nigeria), Jan. 2, 2006 [hereinafter Make
Public Reaction]; see also Zoe Eingstein, Sdo Tomd Says it Needs Nigerian OK to End Flawed
Oil Deals, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 10, 2005 (noting serious irregularities in the block
award procedure); Jacinta Moran, Nigeria, Sdo Tomn to Proceed with Signings, Won't be De-
railed by Sdo Tonw Attorney General's Concerns: Daukoru, PLATrs OLIGRAM NEWS, Dec. 22,
2005. Sio Tomb's government has reportedly conducted an investigation into the alle-
gations, although as of the beginning of 2006, its report has not been released. See Make
Public Reaction, supra.
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and resulted in the award of only one block in the JDZ. Chev-
ron-Texaco was awarded a fifty-one percent stake, Exxon-Mobil
was awarded a forty percent stake, and Dangote-Energy Equity
Resources was awarded a nine percent stake.3 °0 In other words,
during the first licensing round, prestigious bidders were given
six months to put together bids and proposals.
In contrast, in 2004, the Authority held the second licensing
round, but kept it open for only one month, giving contractors
the minimal time and a very fast track to meet financial and
technical requirements. The difference in the time duration al-
lotted to each of the two licensing rounds could appear ques-
tionable to any observer, especially when only one block was
awarded during the first round, which lasted half a year, com-
pared to the five blocks that were awarded during the second
round, which lasted only one month. One would likely think
that the situation should have been the reverse-that much less
time should have been allotted to the first licensing round-the
award of one single block, compared to the second round-the
award of five blocks! The Authority gave no other public expla-
nation for this seemingly incongruent phenomenon, other than
what it had announced to the press.'
Consequently, under this fast-track procedure, the 2004 li-
censing round resulted in the award of five more blocks to con-
sortia consisting of a number of U.S. companies, Nigerian com-
panies, and an Indian company. 332 The second round attracted
smaller, relatively unknown independent entrepreneurial com-
panies of lesser stature than the prominent multinationals like
Chevron-Texaco and Exxon-Mobil. Thus, the nature of these
330. See Nigeria; "WhyJDZ is Offering Four Blocks in Next Licensing Round, " AFR. NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2004 (on file with author); see also OFF. OF THE Ayr'Y GEN., SAO TOME AND
PRINCIPE, INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW: SECOND BID RoUNDJOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE 2-9
(Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW: SECOND BID ROUND] (on file
with author).
331. The other blocks were not awarded during the first licensing round. The
Authority claimed it "needed additional time to review the conditions for eligibility in
terms of financial and technical capability of the bidders as well as the quality and
coverage of data." See Okiemute Akoko, Further Block Awards Not Discussed at Joint Ministe-
rial Council Meeting, WORLD MARKETS RES., June 18, 2004 (on file with author).
332. The Nigerian companies included Conoil, Hercules, Overt, (all in Block 4)
and Filtim Huzod (in Block 6). SeeJacinta Moran &James Norman, Addax Takes Spot in
Nigeria-Sdo TomeJDZ Replaces US' Noble Energy in Deepwater Block 4, PLATrs OLIGARM NEWS,
Nov. 2, 2005. ONCG Videsh was the Indian company awarded the 2d block. See Neil
Ford, Sdo Tom4 So Near, Yet So Far, AFRICAN BUSINESS, Aug. 1, 2005.
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bidders should have resulted in more time given them to justify
their technical experience, financial capabilities, and industry
experience. Yet, these small independents had only a month to
satisfy and respond to bidding requirements, including the task
of proving their financial and technical capabilities. Questions
may legitimately be raised whether these smaller, lesser-known
companies were pre-approved under less than transparent crite-
ria applied by the Authority, or whether the multinationals in
the first licensing rounds were given favoritism (i.e., much more
time to bid and work out their alliances) because of their stature
and existing governmental relationships. Overall, a neutral ob-
server cannot help but return to the perplexing question: Why
was the second round licensing round open for a much shorter
period of time than the first licensing round?
News reports point to some of the possibilities, centering on
the awardees for the second round. For instance, the President
of Sio Tom6, Fradrique de Menezes,333 complained that the in-
digenous Nigerian companies awarded interests in the blocks
are connected to the Nigerian Presidency.334 This allegation
seems to have some backing. ERHC, a company incorporated in
the United States but owned by a Nigerian business man (with
ties to the President Obusanjo) 5 enjoys a thirty-six percent
stake in the entire licensing round spread out over all five
blocks, with a sixty percent majority stake in block four,3 36 the
most sought-after contract area. 3 7 ERHC has little experience
in deep sea drilling. 3 8 Charges of corruption and bribery sur-
round Sdo Tom6 leaders' relationship with ERHC.1 9 Suspicion
also surrounds Filtim Huzod, a relatively unknown player in the
industry with little to no previous experience in deep sea drill-
ing, who was nonetheless awarded an eighty-five percent interest
in block six.340 The company is allegedly owned by former
333. See Oduniyi, supra note 326.
334. See id.
335. See Ford, supra note 332; Seibert, supra note 294, at 9.
336. See, e.g., INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW: SECOND BID ROUND, supra note 330, at 4-
10.
337. See Oduniyi, supra note 326; JDZ Licensing: Conoil on the March Again, THIS DAY
(Nig.), Dec. 27, 2005.
338. See Ford, supra note 332; Seibert, supra note 294, at 13.
339. See Siebert, supra note 294, at 4-6, 9-11.
340. See Afrol News, Sdo Tom.eNigeria Oil Blocks Finally Awarded (June 1, 2005),
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Nigerian politicians.34 ' In addition, A. & Harman, Godsonic Oil
and Gas, Momo Oil, and Equinox Oil and Gas are allegedly con-
nected to high-level Nigerian politicians and military officials.34 2
Finally, in block five, International Commerce and Communica-
tions, a Cayman Islands registered company, and Oil Explora-
tion Consortium, formed in Texas, were jointly awarded a sev-
enty-five percent interest. Both were relatively unknown compa-
nies.34 3
Overall, most of the awardees in the second round remain
largely unknown. Most of the thirty-three bids submitted for
pieces of the licensed blocks came from smaller, independent
firms. 4 4 The possibilities of irregularities and self-serving inter-
ests that might have accounted for the very short bidding period
for the second round remain a mystery.
On the other hand, it is very evident that the second round
resulted in awards given to indigenous Nigerian companies or
smaller-statured entrepreneurs, rather than conventional indus-
try leaders of the West that already hold firm footings in the re-
gion and in the JDZ (by virtue of the first licensing round)."'
The Authority should be commended for that result. After all,
the gist of the development theory is to empower local stake-
holders to advance local industry and lessening reliance on the
West, but the theory would only work if the diversification ex-
tends beyond the country's elites. It should be noted that while
Sdo Tom6 holds a forty percent stake in the JDZ by virtue of its
territorial claim, no Sdo Tom6 companies formed bidding con-
sortia for partly owned interests, or entered bids of their own.3 4 6
http://www.afrol.com/articles/16483 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007); see also Ford, supra
note 332 (noting that Filtrim Huzod is a "lesser known company").
341. See id.
342. See Oduniyi, supra note 326. A. & Hartman was awarded ten percent of Block
2. Godsonic Oil and Gas was awarded five percent of Block 4. Momo Oil & Gas was
awarded a five percent stake in Block 2, along with three other companies, listed as
SOJITZ, IMT Int., and NISSHO IWAI. Equinox Oil and Gas is sharing a ten percent
stake in Block 3, along with Equinox & Energy Limitada and with Petrochina. See, e.g.,
INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW: SECOND BID ROUND, supra note 330, at 8. No other public
information is available on these awardees.
343. See Sdo Tond-Nigeria Oil Blocks Finally Awarded, supra note 340.
344. See Ford, supra note 332.
345. See id.
346. See Oduniyi, supra note 326.
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6. De Facto Control Over the JDZ by the Private Sector
Under Article 24 of the Treaty,347 the "obligations of con-
tractors in respect of petroleum activities in the Zone shall be
exclusively determined by the financial terms of petroleum de-
velopment contracts approved under this Article. ' 34 8 Thus,
neither the Treaty nor actual licensing rounds conducted there-
under changes the norms in Third World oil economies: (i) pe-
troleum development contracts are negotiated between big busi-
nesses and State authorities, (ii) the State's need for and depen-
dency on foreign capital and technical expertise would
practically result in significant power resting with the private
contractor, and (iii) the development contract is typically a forti-
fication of a mutually beneficial government-industry relation-
ship. Typically in a JDZ arrangement, instead of negotiating fi-
nancial terms with one government, the private contactor will
negotiate with a coalition of several governments. If a private
contractor maintains an ongoing existing relationship with a
particular government within the coalition, naturally the private
contractor and that government would tend to make a pact in
the negotiation of interests within the Zone. The pattern contin-
ues, and the possibility exists that powerful autocratic govern-
ments and powerful monopolistic players in the oil industry may
continue to lean on each other. The JDZ is just the mechanism
to avoid protracted legal battles without hard-to-predict out-
comes among governments to enable speedy production. In
such a mechanism, powerful States and their industry partners
are well-positioned to occupy the driver's seat.
The confidential nature of negotiation with the private sec-
tor leaves many questions open with respect to the Nigeria-Sdo
Tom6 arrangements. Who are the appointees to decision-mak-
ing bodies and what are their histories? What are the sources of
revenue for State parties-tax, royalty and/or production share,
or a combination thereof? Will there be contractor contribu-
tions for local personnel training, social services or local good-
will programs, as well as environmental protection, workforce
safety, and sustainable development programs? How are these
benefits and goodwill programs, if any, allocated between the
participating States? (Not all of these benefits can be quantifi-
347. See Nigeria-Sdo Tome Treaty, supra note 169, art. 24.
348. See id. art. 24.1.
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able in accordance with the 60-40 percent split.) What are the
safeguards for the minority interest holders in the JDZ decision-
making body (Sdo Tom6 in this case)? Are local citizens em-
ployed in the JDZ, at what level, and from which country? How
much of industry's revenues is being reinvested in Nigeria and
Sdo Tom6, in what way, and under what allocation formula be-
tween the two countries? These questions will have to be ad-
dressed in the development contracts to be spearheaded by and
negotiated with industry. If industry is in bed with its chosen
government in these negotiations to fortify their existing rela-
tionships in the region, it takes no great creativity or a sense of
paranoia to understand that the smaller and less-leveraged State
may be disadvantaged.
D. Recent Development with Respect to the Timor Gap JDZ
On May 20, 2002, Australia and the newly independent
State of East Timor signed the Timor Sea Treaty ("TST"), which
creates a JDZ in the Timor Sea.3 49
On its face, the TST generously allocates approximately
ninety percent of petroleum in the zone to East Timor and only
ten percent to Australia.150 Hence, at first glance, the TST seems
to favor or at least create a balance of power for the benefit of
the smaller State, East Timor. A closer look at the surrounding
circumstances and historical development raises concerns
whether such appearance of balance is only skin-deep, and that
the potential ills as examined in other recent JDZs may also be
lurking.
The TST falls under the 'Joint Authority Model," as with the
case of the Nigeria-Sdo Tom6 Treaty. 51 The TST creates a Joint
Commission with "one more commissioner appointed by East Ti-
mor than by Australia."3 5 2 The Joint Commission is charged
with, inter alia, directing a Designated Authority ("DA"); over-
349. See Timor Sea Treaty, E. Timor-Austl., art. 3(b), May 20, 2002, [2003] A.T.S.
13.
350. See id. art. 4(a).
351. Another example of the Joint Authority Model is the Thailand-Malaysia Joint
Authority created for certain area within the Gulf of Thailand. See supra notes 171-174
and accompanying text (discussing various types of JDZ, including the Joint Authority
Model, comparing the Timor Gap treaty to the Thailand-Malaysia treaty, and classifying
the Thailand-Malaysia treaty as Joint Authority Model).
352. Timor Sea Treaty, supra note 349, art. 6(c) (i).
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seeing the DA's powers and functions; approving its income and
expenditure estimates, procedures, rules, and regulations; and
authorizing, performing, and approving inspections and audits
of the DA's and contractors' books and accounts. 353 Created as a
legal entity with full juridical status,3 5 4 the DA can enter con-
tracts, obtain and dispose of property, undertake the day-to-day
regulation and management of petroleum activities under the
Joint Commission's supervision, 55 as well as other environmen-
tal, safety, record-keeping, and accounting matters. 356 For the
first three years of the TST's term, the DA is appointed by the
Joint Commission.5 After three years, the DA becomes "the
East Timor Government Ministry responsible for petroleum ac-
tivities .... 58
Considering that East Timor has one more representative
on the Joint Commission that Australia and that, after three
years, East Timor's government will take over the DA, the TST
appears fair and East Timor's interest should be well-guarded.
Other provisions add to this sense of fairness and procedural
due process. For example, a Ministerial Council, composed of
an equal number of Ministers from both parties, is empowered
to "consider any matter relating to the operation of [the TST]
that is referred to [the Ministerial Council] by either East Timor
or Australia."359 If the Council cannot settle a dispute, the mater
is resolved under an established dispute resolution procedure.360
Both countries are responsible for negotiating a Petroleum Min-
ing Code that will establish terms for the exploration and devel-
opment of petroleum within theJDZ and for the export of petro-
leum from the area.3 6' Nearly all other matters, including the
construction and operation of pipelines, environmental protec-
tion, and security measure, demand similar cooperation between
Australia and East Timor.36 2
Yet, despite the fairness and balancing of power inherent
353. See id. annex D.
354. See id. art. 6(b) (iii).
355. See id. arts. 6(b) (iii), 6(b) (iv).
356. See id. annex C.
357. See id. art. 6(b)(i).
358. Id. art. 6(b)(ii).
359. Id. art. 6(d)(i).
360. See id. annex B.
361. See id. art. 7.
362. See id. arts. 8, 10, 19.
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and apparent in the TST, East Timor is aggressively seeking a
newJDA to regulate petroleum exploration and development in
the Timor Sea. The facts surrounding the ongoing dispute be-
tween the two countries should pose a legitimate question: Is
the TST's fairness is largely a facade, at least from the perspec-
tive of the Timorese Government? Although the TST establishes
that 90 percent of petroleum shall belong to East Timor,363 the
JDZ covered by the TST subsumes only 20.1 percent of the con-
troversial Greater Sunrise Oil Field ("Greater Sunrise") .364 Geo-
graphically, the Greater Sunrise gas field is closer to East Ti-
mor-the field is situated about 170 kilometers from East Timor
and 450 kilometers from Australia.36 Yet, according to the TST,
the remainder of Greater Sunrise, widely regarded as holding
the bulk of the Timor Sea's petroleum deposits, 366 becomes the
property of Australia.36 7 In other words, the section of Greater
Sunrise included in the TST allegedly holds only a proportion-
ally tiny amount of oil! Thus, no matter how equitably the TST
divides power among East Timor and Australia, its apportion-
ment of the Timor Sea's richest petroleum deposits to Australia
(the Timor Sea's richest nation) prevents the TST from acting as
an equitable solution to the territorial disagreement between
East Timor and Australia. For that reason, despite the signing of
the TST, the two governments continued to seek a new joint de-
velopment agreement. As explained below, the matter recently
reached resolution in February 2007. Under this new develop-
ment, the two State parties each received a 50-50 royalty split for
the petroleum resources in the Timor Sea.368
363. See id. art. 4(a).
364. See id. annex E.
365. See Timor SeaJustice Campaign, Press Release, TSJC Slams Govt "Values" Hy-
pocrisy (Aug. 31, 2005) (on file with author); see also Timor Sea Justice Campaign, Ti-
mor Sea Dispute Background (on file with author).
366. See Nigel Wilson, Dawn at Hand for Sharing Sunrise, AusTRALtAN, Jul. 25, 2005,
at 29.
367. See Timor Sea Treaty, supra note 349, annex E. ("East Timor and Australia
agree to unitise the Sunrise and Troubadour deposits (collectively know as "Greater
Sunrise") on the basis that 20.1 percent of Greater Sunrise lies within the Joint Petro-
leum Development Area ("JPDA"). Production from Greater Sunrise shall be distrib-
uted on the basis that 20.1 percent is attributed to the JPDA and 79.9 percent is attrib-
uted to Australia.").
368. See East Timor Ratifies Deal with Aust over Oil, Gas Carve Up, AAP NEWSWIRE, Feb.
21, 2007 (on file with author); Australia, East Timor Bring into Force Timor Sea Oil Treaties,
BBC MONITORING INT'L REP's., Feb. 23, 2007 (on tile with author).
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1. Pending Negotiation and Proposed Agreement on
Greater Sunrise
In 2003, Australia and East Timor signed the Greater Sun-
rise Unitisation Agreement ("GSUA), which would have given
East Timor an eighteen percent stake in the portions of Greater
Sunrise not subsumed by the TST. East Timor never ratified the
GSUA. The question remains as to why a small, newly formed
Nation might have chosen to sign a bilateral agreement which it
later could never feel comfortable ratifying.
Both countries have since advanced different interpreta-
tions of international law with respect to their legal claims to
Greater Sunrise. This subsequent divergence in the interpreta-
tion of applicable international law apparently had caused East
Timor to reconsider whether the GSUA fairly and equitably di-
vided resources. Based on its 1972 Timor Gap Treaty with Indo-
nesia, Australia argues that the disputed area belongs to it under
the concept of natural prolongation, which allows the "continen-
tal margin" of a coastal state to include the "submerged prolon-
gation of the land mass of [such] coastal state. ' 369 This theory
would allow the boundary, which is significantly closer to East
Timor than Australia, to draw most of Greater Sunrise into Aus-
tralian territory37 Australia maintains that the TST is already a
compromise of Australia's sovereign interest because if the Ti-
mor Trough itself were used as the boundary line (as it should
be under natural prolongation), even more of Greater Sunrise
would fall in Australian territory. Accordingly, Australia asserts
that the TST's 90-10 split is extremely generous. 37
1
East Timor, on the other hand, can raise the argument that
369. See Zou Keyuan, Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
in East Asia: Issues and Trends, 9 SINGAPORE YEARKBOOK OF INT'L L. 37, 50 n.61 (2005)
("The doctrine of natural prolongation is embodied in UNCLOS, which provides that
'the continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the
costal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the
rise."') (citing UNCLOS, art. 76); see also Robert L. Bledsoe & Boleslaw A. Boczek, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAw DICTIONARY 195 (1987) (geographical definition of Continental
Shelf may include "seabed that geologically is not a natural prolongation of lass mass at
all"); PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 J. Craig
Barker &John P. Grant eds., 3d ed. 2004) (distinguishing geological definition of Con-
tinental Shelf from its legal definition, which extends throughout "natural prolongation
of land territory); Clive Schoefield, A "Fair Go"for East Timor? Sharing the Resources of the
Timor Sea, 27 CoNTEMP. SOUTHEAST AstA 255, 264-65 (2005).
370. See generally Zou, supra note 369.
371. See generally Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific, Timor's Struggle to Plan a
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sea boundaries should not be determined by geological factors,
but instead should be fashioned to achieve an "equitable" result,
under modern international law-approximately eighty-nine
percent of delimited maritime boundaries are based on some
form of equidistance. 72 If equidistance principles applied,
much if not all of the disputed territory would belong to East
Timor. 37 1 The countries took their legal positions to the ICJ, but
East Timor cannot have its legal claim adjudicated, because two
months prior to signing the TST, Australia withdrew from the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. 74
The two countries continued working to reach a new agree-
ment over Greater Sunrise, drawing closer to concluding a new
treaty.3 75 It is believed that such a new agreement between East
Timor and Australia on the Greater Sunrise Field would split
royalties 50/50 between the two countries, 76 and would likely
delay the permanent delimitation of maritime boundaries be-
tween Australia and East Timor for fifty years.3 7 7 Such a pro-
posed agreement would certainly result in a more equitable solu-
tion than the currently guiding treaty, the TST, which places ap-
proximately eighty percent of Greater Sunrise, including the
most oil-rich portion, in Australian hands. The young Timorese
State would generate significantly more revenue under the 50/
50 splitting of royalties in Greater Sunrise. Estimates of the
value of oil in Greater Sunrise go as high as US$40 or $50 bil-
lion, 8 though more conservative estimates of US$10 billion
have also been stated.379 The real potential of Greater Sunrise in
terms of actual oil revenue is yet to be discovered or ascertained.
Future With Reduced Aid, Jul. 14, 2004, http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2007).
372. See supra notes 109-113; Schoefield, supra note 369, at 265-68.
373. Timor Sea Justice Compaign, supra note 365.
374. See Schoefield, supra note 369, at 274.
375. See Timor SeaJustice Campaign, A Fair Go For East Timor, (Feb. 2006) available
at http://tsjc.asiapacificjustice.org/news/htm.
376. Timor Sea Justice Campaign, supra note 365; see also Nigel Wilson, Global Busi-
ness Brief, AUSTRAUAN, Aug. 20, 2005, at 32.
377. Timor Sea Justice Campaign, supra note 365; James McLaren & James
Faheym, Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Natural Resources and Energy Law Update-Aug.
2005: Recent Development in the Timor Sea Gas Fields, http://www.mallesons.com/
publications/natural resources/8057036W.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
378. See Simon Montlake, Timor-Leste: Asia's Newest Nation Spites Oil, BANKER, Oct.
1, 2005; see also Wilson, supra note 376.
379. See Wilson, supra note 376.
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As of February 2007, East Timor ratified the newly negoti-
ated International Unitisation Agreement ("IUA") signed in
2006, which allegedly allowed East Timor to earn a fifty percent
royalty split in the Zone, while delaying negotiation for a perma-
nent maritime boundary for fifty years. According to news re-
ports, Woodside Petroleum was and still is the Greater Sunrise
operator under the old as well as the new treaty regime. A few
days later, the Office of the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister
issued a press release announcing that the two States have
reached agreement, confirmed with diplomatic notes, to resolve
the pending disputes, thereby allowing the Greater Sunrise de-
velopment to go forward. The IUA, together with the Certain
Maritime Arrangements in the East Timor Sea ("CMATS")
Treaty, establishes the new legal and fiscal regimes for petro-
leum resources in the Timor Sea. 8 °
The status of the dispute and sovereign behaviors as de-
scribed above fit squarely into the thesis raised above-that the
rich and more powerful State may be able to pressure smaller
States such as East Timor into compromising or relinquishing
valid legal claims in the JDZ solution. The question should be
raised as to why East Timor initially signed on to the TST as well
as the GSUA-the type of commercial treaty that, while benefit-
ing the country, might have granted East Timor much less terri-
tory and oil revenues than it may deserve under international
law. The new treaties have yet been disclosed fully to the public,
although the new terms appear to be quantitatively more
favorable to East Timor. Yet, compromise is the spirit of the JDZ
concept as a practicable solution. When looked at this way, the
JDZ means a concession of principle in exchange for peace!
When we consider the additional fact that the GSUA
(signed by both countries but never ratified by East Timor)
would have endowed Woodside Petroleum, 81 one of Australia's
largest oil companies, with the right to develop Greater Sunrise,
support for this thesis may fully emerge. Any contractor selec-
tion under the newer treaty regime is yet to be implemented and
hence remains to be seen. As of now, it is unclear which com-
380. See East Timor Ratifies Deal with Aust over Oil, Gas Carve Up, supra note 368; see
also Australia, East Timor Bring into Force Timor Sea Oil Treaties, supra note 368.
381. See id.; see also Michael White & Ryan Goss, Australian Maritime Law Update:
2004, 36J. MAR. L. & COM. 253 (2005).
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pany or companies will be given the right to develop the area.
Meanwhile, the complexity of oil processing, including the lucra-
tive and complex operation of shipping petroleum extracted
from Greater Sunrise to either Australia or East Timor for
processing, has been a source of contention.382 Until all of these
issues are formally resolved either diplomatically or contractu-
ally, any discussion will just be speculation, and any sovereign
action observed by the media may just be all part of Realpolitik,
paving a way for the final allocation of economic benefits.
CONCLUSION
Some Observations
Other than JDZs, various other models may also be available
for resolving the South China Disputes. For example, the estab-
lishment of an international natural park3 83 over the Spratlys in
order to modulate and regulate activities on the island, or a
supra-national "Spratly Authority" (analogous to UNCLOS Inter-
national Sea-Bed Dispute Chamber of the Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, or the Mekong River Commission in Asia. 84 ) that can
administer resources. Yet, these ideas remain too ambitious, re-
quiring a coalition of sovereignties in an environment where the
competing interests are not yet ripe to invoke solid agreements
by all States concerned. The challenge is just as complex and
grave as the establishment of a "special purpose" investment
and/or trade bloc for Asia. On the other hand, there is the
growing recognition that the geological complexity of the deep
waters surrounding the Spratlys may not justify the costs of ex-
ploration-offshore exploration in the South China Sea has al-
ways been a costly proposition.
Off and on, the price of oil has more than tripled since late
382. See Schofield, supra note 369, at 273-74.
383. Compare Neal A. Kernkar, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between
India and Pakistan on the Sieachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace
Park, 25 STAN. ENwr'L L.J. 67 (2006), with Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis For Creation of
A New Method of Defining International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo. ENTW'L L. &
POL. Rav. 1 (2005) (discussing the possibility of creating an international park out of
Arctic Ocean by sovereign States bordering Arctic).
384. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 287; MarkJ. Valencia, A Spratly Solution, FAR
E. ECON. REv. (Mar. 31, 2004); see alsoJoyner, supra note 23. For a discussion regarding
the Mekong River Basin, see Adam X. Rix, The Mekong River Basin: A Resource at the
Cross-Roads of Sustainable Development, 21 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH.J. 103 (2003).
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2001."85 The Middle East-the belly button to the world's ex-
isting petroleum resources-continues to be a region of political
turmoil. Outside the Middle East, the wildcat chase for oil con-
tinues. Alternative sources of energy such as electricity have
been explored to address the shortage of oil, but one major fuel
to generate electricity is gas, and gas is also a hydrocarbon like
oil.3 16 If there is going to be an imminent global energy crisis,
the search for petroleum anywhere in the world by any player
will immediately take on the gravity of a global concern. The
future twists and turns of the world economy and global petro-
leum supply may just re-instigate international attention to the
South China Sea and the hydrocarbon reserves it potentially
holds.
China, as one of the two biggest world consumers of oil,3 87 is
a substantial interested party in the South China Sea Disputes.
So far, the high costs and sophisticated technology needed for
deep water drilling, this Sea's geological complexity, its strategic
importance to the region as a shipping route, and the various
territorial disputes, all might have turned this Sea into a mystery.
Currently this "mysterious" Sea does not yet occupy a position of
competition for the Middle East as a major petroleum reservoir
for world consumers.388
The continuous hunt for energy by China and other coun-
tries to fuel their economies has pushed their interest in petro-
leum companies to the forefront. The recent bid by the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation for America's UNOCAL
aroused both media attention and political turmoil before it was
withdrawn. 389 Now China, via the China National Petroleum
385. See, e.g., The Oiloholics, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 2005, at 11.
386. The South China Sea has been proven as a rich reservoir for gas. See supra
note 7 (describing British Petroleum's gas discovery and pipeline project in South
China Sea); see also Song Nguyen & Anh Minh, BP Plans New Gas Pipeline Project in South-
ern Area, SAIGON TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007 (on file with author). Petroleum is defined as
including "any mineral oil or reactive hydro-carbon and natural gas existing in its natu-
ral condition in strata, but does not include coal or bituminous shales or other stratified
deposits from which oil can be extracted by destructive distillation." HOWARD R. WIl-
LIAMS & CHIARLESJ. MEYERS, 8 MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (12th ed. 2003) (emphasis
added).
387. The two biggest consumers of oil are China and the United States. See Energy
Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Top World Oil Consumers-2005, http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables3_4.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
388. See supra note 3.
389. See A Bill to Prohibit the Merger, Acquisition, or Takeover of Unocal Corpo-
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Corporation-allegedly ranked by U.S. Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly in 2001 as the tenth largest among the world's top fifty
petroleum companies-has bought Petro-Kazakhstan, a Cana-
dian oil producer with all of its assets located in oil-rich Kazakh-
stan. 390 The aggressive stand that China must take and is willing
to take to solve its energy needs is evident.
With respect to the South China Sea Disputes, for the past
decades, China has shifted positions. As pointed out earlier, in
the 1990s, China staged wars and aggressively proclaimed its sov-
ereign rights. She then melted down into a conciliatory stance
and reached out to ASEAN via various good faith commitments
to peace and cooperation. Yet, in this decade and amidst those
recent signs of cooperation, China reportedly has subsidized the
fishing trade and increased economic support for Chinese fish-
ing boats in the disputed Spratly area.39
Meanwhile, at least one Chinese advocacy group still main-
tains that the ASEAN claimants had paid "lip service," conducted
political and diplomatic campaigns against China, "invaded" and
"occupied" China's [Spratly] territory, received technological
and military aid and donations from the superpowers (including
the United States, Japan, and India) in order to accomplish the
"China-bashing" task.3 92 To the contrary, China-threat specula-
tors still argue that (i) China's goal has always been to fill the
strategic vacuum in the South China Sea after the end of the
ration by CNOOC Ltd. of China, S. 1412, 109th Cong. (2005); Expressing the Sense of
the House of Representatives That a Chinese State-owned Energy Company Exercising
Control of Critical United States Energy Infrastructure and Energy Production Capacity
Could Take Action That Would Threaten to Impair the National Security of the United
States, H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Press Release, Office of Congressman
Thomas M. Reynolds, Reynolds Challenges China's Bid for UNOCAL-Congressman
Says Proposed Bid Brings UP National Security, Energy Concerns (June 30, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.reynolds.house.gov/index.php?optioncom-content&task=view&id
=61&Itemid=9; Kerry Dumbaugh, Congressional Research Service, China-U.S. Relations:
Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy 4-8 (July 8, 2005), available at http://digital.
library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2005/upl-meta-crs-6695/RL32804_2005JulO8.pdf.
See generally Susan W. Liebeler and William H. Lash III, Exxon-Florio: Harbinger of Eco-
nomic Nationalism?, CATO REv. OF Bus. & GOV'T, http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regl6n1d.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007); China's Economy, ECONOMIST, Aug.
2, 2005.
390. See PetroKazakhstan Deal Receives Court Approval, CHINA ENERGY WEEKLY,
Oct. 28, 2005.
391. See Guangxi Fishermen Receive State Subsidies for Fishing in Spratlys Region, Jan. 26,
2001, http://www.ykien.net/tlviettrung01.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
392. See, e.g., Worrisome Situation, supra note 24.
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Cold War; and (ii) as part of expansionism, once China achieves
reunification with Taiwan, she will push for full control of the
South China Sea and possibly control of Asia.2
The Gloomy Picture for the Developing Coastal State in its
Search for Petroleum and its Assertion of Sovereignty
It is predictable that if the resources of the South China Sea
are confirmed, thereby rendering the Disputes ripe, China will
assert its aggressive stand in the structuring and implementation
of joint petroleum development for the region. Such aJDZ sce-
nario, under the analysis presented in this Article, is the right
environment for the private sector to partner silently with China,
to the detriment of the smaller States. The petroleum sector has
already been concentrated into a handful of players at the top,
as a result of recent multinational mergers. Diversification and
monopolization of international market shares have continued
to be the trend, leaving the world economy in a handful of mul-
tinational corporations with diversified portfolios of interna-
tional assets that transcend industries and sectors.3 94 The mul-
tinationals that make the most money out of China will support
China, and China will line its national interests with those mul-
tinationals' corporate interests to support the silent partnership.
Such a scenario will justify the cynic's pessimism: what good
does law do, if any, in the solving of economic problems? The
"legalization" movement, which pushes for the formation of uni-
versal legal norms to govern economic conduct-is, and has al-
ways been, a byproduct of Realpolitik. 95
393. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea: The
Interplay of Law and Geopolitics, 13 INT'LJ. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 53, 64 (1998); see
also Francesco Sisci, The Spratlys Pact: Beijing's Olive Branch, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Nov. 6,
2002), http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/China/DK06AdO1.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2007).
394. One such example is General Electric ("GE"), which owns substantial inter-
ests in the energy sector (including power-generation/electricity and oil and gas ser-
vices), communication/media, national security, consumer products and household ap-
pliances, and consumer credit financing. See GE, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31,
2005); see also GE, Business Directory, http://www.ge.com/en/company/businesses
(last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
395. One example of the legalization movement is the OECD Convention to Combat
Bribery in International Transactions, Nov. 17, 1997, 27 I.L.M. 1, http://ww.olis.oecd.org.
The Convention came into being as a result of Realpolitik. For decades, U.S. companies,
bound by the prohibitions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, were unhappy that
their counterparts in Europe and Asia were not bound by the same prohibitions. The
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In summary, the complexity of the region and the uncer-
tainty of the South China Sea Disputes render the peac,4ul sur-
face of the Pacific Ocean an illusion indeed. Today's leading
authority on international maritime law, UNCLOS, offers little
help or concrete guidance to the resolution of these Disputes or
related sea-use rights. The competing sovereignties-China and
the ASEAN nations-will end up executing JDA's as a practical
treaty solution for the sharing of natural resources. But such a
solution is imperfect. In such a solution, law will matter little
and Realpolitik will take over. Realpolitik suggests that policymak-
ers of a country will seek to increase their power base, and will
use whatever economic or military methods necessary to accom-
plish these pragmatic goals in their self-interest.
What's more, the South China Sea holds strategic and politi-
cal importance independent of the search for petroleum. The
Spratlys group lies in the crossroads of important maritime
routes leading ultimately to Japan and the United States. The
nation that has sovereign control over the Spratlys, or part
thereof, holds the gateway to those maritime routes. This strate-
gic significance cannot be resolved via a JDA/JDZ, which repre-
sents only an economic compromise. Even with a successful
JDA/JDZ solution, the South China Sea will always hold a secur-
ity flashpoint for the Pacific and can greatly impact the global
economy.
The ASEAN Alliance Proactive Solution
As already explained, in a multilateral economic treaty ne-
gotiation, three possibilities may doom the fate of the weaker
nation or nations. First, the more powerful State will likely team
up with the private sector to safeguard their mutual interests.
Second, the private sector will end up suggesting, fashioning, im-
United States ended up lobbying other industrialized nations to impose similar prohibi-
tions on their corporate citizens, such that U.S. companies would no longer be disad-
vantaged. The Convention came about as the result of the United States' lobbying
efforts, demonstrating the commitment of the industrialized nations (the bribe-giving
countries) to enact similar anti-bribery laws in order to put all multinational corporate
players on the same level playing field in the developing economies (the bribe-receiving
countries). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FIGHT GLOBAL CORRuPTION: BUSINESS RISK
MANAGEMENT 3 (2000), available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/exp_000928.pdf; see
also Wendy Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs in the Search for Oil: Unveiling and Re-exam-
ining the Patterns of "Third World" Economic Development in the Petroleum Sector, 25 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1171, 1246-47 (2004).
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plementing and controlling the framework for joint develop-
ment. Finally, the weaker nation will be left with no choice but
to participate in the lopsided joint negotiation and take its
smaller piece of the pie, considering the worse alternative-an
ultimate military showdown, or continuing economic and politi-
cal pressure from the more powerful State.
These sad possibilities confirm once more the highly theo-
retical nature of "soft" public international law and its heavy de-
pendence on the Realpolitik of international relations. Unless
and until the power dynamics of international relations can be
restructured or shifted based on a new model of globalization-
one that operates strictly on the market forces of supply and de-
mand, a truly meaningful "new international economic order"
for the twenty-first century remains a vision, but not a reality.
This Article simply uses the legal issues in the South China Sea
territorial disputes as the contextual springboard for examining
this gloomy picture. In such a picture, ultimately the poverty-
stricken Third World inhabitants may be "guinea-pigged."
In anticipation of any JDZ solution motivated by Realpolitik,
the ASEAN nations should immediately join forces to counter-
balance the enormous powerbase of China. ASEAN should not
be shy in turning itself into an "international economic cartel."
If and when a silent partnership between China and the petro-
leum private sector occurs at the JDA/JDZ negotiation table for
Southeast Asia, the circumstances will have been conducive to
the real economic and political alliance of ASEAN. The right
context for ultimately the de facto formation of an embryonic
Asia-Pacific Rim investment and trade bloc will then emerge-
born out of pressing economic needs as a creature of circum-
stances, rather than a product of positivism or legalism.
In addition to a real alliance among themselves, the ASEAN
leaders must make not only wise short-term decisions, but also
careful long-term planning. Long-term planning should include
two policies. First, in order to even out and broaden the current
power bases, ASEAN, as a pact, must continue to invest in ongo-
ing conciliatory diplomatic ties with other superpowers (includ-
ing Japan, Russia, North America, Australia, and Western Eu-
rope), as well as the developing Europe, Africa, and Latin
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America-a notion of "preventive diplomacy." '396 In addition,
ASEAN as a bloc (and not just individual Member States) must
invest in stronger and broader economic relations with all such
countries and potential trading partners. This will help solidify
ASEAN's strength and unity. Second, even with Realpolitik con-
siderations, ASEAN leaders must invest long term in their peo-
ples. Call it idealistic, but in a world of Realpolitik, this premise
demands our belief. The only Realpolitik that truly works long-
term for leaders of the developing nations is the kind of Realpoli-
tik that represents an investment in the people, because the peo-
ple constitute the labor and consumer force-the real impetus
for supply and demand, and the backbone of the economy. The
ASEAN leaders, facing their seas of challenges, must do all it
takes to let their peoples mature and prosper, not only economi-
cally but also intellectually and emotionally (for lack of a better
description). Economic prosperity means savvy macro and
micro-economic measures to quickly create a healthy middle
class and close the gap between the rich and the poor in South-
east Asian societies. Intellectual and emotional prosperity
means emphasis and concentration on education, civil liberties,
self-reliance, and a rule-of-law system.
It is only in this long-term vision that ASEAN can hope to
become an alliance of strength in order to secure its place at any
JDZ negotiation table or sovereignty discussion, and ultimately
its future as an potential investment and trade bloc vis-d-vis any
counterpart, whether it be China, Japan, Russia, America, or Eu-
rope.
An After-Thought: Idealism vs. Realpolitik-
The Interest of the People
By now, it is hoped that this Article and others have amply
demonstrated the impact of Realpolitik on petroleum transac-
tions in the South China Sea and the resolution of related terri-
torial disputes. The kind of Realpolitik that results in a silent
partnership between the giant monarch and the monopolistic
corporate mogul as a fact of life will not cause any harm unless it
detriments the lives of the most vulnerable sector: the people of
East and Southeast Asia. More broadly, this can mean the peo-
396. See, e.g., Hasjim Djalal, Preventive Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific, JAKARTA POST, Aug.
26, 1998.
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ple of the world in a global economy that suffers from rising
energy commodities prices, depleted raw supplies, worsening en-
vironmental problems, and divided politics.
Since previous articles suggested the procedural safeguards
of including the voice of the public interest in private, confiden-
tial petroleum negotiation,397 these safeguards are repeated
here. Somehow, the voice of the public interest, independent of
governments, in the form of aspiring, thriving NGOs and inter-
national NGOs, must be included in the negotiation and imple-
mentation ofJDA/JDZ's, in some form or manner. This will sup-
ply the transparency and watch-dog function needed to assure
that any treaty solution for solving territorial disputes is truly in
and for the best interest of the people regardless of borders.
Building such procedural safeguards via the involvement of non-
governmental organizations is a long-term twenty-first century
project full of obstacles and political nuances. It will indeed be a
long, hard, and bumpy road.
Any treaty resolution of the South China Sea Disputes must
somehow include the voices of the people independent of their
autocratic governments (unless these governments implement
democracy). Preparation for this process may be difficult and
problematic, procedurally and politically, but it must start now.
The process begins, as always, with the passionate, hard-to-
silence public interest lawyer.
397. See supra notes 11, 394.
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